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A peer-reviewed electronic journal
published by the Institute
for Ethics and ISSN 1541-0099 16(1) – June 2007 |
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Individual
and Collective Rights in David Koepsell Journal of
Evolution and Technology - Vol. 16 Issue 1 - June 2007 - pgs 151-159 Abstract Within
the past decade, nearly 1/5 of the human genome has been patented by
corporations, universities and research institutes. This happened with little
in the way of philosophical debate nor ethical inquiry. There are a number of
practical, ethical questions raised by this practice which should be
explored, and which are introduced here, which should inform debate in the
public policy arena regarding the patenting of human genes. Among these
issues are: the ontological status of human genes and persons, the ethics of
ownership of human parts and information, the practical consequences of
undoing the present situation, and issues of justice regarding the practice
of bio-prospecting. 1. The Current
Conundrum The human genome has been mapped, and daily more of its
territory becomes known and understood.
Scientists are discovering the complex web of relationships between
the four-molecule alphabet and the 3 billion base pairs that comprise our
genetic identities, and the ongoing dance of proteins and RNA that results in
our individual existences. The map is
general, giving us a high level view of the landscape, but it is virgin
territory for the most part. We have
yet to understand just how the expression of the data that makes us who we
are actually occurs. Even so, the
outlines of the territories of the map are being claimed, with nearly a
quarter of the genome now staked out by various parties, patented against the
claims of other newcomers.1
In fact, the ability to stake those claims was largely responsible for
the early completion of the Human Genome Project, spurred on by market
competitors, and funded by the future value of ownership of DNA sequences and
the pharmaceutical promise they hold. Numerous authors have considered the practical and ethical issues
involved in granting ownership over parts of the human genome. The range of considerations has spanned
concerns over autonomy, dignity, economic efficiency, and other important
ethical considerations. Certainly,
most people, when confronted with the fact that their genetic code is now
partly owned by a plethora of universities, corporations and research
institutes, visibly blanche and insist that it ought not to be so. It assuredly is so, and a quick search of the
Patent and Trademark Office filings will reveal thousands of patents
currently owned on portions of your genome and mine. How can this be? Is it right? Don’t I own my own genetic code, or isn’t
it a commonly-owned human good? These
questions have been posed, and various ethicists, legislators, lawyers and
theologians have answered in numerous ways.
Some attempts have been made to reconcile these varied points of view
into declarations, codes, and even laws meant to either settle the ownership
question, to create means of remuneration, or to prevent ownership of the
human genome or its parts. Yet
thousands of new patents continue to issue every year, and the public domain
in the human genome continues to shrink. I have written in the past about the nature of intellectual
property in general, arguing that there is no natural right to expressions
(man-made objects, intentionally produced), and that we are free to create
laws regarding the ownership of expressions as we see fit. I have argued that the dichotomy that
pitches “utilitarian” versus “aesthetic” expressions, inherent in the
distinct realms of copyright and patent, is confusing and ontologically
unsound. In truth, expressions are all
of a kind, falling along a spectrum, but in no sense are the natural
categories of patent and copyright law mutually exclusive. I have argued that understanding the errors
of the current ontology of intellectual property leaves us free to
restructure our ownership of expressions in more sensible and efficient ways,
to carry out better the goals of the authors of Article 1, Section 8 of the
U.S. Constitution. Given that
intellectual property law is the currently accepted and yet most troubling
context for discussing whether one ought to be able to exert property rights
over the human genome or its parts, it is natural for me to begin with the
methodology I have used in the past, namely, exploring the underlying
ontological issues and assumptions and considering whether these have a sound
basis, or whether we need a fresh perspective. The literature and ongoing debate regarding the ethics of genome
ownership has so far centered on discussing the following issues: a) Is the
generic human genome part of some collective human heritage? b) Can
individuals exert property rights over their individual genomes? c) Do patents
and other forms of intellectual property protection fairly expedite economic
efficiencies and innovation? d) Can states
or communities justly regulate economic exploitation of populations’ genomes collected
in databases?2 All of these issues are important and worth considering, and
arguments from many viewpoints have been made on all potential sides of these
issues. However, no one has adequately
addressed a much more basic question which would frame each of these
debates. Namely: what are the
relations among the following entities: individuals, populations, species,
the generic “human genome,” and the specific genome of an individual? In other words, we need to work out the ontology of the above-named
entities to better frame the context for the ethical debates about rights,
genes and property. Although there is
clearly an inherent or assumed ontology underlying the present debate, it
seems ill-conceived and worth reconsidering before we draw conclusions. For instance, the current legal and social
framework for ownership rights presently being conferred and recognized seems
at first glance to be unsound, and various attempts to clarify, restrain, or
contain that framework have failed for one reason or another. Let’s look at the current framework and
