Against Unrestricted Human Enhancement Patrick
Lin and Fritz Allhoff, The
Nanoethics Group at California Polytechnic State University (San Luis Obispo) and Western Michigan University Journal of Evolution and Technology -
Vol. 18 http://jetpress.org/v18 Introduction
The defining debate in this
new century will be about technology and human enhancement, according to many
across the political spectrum.[1] Our ability to use science to enhance our
bodies and minds – as opposed to its application for therapeutic purposes – is
one of the most personal and therefore passionate issues in an era where
emerging technologies seduce us with new and fantastic possibilities for our
future. But in the process, we are
forced to rethink what it means to be human or, essentially, our own
identity. For some, technology holds
the promise of making us superhuman; for others, it offers a darker path toward
becoming Frankenstein’s monster. This paper will look at a
growing chorus of calls for human enhancement to be embraced and
unrestricted. Specifically, we will
critically examine recent “pro-enhancement” arguments – articulated in More Than Human (2005) by Ramez Naam,[2]
as one of the most visible works on the subject today – and conclude that they
ultimately need to be strengthened, if they are to be convincing. Our overarching motive here
is not so much that we are against human enhancement technologies; that seems
to be too premature a conclusion given the state of research and debate, and
such technologies may be inevitable anyway.
However, we believe that a skeptical eye should be applied to claims
that there should be no restrictions
on any particular action. Even our most
cherished human rights are bounded by reason or societal norms, for whatever
they are worth. For instance, our right
to free speech still does not allow us to yell “Fire!” in a crowded theater or
to slander others. Our right to fall in
love and to make love with whom we want does not extend to children. And for all the talk about the virtues of a
“free market” or “free trade”, the invisible hand of our economy is still
occasionally slapped by anti-trust lawsuits, which would not be an issue if the
market were truly free. So even if
human enhancement seems to be a reasonable practice and even a right,
restrictions may still be required to mitigate undesirable circumstances or
unintended consequences – which would be consistent with how functioning
societies treat other liberties, values and rights. But first, we should lay out
a few real and hypothetical scenarios in order to be clear on what we mean by
“human enhancement.” Beyond steroid use
to become stronger and plastic surgery to become more attractive, people today
also use drugs to boost creativity, attentiveness, perception, memory, mood,
and so on. Some enhancements today may
seem gratuitous to others, such as attempting to physically transform into a
lizard by tattooing scales all over one’s body and forking one’s tongue or into
a cat by implanting whiskers, sharpening teeth and clipping one’s ears. (The latter enhancements, of course, raise
the question whether “enhancement” is the right word to use in the debate in
the first place, as opposed to simply “engineering” or a more neutral term that
does not connote improvement.) In the future, technology
might give us implants that enable us to see in the dark, or in currently
non-visible spectrums such as infrared. As artificial intelligence advances,
nano-sized computers might be imbedded into our bodies in order to help process
more information faster, even to the point where man and machine become
indistinguishable. And perhaps someone
would want to have a prehensile tail or flippers implanted to swim better or
for whatever reason. What we do not mean by
“human enhancement” is the mere use of tools, such as a hammer or Microsoft
Word, to aid human activities, or “natural” improvements of diet and exercise –
though, as we shall discuss later, agreeing on a definition may not be a simple
matter. Further, we must distinguish
the concept from therapeutic applications, such as using steroids to treat any
number of medical conditions, which we take to be unobjectionable for the
purposes of this paper. I
In the introductory chapter
of More Than Human, Naam offers four
distinct arguments to defend the pro-enhancement position, which clears the
path for the rest of his book: first, there are pragmatic reasons for embracing
enhancement; second, regulation will not work anyway; third, respect for our
autonomy prohibits restrictions; and, fourth, that the desire to enhance is
inherently human and therefore must be respected. In his first argument, Naam
points out that “scientists cannot draw a clear line between healing and
enhancing.”[3] The implied conclusion here is that, if no
principled distinction can be made between two concepts, it is irrational to
afford them different moral status. So,
since there are no restrictions on therapy, in that we have a right to medical
aid, there also should be no restrictions on human enhancement, i.e., using the same medical devices or
