|
A peer-reviewed
electronic journal published by the Institute
for Ethics and ISSN
1541-0099 19(1)
– September 2008 |
The Amorality of
Preference: A Response to the Enemies of Enhancement
Joseph Jackson
Network for Open Scientific Innovation
Journal of Evolution and Technology -
Vol. 19 Issue 1 – September 2008 - pgs 42-50
http://jetpress.org/v19/jackson.htm
Abstract
Elucidating a
theory of intrinsic value is an urgent task for Transhumanism. Indeed, our opponents distinguish themselves
precisely by refusing to delve beyond their intuitions that the use of
enhancement technology is wrong. Yet
both proponents and critics of enhancement technologies are often guilty of the
same error. For example, some
libertarian supporters of transhumanist technologies assume that within certain
self-regarding spheres, an agent’s subjective personal preference is
unquestionable, and ought to be decisive—all is justifiable in the name of
personal freedom. On the other hand,
certain bio-conservative pundits attack preferences for enhancements such as
cosmetic procedures as frivolous, irresponsible, and even immoral. Often, such critiques try to have it both
ways. If standards of beauty are truly subjective, there are no intrinsic
grounds for attacking the cosmetic alteration (the critique must cite other
negative social externalities). If there are objective reasons for wanting to
use a given technology, then we may actually have a duty to help individuals
access it. Without further information, we must conclude that a preference is
amoral. I might prefer anything at all,
and what is lacking in the current debate is a comprehensive account of what an
agent’s well-being consists of.
Fundamentally, the strength of a person’s preferences, independent of a
judgment of what there is reason to prefer, has insufficient connection with
the idea of the good of the person—what actually makes his or her life better
or worse. That is, something is not valuable because it is preferred; rather an
agent forms a preference for something because he values it independently on
some other grounds.
Changing the Terms of Debate
“I asked Richard, when he invited me to come here and speak, whether he
wanted an institutional talk about Harvard's policies toward diversity or
whether he wanted some questions asked and some attempts at provocation,
because I was willing to do the second and didn't feel like doing the first”
(Summers 2005, n.p.) Famous last words:
in January, 2005, former Harvard President Larry Summers was invited to
speak about diversity and committed a fatal error when he suggested that there
may be some “innate” or “biological” explanations for why women are
under-represented at the highest levels of science.
Summers began with an innocent enough
premise: “It is after all not the case
that the role of women in science is the only example of a group that is
significantly underrepresented in an important activity and whose
underrepresentation contributes to a shortage of role models for others who are
considering being in that group. To take a set of diverse examples, the data
will, I am confident, reveal that Catholics are substantially underrepresented
in investment banking, which is an enormously high-paying profession in our
society; that white men are very substantially underrepresented in the National
Basketball Association; and that Jews are very substantially underrepresented
in farming and in agriculture” (Summers 2005, n.p.) However, Summers then got
himself into trouble by saying that he doubts a “socialization” hypothesis can
explain the preponderance of men at the highest levels of the sciences—instead,
he believes that girls and boys have different (unlearned) tastes, and that
different innate abilities explain the differences in representation (even
small differences in the standard deviation translate into very large
differences in the talent pool later in life).
From a transhumanist perspective, Summers’
comments seem boring and the entire “scandal” misses the point. Certainly, Summers’ impromptu hypothesizing
was not up to the rigorous standards of the scientific method, but it wasn’t intended to be. Sadly, the entire fiasco is more a testament
to Harvard’s political correctness and the faculty’s often combative stance
toward any authority (prior to the incident they had already engaged in a power
struggle with the president over a number of issues involving faculty accountability/lack
thereof), than any “sexism” on the part of Summers. To me, the president’s remarks were problematic because they seem
to invoke the inappropriate level of explanation. For example, some evolutionary enthusiasts “fetishize” evolution,
invoking selection as an explanation for every human. Consider three examples.
Is there a gay gene?