those attempts to re-conceive it, and ask whether all of these efforts have
jumped the gun, and made erroneous ontological assumptions. 2. The Objects
of Our Study Except for some viruses that rely only on RNA, all living things
are built by the interaction of DNA and RNA within cells and the
environment. Deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) was discovered well before its central function in reproduction, cell
differentiation, development, and ongoing existence of organisms was fully
realized. It consists of four bases,
-- thymine, guanine, cytosine and adenine, -- held together by a phosphate
“backbone” and famously revealed by Watson and Crick to twist in a double
helix. Because thymine always pairs
with adenine and cytosine always pairs with guanine, replicating the three
billion base pair length of a full human genome requires only enzymatic
splitting of that DNA. Although part
of a highly complex process, the simplicity and necessity of the structure of
DNA as revealed through the work of Watson, Crick, Wilkins and Franklin, is
immediately apparent. DNA is the code
upon which the machine of an individual is built, and upon which it builds
its offspring. All of the functioning
of the organism is bound up with this molecule, in conjunction with scores of
other ongoing cellular and biological processes, all nonetheless wholly
dependent for their inception and continuation on that code. Reproduction of all organisms involves the reproduction of the
code of an organism’s DNA to produce a new organism. In the case of parthenogenesis, the
organism’s exact code is merely duplicated (although mutations inevitably
occur over generations). In the case
of sexual reproduction, the codes of two organisms are recombined into a new,
unique individual. While biologists
had noted that certain traits appear to be inherited by offspring with
predictable frequencies, the mechanism of that inheritance was not fully
understood until the role of DNA was revealed. The “genes” responsible for certain traits
are instructions embedded within an entire DNA sequence to turn on and off
the production of various proteins at various stages of development or
function. The entire sequence, all three
billion base pairs, for an individual, exists in each cell of an
organism. As cells differentiate,
however, certain parts of the genome necessary for the proper function of
discrete organs remain switched “on” while others are switched “off” according
to the organ or system in which that cell is situated. DNA is organized into triplets or “codons”
each of which is responsible for the production of a known protein, and
working together constitute genes of various lengths. Codons are the syntax for the language of
DNA. DNA directs protein production and metabolism indirectly by
interaction with messenger RNA, ribosomes and other organelles in each
cell. The nucleus, where the DNA is
harbored, is essentially a central processing unit that mediates cellular and
biological development and function for an entire organism, and it transmits
the evolutionary adaptations of the species from one generation to the
next. In the sense that an entire
species shares much of the same genome, the generic genome is a unique
entity, distinct from each instance of that genome in the form of
individuals. The genome of the species
defines the general characteristics of a species, and the unique genome of an
individual defines the unique characteristics of an individual. Thus the “human genome” is an entity, characterizing
in general the human species, consisting of certain necessary collections of
genes. The “code” analogy is helpful, as indeed we are learning to
decipher the instructions that compose the nearly 24,000 human genes, and to
understand how they relate to the development of individuals of a species,
and to the evolution of a species itself.
This code, however, is unlike most man-made code in that it underlies
the formation of the second critical object of our study, namely – persons. We are only interested in the moral
consequences of owning portions of the human genome because it impacts
persons, and persons are the typical objects of moral consideration. Human beings and persons are distinct
social entities. Human beings can be
dead, or lack consciousness or the capacity for consciousness, but persons
cannot. Persons are conscious or
potentially conscious, rights-bearing, and duty-bound creatures. Critical to our study will be uncovering the relationships among
DNA, genes, the “human genome,” human beings, and persons. At some level, the higher level social
objects we call persons consist of the interaction of the DNA molecule
with a body and its environment. All
of the higher-level functions that we associate with personhood depend
ontologically on the chemical processes forming a person’s day-to-day
development and functioning. Before we
make decisions about the justice of allowing for ownership of parts of the human genome, we ought to
describe fully those relations in order to discern whether property relations
among those entities are proper or even conceivable. 3. The
Framework So Far In the western world, the law of intellectual property has
prescribed the legal bounds for ownership of genes and other portions of the
genome. A number of reasons account
for this, including two important Supreme Court decisions, Chakrabarty
and Moore. Chakrabarty
established the principle allowing for patents on genetically engineered
organisms, and Moore established that individuals do not have
ownership rights over the fruits of discoveries made by harvesting of their
DNA.3 Between these two
cases, and a massive land-grab for parts of the human genome justified by
Celera Corp.’s entry into the Human Genome Project race, the borders of the
current situation were drawn without much in the way of public involvement or
ethical consideration, much less sound ontological investigation. Despite the fiat boundaries set by these
forces, there is no public consensus over the justice of the current situation. Most ordinary people do not viscerally
accept the fact that products of nature, tied up with all human DNA, could be
declared to be private property.