procedures to improve our already-healthy bodies. In other words, there is no significant or moral difference
between therapy and enhancement. There are several problems
with such a claim, including the following two. The first problem can be illustrated by the famous philosophical
puzzle called “The Paradox of the Heap”: given a heap of sand with N number of
grains of sand, if we remove one grain of sand, we are still left with a heap
of sand (that now only has N-1 grains of sand). If we remove one more grain, we are again left with a heap of
sand (that now has N-2 grains). If we
extend this line of reasoning and continue to remove grains of sand, we see
that there is no clear point where we can definitely say that on side A, here
is a heap of sand, but on the side B, this is less than a heap. In other words, there is no clear
distinction between a heap of sand and a less-than-a-heap or even no sand at
all. However, the wrong conclusion to
draw here is that there is no difference between them; so likewise, it would be
fallacious to conclude that there is no difference between therapy and
enhancement. It may still be the case
that there is no moral difference between the two, but we cannot arrive at it
through the argument that there is no clear defining line. Second, there likely are
principled distinctions that can be made between enhancement and therapy.[4] For example, Norm Daniels has argued for the
use of “quasi-statistical concepts of ‘normality’ to argue that any intervention
designed to restore or preserve a species-typical level of functioning for an
individual should count as [therapy]”[5] and the rest
as enhancement. Alternatively, Eric
Juengst has proposed that therapies aim at pathologies which compromise health,
whereas enhancements aim at improvements that are not health-related.[6] Another pragmatic reason
Naam gives is that “we cannot stop research into enhancing ourselves without
also halting research focused on healing the sick and injured.”[7] However, this claim seems to miss the point:
anti-enhancement advocates can simply counter that it is not the research they
want stopped or regulated, but rather the use of that research or its products
for enhancement. For instance, we may
want to ban steroids from sports, but no one is calling for an outright ban on
all steroids research, much of which serves healing purposes. Naam also puts the burden of
proof on the anti-enhancement side to show that regulation of enhancement is
needed, instead of offering an argument that enhancement is harmless to the
person or society and therefore does not need to be regulated.[8] But it is unclear here why we should abandon
the principle of erring on the side of caution, particularly where human health
may be at stake as well as other societal impacts. Further, both sides have already identified a list of benefits or
harms that might arise from unregulated human enhancement. The problem now is to evaluate these
benefits and harms against each other (e.g.,
increased longevity versus overpopulation), also factoring in any relevant
human rights. If neither side is able
to convincingly show that benefits outweigh harms, or vice versa, then burden
of proof seems to be a non-issue. II
In his second argument, Naam
compares a ban on enhancement to the U.S. “War on Drugs”, citing its
ineffectiveness as well as externalities such as artificially high prices and
increased safety risks (e.g., users
having to share needles because they cannot obtain new or clean ones) for those
who will use drugs anyway.[9] If people are as avidly driven to
enhancement as they are to drugs, then this admittedly may be the case. But is that a good enough reason to not even
try to contain a problem, whether it is drugs, prostitution, gambling, or
whatever? While such laws may be
paternalistic, they reflect the majority consensus that a significant number of
people cannot act responsibly in these activities and need to be protected from
themselves and from inevitably harming others.
Even many liberals are not categorically opposed to these regulations
and may see the rationale of “greater good” behind similar regulation of
enhancement. Further, that we are unable
to totally stop an activity does not seem to be reason at all against
prohibiting that activity. If it were,
then we would not have any laws against murder, speeding, “illegal” immigration
– in fact, it is unclear what laws we would have left. Laws exist precisely because some people
inescapably have tendencies to the opposite of what is desired by society or
government. Again, this is not to say
that human enhancement should be prohibited, only that a stronger and more
compelling argument is needed. One objection to our
argument here is that if human enhancement is regulated, then that would merely
make it more expensive to receive those enhancements.[10] Enhancements would not really be curtailed,
because those who can afford to travel to other countries where there are no
such restrictions would do so, much like American citizens today travel on “medical
or cosmetic surgery vacations” to undergo procedures that are either too
expensive in the U.S. or denied to them.