Homosexuality must confer some benefit—the homosexual member of the
family will dedicate his/her time to raising a sibling’s child, thus increasing
the total fitness of the family’s genes!
Likewise, an adaptive explanation of rape stipulates that it must confer
an advantage by allowing the rapist to pass on his genes. Finally, evolutionary explanations of
reading posit that there must be a special “module” that controls reading since
we are so good at it.
Actually, evolution does not act directly on
these specific behaviors. Reading and
writing “piggybacked” on top of the complex cognitive machinery that was built
up over the course of evolution.
Evolution instills general purpose drives—for food and sex, etc. This is a much more efficient mechanism for
ensuring flexibility that will aid human survival than is building a specific
“rape” drive. Accordingly, my own
unscientific hypothesis about why women are underrepresented in some
professions would run as follows.
Women are clearly underrepresented in many
areas ranging from comic book conventions, science fiction conventions, and
Transhumanist conferences, to professions such as computer programming, and the
natural sciences. Serial killers are also overwhelmingly male. We know that testosterone and other sex
hormones have profound early effects on brain development even in the
womb. Nobel prize winners and other
“ultra-achievers” in these fields where women are underrepresented tend be
rather obsessive in certain respects.
My suspicion is that testosterone influences propensity to engage in
obsessive activities of all sorts, and because obsessive dedication and training
are the most important determinants of expertise, which leads to achievement,
testosterone explains the different proportions of men and women in certain
areas. Simply put, perhaps women tend
to choose a more balanced life and are less likely to work an 80 hour week at
whatever endeavor. In a society that
currently glorifies professional achievement, drive, and extremist dedication
at the expense of leisure and family life, maybe we should question the premise
that unrestrained, “masculine” behavior patterns are to be encouraged for men
and women alike!
We know that there are some biological
differences between the sexes. We also
know that much or most of “gender” is socially constructed. So what?
Transhumanists don’t get upset by what may or may not have a biological
basis. If “female” brains have some
advantages for some tasks, and “male” brains excel at others, a Transhumanist
is interested in finding out how to combine the best aspects of both so that we
can live happily ever after in a “post-gender” world. Want to be a man, woman, some combination of both? Complete, functional sex changes and
augmentations (multiple genitalia anyone?) may well become a reality in the
future. Feathers, fur, wings, fish scales? After one has thought through the
implications of artificial wombs and morphological freedom, the old debates
seem tame.
Let’s take a final case where the current
terms of debate are entirely inadequate.
I am straight. I am sexually
attracted to women; I “prefer” them.
Much to my chagrin, I don’t like men, even though they like me, and over
the years I have missed out on a number of opportunities when I have had to
politely decline an advance. Is it a
sexual “preference” or sexual “orientation?”
This terminology obscures the issue.
Who cares? Evidently, the public
cares a great deal because there is an unending debate over whether
homosexuality is “genetic” or a lifestyle choice. This debate is superficial not only because every behavior or
trait has environmental influences (when a kitten’s eye is covered during the
crucial period of development it will be blind, despite sight being
“genetically” hard-wired), but because even if we answer it definitively, it
does not matter morally. If it is
“genetic” then it is un-chosen and a person cannot be held responsible or blamed
for it. If it is a choice, this is
equally irrelevant, because an adult’s preferences as to which other adults
he/she wants to have sex with are not the proper subject matter of moral
evaluation. Preferences are morally
inert. I have a whole slew of preferences
that are amoral—I don’t like fat women, for example. I rank women according to the following order: I am most attracted to Caucasian women
(blondes are first within this group), then Hispanic, then Asian, then
Black. Am I a racist? Should I be worried that I have noticed this
feature about myself? What about ugly
people, should I not “discriminate” against potential mates based on whether I
find them attractive? Is there anything
wrong with being most attracted to women of one’s own race? These kinds of preferences, be they “innate,”
instilled through some evolutionary mechanism, or learned through
socialization, are neither intrinsically good nor bad.