Moreover, no other analogous legal entity enjoys this status. Partly because DNA is “unique,” as argued
by those who promote “genetic exceptionalism,” the current state of affairs
goes largely unchallenged in the public sphere, despite considerable
philosophical objections. The arguments are plentiful and strong in favor of
exceptionalism. DNA is indeed unique,
but there is very little in-depth argument tying together DNA’s clear
uniqueness and its current legal and social status. In order to do that, work, more must be
done than simply highlighting DNA’s uniqueness. What are the relationships among DNA,
identity, personhood, rights, duties and property? Are there any analogous objects that might
inform these issues? A number of conflicting statements from world leaders and
international organizations have challenged the current framework, suggesting
that DNA may be part of a “common human heritage” and thus not prone to
private ownership, or suggesting that individuals themselves own the rights
to their own DNA. These alternative
frameworks have been proposed late in the game, and rarely adopted, to little
net effect in the race to patent portions of the human genome.4 The stakes under the current framework are significant and
should be cause for concern. They are
not alarmist nor simply academic. The
practical consequences of patenting segments of DNA without ethical clarity
about the subject may include increased litigation, costlier research and
therapies, and the potential for significant conflicts regarding
unintentional infringements. The
economic incentives of patent are also significant, and if the current
framework can be sorted out to dampen controversies regarding the practice,
then important research can flourish without unnecessary impediment. Currently, and without adequate reason, DNA
is being treated like software, steam engines, man-made chemical compounds,
and other more likely candidates for patent.
And estimated 20% of the human genome is now claimed under patents
held by corporations, research institutes and universities. It is not yet too
late to consider whether there is a sound theoretical basis for this. a) The
Property Paradigm Property is perhaps one of the oldest concepts in law, and it is
not surprising that it has arisen as a dominant theme in arguments for
control over DNA. The most common
forms of property historically are real property, moveables, and
chattels. Each of these can arguably
arise extralegally, with the brute facts of ownership exerted by possessors
and those who literally stake out the bounds of their possessory
interests. Posession is extralegal in
that it is a fact independent of any legal or social facts. It is a brute fact as described by Searle’s
account of social reality. The legal
and social status of ownership follows the brute facts of possession.5 As I have argued in The Ontology of Cyberspace (Open
Court 2000) there is no “natural” or brute fact possession of the expressions
we protect via intellectual property law.
If we can say that certain forms of natural possessory facts are
legally valid or validated by the legal institutions of property and
ownership, we cannot say anything similar about intellectual property
law. We are free, essentially, to
create intellectual property laws as we wish, unbounded by concerns of
justice and validity with respect to brute facts of possession. Intellectual property is an expedient
designed to improve economic efficiency.
Certain types of objects fit neatly into the categories we have
created for intellectual property law, although the broad category of such
objects is, as I have argued, simply “man-made objects intentionally
produced.” All intellectual property
has, until recently, fallen into this broad category. The subcategories of copyright and patent
have covered the spectrum of those objects whose uses have been primarily
aesthetic to those whose uses are primarily utilitarian, but there is no
natural basis by which to draw clear lines between these two ends of the
spectrum of expressions. Thus, I have
proposed a unitary scheme of intellectual property protection based upon the
ontology of the entities involved and arguments for efficiency. Are we similarly free to define the bounds of ownership and
property rights over the human genome, or are there brute facts grounding
certain valid claims and not others? b.) The Commons Paradigm There is no consensus yet as to whether portions of the human
genome should be granted intellectual property protection, as indeed they are
in the U.S. and a number of states, however some international agreements,
conventions and experts have argued that genetic exceptionalism requires we
treat human DNA not as property to be owned by individuals, but rather as a
common good. The notion of the commons
involves goods which are difficult to contain, over which no natural, brute
facts of ownership are easily exerted, and for which general public
well-being argue against individual ownership. Examples of the world typically agreed to
be a part of the commons include: air, fresh water, airwaves, outer space,
airspace, etc. These sorts of things
cannot be enclosed, and enable the efficient working of markets by the fact
of their common availability. Common
goods may also not be appropriated by one without diminishing its value or
amount to the community in general. Many have argued that ideas too are a
part of the commons, and that intellectual property law unjustly encloses
that which ought not to be enclosed. Various international and regional agreements as well as a
handful of statues have at one time or another described human DNA or the
Human Genome as being part of a “common heritage” and thus unencloseable – in
essence, a common good. Some notable
features of common goods do seem to overlap with features of DNA, namely: it
is not containable or encloseable to any natural exclusion of others, it is
abundant and necessary for people in general to thrive, and it arguably
benefits economic efficiency in some ways for it to not be
circumscribed. On the other hand there
are obvious differences between DNA and other common goods. For instance, each particular individual
genome is unique to the individual, and can be appropriated with no
diminution of its value to the individual.