However, this objection is
not really an argument against restrictions, but rather an argument for global restrictions. Its real complaint is that we cannot
simultaneously implement human enhancement restrictions on a global scale,
which is probably true. But even if it
is construed to be a pro-enhancement argument, it does not seem to be sound. For instance, it would not work if applied
to, say, pedophilia: it cannot be convincingly argued that there should not be
any restrictions in the U.S. against pedophilia, because that would only lead
to “pedophile vacations” for the wealthy to other countries where restrictions
or enforcement are more lax. III
In his third argument, Naam
ties human enhancement to the debate over human freedom: “Should individuals
and families have the right to alter their own minds and bodies, or should that
power be held by the state? In a
democratic society, it’s every man and woman who should determine such things,
not the state...Governments are instituted to secure individual rights, not to
restrict them.”[11] Besides politicizing a
debate that need not be political, Naam’s argument here (as well as the
preceding one) assumes libertarianism to be the correct or predominant
political philosophy, which is far from the case judging from annual election
results in the US or any other country.
Both liberals and conservatives, who collectively make up the bulk of
public opinion, can see that the state has a broader role in creating a
functioning, orderly society. This
necessarily entails reasonable limits to whatever natural rights we have and
also implies new responsibilities, such as not abusing one’s right to free
speech. Accordingly, rights are not
inconsistent with regulation, so even if people do have the right to alter
their own minds and bodies, government may still play a useful role here. And while libertarianism may
have its merits and a sense of intuitiveness to some, a democratic society is
not compelled to endorse laissez-faire political philosophy and the minimal
state, as some political philosophers have suggested.[12] Nor would reasonable people necessarily want
unrestricted freedom, e.g., no restrictions or background checks for gun
ownership. Even in a democracy as
liberal as ours in the United States, we understand the value of regulations as
a way to enhance our freedom. Again,
our economic system is not truly a “free market” – though we advocate freedom
in general, regulations exist not only to protect our rights, but also to
create an orderly process that greases the economic wheel, accelerating both
innovations and transactions. As a
simpler example, by agreeing to traffic laws, we actually increase our freedom
on the road: for instance, we can drive much faster, because we can reasonably
anticipate what others might do, e.g., stay
on the right side of the road, drive above a minimum speed limit, not make
erratic turns, and so on. IV
Finally, Naam argues that
people have been enhancing themselves from the start: “Far from being
unnatural, the drive to alter and improve on ourselves is a fundamental part of
who we humans are. As a species we’ve always
looked for ways to be faster, stronger, and smarter and to live longer.”[13] This seems to be an accurate observation,
but it is an argumentative leap from this fact about the world, which is
descriptive, to a moral conclusion about the world, which is normative. Or, as the philosophical saying
goes, we cannot derive “ought” from “is,” meaning just because something is a
certain way doesn’t mean it should be that way or must continue to be that
way. For instance, would the fact that
we have engaged in wars – or slavery, or intolerance – across the entire
history of civilization imply that we should continue with those
activities? Clearly, the answer is
no. If we cannot agree that war or
slavery is repugnant or at least undesirable and should be avoided – Nietzsche
aside – then any “ethics” of human enhancement technologies would seem to have
no hope. Further, even if it is
obvious to the pro-enhancement camp now that human enhancement technologies
should be unrestricted, this might not always be the case and is therefore
little evidence of how things should be or will be. As an analogy, the overwhelming majority of the world’s
population people has been indoctrinated since the time we can eat solid food
that meat is one of our core food groups, should we be lucky to have it; but it
is conceivable, given the traction by animal rights activists and scholars,
that farming animals may one day be regarded as barbaric and morally backwards,
viewed with the same disdain as slavery is now, especially if an alternative
(and equally tasty) protein source is created.