As we will explore shortly, when certain
individual preferences are acted upon, the social consequences may be harmful
and the end result immoral. This is
analogous to the coordination game of deciding which side of the road to drive
on—the choice of left or right is arbitrary, but it is important that we all
make the same choice. In my life, I am
obligated to act upon my preferences in a responsible manner. That is, I do not advertise my disgust for
fat women—this is gratuitous and offensive.
We can imagine a sliding scale where my brute preference is decisive and
unquestionable in some areas, and should rightly be over-ruled in others. Because I am typically less attracted to fat
women and women of black ethnicity, or for that matter, women with terrible
body odour, I am unlikely to be actively pursuing to date them. If however, I find that I am engaged in a
friendship with a female with these characteristics, and the relationship takes
a romantic turn, I will have to evaluate the weighting of my preference, as I
would not want superficial features to stand in the way of “true love.”
Can sexual orientation be similarly
overturned? The incidence of
opportunistic homosexuality in prisons suggests that orientation is flexible
and that sometimes humans decide any kind of sex is better than no sex. Still, it seems unreasonable for a homosexual
man to fault me for not returning his attentions. Sure, it might be possible for me to overcome my initial
revulsion to the idea of sex with a man, but why should I? This disutility that I feel is too high an
initial barrier to beginning a relationship, and without some
countervailing reason, the brute fact of my not liking men is decisive and
cannot be indicted as “immoral.”
Most of our concerns about racism, sexism,
and discrimination center on the feeling that characteristics that are un-chosen
should not be the object of approbation or disapprobation. In a Transhuman world of total choice and
morphological freedom, these types of discrimination would simply cease to
operate. I hate “purple people.” The statement is nonsensical. First, it is not rational to hate a group of people. Hatred is an intimate interpersonal
undertaking—it requires an intricate process of responding to an individual’s
character, the special way they conduct themselves that makes you truly despise
them. Likewise, love involves firsthand
knowledge of, and responding to an individual’s
characteristics, not a group’s. Second,
purple is not a moral property. It is
an aesthetic one. Moral judgments operate
in the relational sphere and take an
agent’s behavior and conduct vis à vis other agents as their object. Purple is not even an attribute such as
intelligence or health where, arguably, one can confidently make the evaluation
that a life that contains more intelligence/health is superior to one that
contains less. The most one could say
is “I dislike the way purple people look; it is a strange choice.”
Actually, the chosen/un-chosen dichotomy
does not capture everything. Are we
irrational to get our feelings hurt about un-chosen features while shaking off
criticism of enhancements/augmentations we have chosen? Why should it bother me to have my crooked
nose made fun of, or to be ridiculed for being fat? I didn’t choose these. On
the other hand, I am a bodybuilder. I
joke about receiving attention from gay men, but it is often said about and
among bodybuilders that we build our muscles for the attention of other men,
not women. Nine times out of ten, it is
another guy who is impressed, remarks, or asks to feel the biceps. Some women are repulsed at large muscles and
declare that I am “too big!” I shrug
this off because bodybuilding is a lifestyle I have chosen—I was not born with
freakish muscles. Yet arguably, perhaps
I should be terribly offended since not only has the woman insulted my
appearance (justifiably expressing her brute, amoral preference), but she has
belittled an activity I value and am passionately committed to.
There are some lessons here for the debate
over enhancement. Robert Nozick (1974)
points out that self-esteem is based on differentiating characteristics. We don’t take pride in our common
abilities—as a human animal, I can read, write, do arithmetic—isn’t this
wonderful?! Actually, we take these
capacities for granted. We all can do
these things, so we don’t take pride in them.
In a sense, this is perverse, even irrational, because, if these
capacities are intrinsically valuable, we are objectively better off for having
them and should be pleased. Consider a
discus-throwing competition. The winner
beats his opponents by the slimmest of margins—a mere fraction of a
centimeter. What is more, all
competitors are pathetically weak and manage to throw the discus a puny
distance. Why be pleased at having
won? Not a single athlete in the event
exhibited any excellence on an absolute scale.