The same may be argued about the generic “human genome.” Its appropriation does not deprive humanity
in general, and in fact arguably enriches everyone given the health benefits
expected to be achieved by scientific research and technological development
conducted with the help of profits garnered through intellectual property
protection.6 Convincing arguments have been made regarding the strain on
efficiency and drag on innovation that treating the human genome as a commons
might pose. Indeed, with about a
quarter of the territory already claimed, it seems clear that a reversal of
the trend would be costly. But it
should not be too late to inquire into whether a current practice is just, or
philosophically warranted, and as to whether it ought to be adjusted or even
abandoned in light of updated thinking or ethical considerations. 4. Special
Challenges of DNA DNA is clearly unique .
No other chemical or compound directs its own replication as it does. It has evolved a remarkable range of
strategies for replication, resulting in all of the millions of species here
on Earth. Most of those species, in
fact, share much of their DNA. We
share with the fruit fly genes that conduct the same processes, and in all
likelihood share the same historical evolutionary origin. Genetic exceptionalism has not been
reflected in any exceptional legal or social treatment. Why, if DNA is so different than other
types of compounds or objects, is it treated in the law as though it were a
man-made object intentionally produced?
Why are we shoving a double helix into a square hole? There may well be arguments to back this
up, but they have not been well-expressed.
The most frequent arguments have been purely utilitarian, and the
theoretical underpinnings are lacking.7 Ordinarily, products of nature are not granted patent or other
property protection. Yet today, nearly
4000 of the estimated 24,000 human genes are claimed under various patents
held by corporations and universities.
These patents exert claims in most instances over the specific genetic
sequences of the genes – the strings of base pairs that form the genes
themselves, as well as techniques and processes associated with finding those
specific strings. The limits of patent
protection have previously been to inventions which are novel, useful, and
new. Thus, if new naturally occurring
compounds are discovered, no patent protection could issue. Patents could be granted for applications
of the new discovery to processes, or methods of synthesizing those
compounds, but not for the structure of the compound itself. In the case of DNA, there is certainly a
form of legal exceptionalism going on in the Patent and Trademark
Office. Moreover, this exceptional
legal treatment is being urged on the rest of the world through various
international agreements and trade practices.8 DNA poses numerous challenges to the current legal framework for
protection, and may suggest developing an entirely new social and legal
category, recognizing its uniqueness,
First, however, we should unravel the actual nature of the relations
of DNA to individuals, and species. We
must delve into the ontology of the genome and its relationship to persons. 5. Property
and Parts As discussed briefly above, certain types of legal ownership are
reflections of brute facts regarding possession that make such legally
recognized rights and duties grounded.
Justice reflects an accurate correlation of law and natural states of
affairs. For instance, legal codes
that recognize theft as conferring property rights are unjust. The sorts of things that can be owned
legally are those whose possession can be asserted openly, publicly and
maintained through various social acts.
Those sorts of things that cannot be stolen or adversely occupied are
generally treated as commons. An
in-depth analysis of property and property relations ought to precede
determining that DNA can be property.
Along the way, we will have to consider whether DNA is more like
intellectual property, under which protection is currently granted, or more
like other forms of property. We may
in fact discover that DNA is a unique type of object fit for unique property
protection, or none at all. We may also determine
that DNA is not a distinct entity, but rather a part of another entity. This is an important distinction because
the law does not recognize property rights in one’s own body parts. We might inquire into the justice of this
prohibition, but it seems to be a rather universally accepted norm that one
cannot alienate one’s own body parts at whim.