If, say, meat can be created without the animal, as some scientists are
now doing or in the future with perhaps advanced nanotechnology, then it would
be difficult to justify the unnecessary killing of animals, even if we do
create extra happiness in the world by bringing them into existence.[14] More seriously, this
argument seems to turn on an overly-broad definition of “human enhancement,”
such that it includes the use of tools, diet, exercise, and so on – or what we
would intuitively call “natural” improvement.
An objection to Naam’s first argument also applies here: just because we
cannot clearly delineate between enhancement and therapy or tool-use does not
mean there is no line between them. We
understand that steroid use by baseball players is a case of human enhancement;
we also understand that using a rock to crack open a clam is not. Still, the fact that we have not arrived at
a clear definition of “human enhancement” should not prevent us from using
intuitive distinctions to meaningfully discuss the issue. V
An objection to the entire
preceding discussion is that we have made it relatively simple to defeat the
considered pro-enhancement arguments, so much so that some have complained that
we are attacking a “straw man”, i.e., misrepresenting
the position in such a way that it is easy to refute.[15] Our reply is that the pro-enhancement
arguments we discuss above are in fact complete and actual arguments laid out
in Naam’s book, and though he admittedly is not an ethicist and need not be
held to the standard of careful philosophical thinking, the same arguments
continue to echo in the human enhancement debate as well as unrelated political
debates; therefore, it is important to critically evaluate these persistent and
popular arguments. If it seemed simple for us
to defeat Naam’s arguments, that speaks more to their strength than to our
strategy. Nevertheless, the human
enhancement debate does not end here. Other
arguments not articulated by Naam deserve consideration in separate papers, and
a critical spotlight should also continue to be turned on anti-enhancement
positions as well. Our point here is
not that human enhancement should be restricted. It is simply that current arguments need to be more compelling
and philosophically rigorous, if the pro-enhancement side is to be
successful. There is admittedly a strong
intuition driving the pro-enhancement movement, but it needs to be articulated
more fully, resulting in an argument that is perhaps something like the
following: Who we are now
seems to be a product of nature and nurture, most of which is beyond our
control. So, if this
genetic-environmental lottery is truly random, then why should we be
constrained to its results? After all,
we’ve never agreed to such a process in the first place. Why not enhance ourselves to be on par with
the capabilities of others? And if that
is morally permissible, then why not go a little – or a lot – beyond the
capabilities of others? As suggested in the above
analysis, one of the first steps in discussing human enhancement is to arrive
at a better definition of what it is, perhaps by adopting that used by Daniels
or Juengst, though these are still tough issues. For instance, does it matter whether enhancements are worn
outside our bodies as opposed to being implanted? Why should carrying around a Pocket PC® or binoculars be
acceptable, but having a computer or a “bionic eye” implanted in our bodies be
subject to possible regulation – what is the moral difference between the two? Further, there are societal
and ethical implications that also need to be considered, apart from those
already mentioned. Before we too
quickly dismiss the idea of “human dignity” as romanticized and outdated, we need
to give it full consideration and ask whether that concept would suffer if
human enhancement were unrestricted. Is
there an obligation to enhance our children, or will parents feel pressure to
do so? Might there be an “Enhancement
Divide,” similar to the Digital Divide, which significantly disadvantages those
without? If some people can interact
with the world in ways that are unimaginable to others (such as echolocation or
seeing in infrared), will that create a further “Communication Divide” such
that people no longer share the same basic experiences in order to communicate
with each other? In this paper, we have tried
to detail some of the challenges that society will need to address as human
enhancement technologies become viable. This will not be in the distant future,
but rather sooner than many of us might may expect. It seems to us that the most realistic outcome of a debate about
human enhancement will be neither unrestricted freedom nor total prohibition:
the issue is likely much more complex than hinging on the single issue of
personal autonomy or human dignity.
Rather, like many other political and social debates, we may find some
commonsense somewhere in the middle.
Acknowledgement
This paper is based upon work supported by the US
National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0620694 and 0621021. Notes
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