Thus, one way to diminish envy is to focus on activities where it is
inappropriate to judge oneself comparatively.
I want to be the most beneficent, wisest, holiest, person alive. What? While it makes sense to want to be
beneficent, wise, etc, it is self-defeating to turn this into a
competition. I want to be the least
jealous person in the world. But, when
someone else exhibits even less jealousy, I am jealous of that!
The worry is that if self-worth is based on
comparisons, we can all become as wise as Aristotle, as musically talented as
Beethoven, etc, but still feel no greater sense of self-esteem than we do from
our shared abilities such as being able to use language, or possessing hands
that are able to grasp objects. There
are two ways to create a society where self-esteem is not sabotaged by envy and
positional goods “arms races.” The
two solutions are 1) to focus on the absolute, rather than relative components
of valuable activities. 2) to socially
empower individuals to engage in a huge variety of activities. With more dimensions along which to compare
one another, an individual has a better chance to find “dimensions that some others think important, along which
he does reasonably well, and so to make a nonidiosyncratic favorable estimate
of himself” (Nozick 1974, 246). The intensity of envy diminishes as the number
of differentiating dimensions is expanded.
Thinking
About Enhancement
In his discussion of Germinal Choice
Technologies (GCT), Gregory Stock mentions a fascinating scenario: in a “hands-off” society, deference to
parental choice might mean that some deaf couples would use embryo selection to
guarantee that their child were deaf.
The child would more easily assimilate into the parent’s culture and
there is no physical harm involved—a healthy child is not injured; the quality
of deafness is simply selected. This
scenario is probably very alarming to most people, yet Stock claims that one
third of American obstetricians say they would consider offering a test that would
enable this possibility (Stock 2002, 168). Fortunately, it is possible to
clarify our thinking by formulating and articulating an ethical principle that
should govern these types of decisions.
One attempt at such an axiom is:
No person may make a choice for
another person unless there is a moral obligation to do so. This formula has the advantage of parsimony,
yet it is problematic nonetheless.
Aside from the objection that there might not be universal agreement
about what constitutes a compelling “moral obligation” in a given circumstance,
such an inflexible principle would proscribe many actions that are clearly not
morally necessary, but are nevertheless extremely convenient.
For example, through the use of GCT it will
eventually be possible to ensure that children are born with beautiful,
straight teeth. Yet it seems rather
silly to assert an unborn child’s “right to straight teeth.” Apart from concerns about health problems
caused by an uneven bite, etc, there is no moral obligation to provide everyone
with cosmetic orthodontic procedures.
Of course, teeth can become a marker for class distinctions, even a
source of international ridicule (the poor British!) endowing the issue with
social/moral importance. But the
primary concern is with aesthetics—straight teeth are not a fundamental
necessity for living a fulfilling life.
However, it is not reasonable to object to having been given the gene
for straight teeth. Using GCT would
eliminate the pain, inconvenience, and cost of having braces. If having straight teeth is a morally
acceptable goal, then using GCT to obtain it is acceptable (if one accepts that
the technology itself is not intrinsically wrong). Furthermore, the interests of parent and child are perfectly
aligned, and the outcome is convenient for both. If there is sufficient demand for crooked teeth, future
orthodontists can create a new industry to safely rearrange patients’ teeth in
a jagged pattern. The practice will be
the exact reverse of how it is today.
Morally, it would not matter if we were all born with straight teeth by
default and then had to have them altered to suit our personal tastes. The same goes for baldness—current
technology, shaving, easily allows us to achieve this result. But hair regrowth is still quite primitive,
and a wig is not a satisfactory replacement.
Thus, altering the genes for male pattern baldness doesn’t deprive a
child in the least; he can always shave.