Is there a sound ontological basis for treating body parts this way? If so, is DNA to be treated like a body
part?9 In determining the relation of DNA to individuals, we will need
to discern the mereology (the study of parts and boundaries) and topologies
of highly complex objects. In so
doing, we will need to elaborate the nature not just of the DNA that instructs
the formation of a person, but of a person itself. One reasonable conclusion of our
investigation may be that DNA and persons are holistic objects, incapable of
reductionism, Such a conclusion would have significant implications for how
we ought to treat DNA legally and socially.
6. Ethics and
Method So far, those who have considered the issues raised above have
done so by analogy, or by applying ethical theories of various sorts
(utilitarianism, Kantianism, etc.) to the present legal and social status of
human DNA. This has been putting the
cart before the horse. It assumes too
much about the nature of DNA to accept its current classification while
arguing either for or against the ethics of its ownership. The best literature on the subject has
argued for genetic exceptionalism, pointing out DNA’s unique nature.10 Neither those who have done this good work,
nor those who have prematurely argued either for or against the ethics of DNA
ownership, have done the foundational work of describing the objective
relations among genomes, genes, individuals, persons and species. Only by first describing these relations
can we begin to consider the justice of treating DNA as property or as a
commons, or as something entirely new. While I do not wish to argue from a particular ethical theory,
neither utilitarianism nor Kantianism, nor some other fixed ethical
standpoint, I do assume that there is such a thing as Justice. Part of my argument will involve defending
the claim that certain laws are grounded and others are not. If in fact there is no justice, and
laws bear no relation to it, then there is no sense in evaluating the justice
of any particular system or institution as against any other. I also assume that even those who call
themselves Utilitarians care about justice.
Utilitarianism concerns itself also with the “good” and is thus an
ethical theory by which justice is often measured. There are many flaws more able
philosophers have noted with both pure deontological and pure utilitarian
theory. For instance, utility is
itself based upon an arbitrary yet absolute value: happiness. Deontological theories of the good are
flawed because they must admit of defeasible values, and evils must be weighed
one against another. These objections
and arguments are well-known. While
the first stage of our investigation will seek to uncover the ontology of the
genome in relation to persons, etc., we will at some point wish to make
decisions about the justice of the present state of affairs as
measured against other possible states of affairs. In so doing we will look to bolster
arguments I have mentioned so far in passing, regarding the groundedness of
certain legal institutions and objects, allowing for us to call certain of
them “valid” and others not. We will
also consider, for those not swayed by this definition of Justice, the
economic utility of various schemes of treatment of human DNA. Ultimately, I will argue that our normative ethical decisions about
property as an institution precede theory, and that pure ethical theories
fail because they are not themselves scientific. They start from first principles, rather
than observation. Institutions, laws,
rules and customs are based, at some point, on brute facts. It is at that nexus, between
pre-institutional or extralegal facts, and the institutions we devise, that Justice
is instituted or fails. Observation of
brute facts, and careful examination of necessary relations that exist
pre-institutionally, pave the way for decisions about how or whether laws,
customs or social norms are supported by the brute facts of the world. 7. An Outline
for The Investigation Our first step will be to look carefully at the science of the
relations among the smallest constituent parts of our study, namely, the
biochemistry of the genome. How are
genes formed from their organic components, how do they interact with the
environment, both at the cellular level and extracellularly, to produce
proteins, and how do those proteins interact with the environment and each
other to create a functioning unique organism? This inquiry will lead us to our first big
philosophical puzzle: how does the mechanism described by these processes
correlate to the social object we call a “person?” We will consider some problems of genetic
determinism, including the role of genes in forming behaviors, and the role
of the environment in interacting with genes and behaviors to shape the
social continuants of, for instance, George Bush or Osama Bin Laden. The link between personhood and the genome
is crucial to discerning whether DNA ought to be treated as property, part,
or as some other object given that the social and legal institutions of
property and ownership only apply to persons. Next we will look into the relationships among individuals and
species. DNA is not like any other
known compound in that each individual’s genome is unique, but all DNA shares
certain general features.11
How are the general features of DNA reflected in the “human genome” as
opposed to individual genomes? How are
these similarities and differences reflected in individuals of a species
versus the species itself? Uncovering
these relations should help us discern the nature of individual or collective
rights, if any, over the human genome or individual, unique genomes or their
parts. We will examine the dimensions of gene ownership under current
regulatory and legal regimes internationally.