Teeth are morally irrelevant in a way that
hearing is not. A child that could hear
and wanted to better understand its deaf parents could choose to simulate
deafness or even become deaf through a surgical procedure. Currently we do not have the technology to
give the deaf the ability to hear. In
the deafness scenario, the parent’s interest conflicts with the unborn
child’s. A child with hearing can be
taught sign language at the same time it learns to speak. It is impermissible to select deafness on
the basis that deaf children will be more convenient for deaf parents. Even if the deaf child “would never know
what it was missing” in that, having had no experience with music it could not
miss hearing it, we know the joys of music and hearing. There is a concrete
obligation to ensure that a child has the ability to hear.
Now consider the case of gender
selection. Modern western societies
strive for gender equality. In theory,
we are already committed to the principle that both sexes are morally equal and
deserve equal ethical treatment. In
practice, there are still many instances of discrimination. However, the key point is that there is no
moral reason to choose a boy over a girl or vice versa. Can a child be harmed (in the moral sense)
if its parents choose its gender?
No. We have already concluded
that gender is morally irrelevant. A
father might feel that he could be a better father if his child were a son—he
is male, he remembers growing up as a
boy, and he believes he is thus better equipped to guide a son from childhood
to adulthood than a daughter. This
belief might be incorrect, but is it morally wrong? A parent should be able to give love to a child regardless of the
child’s sex. Unfortunately, this is not
always the case.
But in a world where parents pick gender,
there is no longer even the possibility of a child being less loved because one
or both parents (immorally) wanted one of the opposite sex. If everyone is truly committed to the
principle of gender equality, parents should be able to choose their child’s
gender as a matter of taste.
Presumably, different preferences should balance out—on the whole, the
male/female ratio should not be grossly disproportional. In fact, if there is no real reason to
prefer one sex to another, then parents might choose based on the ratio of
eligible males/females in the region or country. If culture placed undue emphasis on having a child of a
particular gender, then using GCT would exacerbate the trend. The cultural norm and its consequences, not the
use of the technology in adherence to that norm, would be the morally relevant
issue. In sum, the axiom that governs
the use of GCT could be worded as follows:
No person may make a choice for
another person unless there is a moral obligation to do so or unless the choice
is morally irrelevant. By
irrelevant, I mean that 1) both the parent and the child’s interests are
aligned—straight teeth or 2) the parents fulfil their interests and the child
has no interest at stake—gender.
It is important to remember that GCT is just
one method of achieving a goal. Contact
lenses already enable us to correct faulty vision, telescopes allow us to see
far away objects, microscopes let us view small objects, etc. In these cases our vision is augmented
through other technologies. The
question becomes whether genetic enhancement is intrinsically more problematic
than “environmental” enhancement.
Analysis suggests that it is not.
Some worry that genetic means of achieving the end of enhancement may
somehow exacerbate old social and ethical problems even if they do not create
uniquely new ones. But it should be
quite possible to prevent genetic enhancement from running amuck. There should be a general presumption in
favor of parental autonomy, but restrictions are required in certain cases,
specifically, when the enhancements are “self-defeating and pose threats to
public goods,” or if “they raise objections of fairness” (Buchanen et al. 2001,
201).
In the case of traits that confer
competitive advantage but are not intrinsically valuable, it would make sense
to restrict the ability to enhance them if enhancement is likely to impose a
cost on society. For example, Sport
Utility Vehicles became very popular in the 1990’s despite the fact that they
waste gas, are hard to park, flip easily, and kill passengers in smaller cars
when there is a collision. One can
imagine that height, a trait with little intrinsic value, might become “trendy”
in a similar way. Hordes of brutish,
towering 5th graders would take up huge amounts of space, require
lots of food, and be difficult to clothe.
By prohibiting enhancement of height beyond a maximum limit, costly
behavior can be avoided. In the case of
a trait such as memory, which clearly has more intrinsic value, it is more
difficult. Considerations of
distributive justice must be balanced against denying enhancement to those who
do have the economic means of achieving it.
Is it fair to prohibit those who can afford enhancements from accessing
them, simply to prevent envy on the part of those who are too poor? This is the “levelling down” problem, the dark
side of egalitarianism. If anything,
these considerations indicate it is time to start working out a comprehensive
financial plan for universal enhancement access.