We will look also at cultural norms regarding ownership in general,
and consider the application of various property and ownership norms to the
special characteristics of the human genome and individuals’ genomes. We will also look at the current dominant
scheme of intellectual property protection for genes, consider to what degree
genes are like other forms of intellectual property, and the degree to which
they differ. We will then compare this
with objects that are generally considered to be part of the “commons” and
analyze the ontology of common goods versus property in general before
applying this to the special problem of the human genome. To what degree is the notion of a commons
supported by the world of brute facts, and can an argument be made that the
human genome is a part of that world? In the process of considering the above, we will examine
arguments in favor of moral realism based upon the “groundedness” of legal
and social institutions. Examples from
the relatively uncontroversial world of real property, moveables, and chattels
will be compared with the human genome and individual genomes. We will also continue to discuss the
relation between justice and groundedness under this version of moral
realism. Because we are concerned not just with pure theory, we will
delve into practical considerations of both the current scheme of DNA
protection and potential alternatives.
What are the economic consequences of patent and other forms of
protection?12 What results
could we anticipate from treating DNA as a commons, and are there other
possible means of achieving the goals of justice and spurring innovation by
economic reward? Finally, we will synthesize the results of the investigation to
determine whether there is reason to accept the current situation, to modify
it, or to revise it entirely. This
holistic approach to the problem has not yet been conducted, and only by
considering first the underlying ontological assumptions and applying them to
existing and accepted norms of ownership and ethics may we reach considered
opinions as to justice, which is our ultimate concern regarding DNA, the
human genome, and ownership rights. 8. The
Challenge Ahead Like it or not, we have plunged headlong into a world where
large portions of the organic code that is responsible for the development
and functioning of every living human being, and generations to come, is
claimed as owned by various individuals, corporations, and institutions. These bits of code, in the forms of whole
genes, Expressed Sequence Tags (ESTs which indicate where certain genes are
located) and even Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs, which are unique
changes in a single base pair), cannot be manipulated, replicated, or
innovated upon without infringing the ownership of the patent holders. There are real-world effects to this
ownership, including undeniable effects on further development and research
of the function and structure of the human genome. Groundbreaking pharmaceuticals, and greater
understanding of the interactions between genes and health are coming to light
every day as a result. Meanwhile, we
are also experiencing increased litigation, and costs associated with
it. The complexity of the patent
system, combined with the complexity of the genome, make inadvertent
infringements and thus litigation inevitable If the current situation were ethically clear, then people would
not react as they generally do when presented with the news that 20% of their
genome is owned by someone. It is
viscerally uncomfortable, and I suggest it is so because it conflicts with something
we sense or know about the brute facts of our world and property relations
that we tend to accept versus those we do not. Before we move further in the direction we
are headed, we ought to sort out the relations among DNA, genes, human beings
and persons, and consider how the present situation may or may not
accommodate our sense of justice in according others rights over something
upon which we all depend and to which we all owe the same debt for our
existence. References1. A. Askland, 'Patenting Genes: A Fast and Furious Primer', International
Journal of Applied Philosophy 17, 267-275. 2. R. M. Berry, 'Genetic Information and Research: Emerging
Legal Issues', HealthCare Ethics Committee Forum 15, 70-99. 3. A. M. Chakrabarty, 'Environmental biotechnology in the
postgenomics era', Biotechnology Advances 22, 3-8. 4. P. C. Cunningham, 'Is It Right or Is It Useful? Patenting of
the Human Gene, Lockean Property Rights, and the Erosion of the Imago Dei',
Ethics and Medicine 19, 85-98. 5. P. J. Whitehouse, 'The Evolution of Gene Patenting', American
Journal of Bioethics 2, 23-24. 6. N. Lenoir, 'Patentability of life and ethics', Comptes Rendus
Biologies 326, 1127-1134. 7. P. R. Wheale and R. McNally, 'A synoptic survey of the
bioethics of human genome research', International Journal of Biotechnology
5, 21-37. 8. R. Witek, 'Ethics and Patentability in Biotechnology',
Science and Engineering Ethics 11, 105-111. 9. L. M. Guenin, 'Dialogue Concerning Natural Appropriation',
Synthese 136, 321-336. 10. R. Hoedemaekers and W. Dekkers, 'Is There a Unique Moral
Status of Human DNA That Prevents Patenting?' Kennedy Institute of Ethics
Journal 11, 359-386. 11. A. L. Caplan, 'What's So Special about the Human Genome?' 12. E. B. Flowers, 'The Ethics and Economics of Patenting the
Human Genome', Journal of Business Ethics. |