The claim that individuals must not use
genetic enhancement when it is complicit with a harmful norm is troubling. As a classmate of mine once put it, “it is
for us to evolve away from our prejudices, not to adapt technology to satiate
them.” If an individual is suffering
and has the opportunity to relieve that suffering, why should she be compelled
to continue to suffer simply to make a stand against prejudice? It is not clear that the burden of
overturning harmful societal practices should fall on any one individual. One solution is to say that if an
individual’s actions in one area (enhancement of a trait) endorse unjust norms,
one is obligated to fight that system elsewhere. However, as long as the individual is free to decide whether or
not to alter the trait in question, it is hard to accept the proposition that a
moral wrong occurs when s/he chooses to alleviate his/her suffering, or simply
does what is most convenient.
Presumably, if society is discriminating unjustly, enough people who
posses, and value the trait being discriminated against, will protest the
practice rather than use technology to escape the situation.
Genetic enhancement technologies create no
fundamentally new problems. If one
objects to designing babies because it exacerbates existing problems—soccer
moms, forced piano lessons, etc, then why not pass a law against piano
lessons? Such a law would be unworkable
and paternalistic. In the words of the
poet Oliver Goldsmith, “How small of all, the human heart can endure, that part
of which laws or kings can cause or cure” (Goldsmith 2001). Is it alright to
ban new techniques simply because they are more
effective at bringing about a bad result than already existing
practices? Enhancement technologies
have great potential for good, as well as for abuse. With careful consideration, a general presumption of liberty, and
restrictions where there is good reason, society will be no worse off than it
is now. More importantly, individuals
will in all likelihood be better off.
Conclusion
This essay has largely ignored the most
important philosophical question raised by enhancement technology—the idea of
the intrinsic value of various traits, capabilities, and modes of being. A satisfactory account of the ethics of
enhancement will explain and defend a comprehensive theory of well-being. This substantial undertaking must await
another occasion, but briefly, such a theory must show how our evaluative
arguments relate to objective properties and features of reality. Leon Kass
takes ignorant revulsion and dresses it up as the “wisdom of repugnance” (Kass
1997). Although he does not, it is quite possible to make substantial rational
arguments against incest, cannibalism, and certain other taboos. For incest, the key moral feature is that it
destroys social relationships. One
cannot stand simultaneously in the relationship of mother/lover, son/spouse,
etc. Yes, the taboo initially developed
because it is harmful for close relatives to mate. But we can understand that the biological aspects of incest are
less significant than the relational by considering the following scenario. Which is worse—two biologically related
individuals, separated at birth meet later in life and, ignorant of their
kinship, have sex (birth control utilized so there is no problem of harm to
offspring)? Or, a single parent adopts
a child, rears it to adulthood, and becomes sexually involved with it? To follow up on this thought experiment, we
might search the case literature for empirical evidence. What documented examples of non-biological
incest are there, and what were the consequences for the relationships of the
involved parties? In this way, we can
discover valid reasons for our “repugnance,” or, if reasons are not
forthcoming, determine that there are grounds for rejecting our initial
intuition.
In exceptional cases, it may be possible to
establish certain conceptual truths that rule out a given course of action a priori. For example, it is absurd to order a person to be spontaneous
since the attempt to comply will be self-defeating. Likewise, arguably one cannot be heroic, if one performs an
action primarily to obtain such recognition.
Finally, it seems impossible to command authentic love, since such
affection could not be credible if compelled.
These examples attest to the fact that there are states that are
essentially byproducts. However, these
are the exception, not the rule, and the burden of proof for a conceptual truth
is very high. Some opponents of
technology misuse this type of argument as follows: to have the virtue of
courage means acting not in the absence of fear, but in spite of it. Therefore, a soldier in battle cannot use a
drug to quell his anxiety because this type of technological means changes the
end achieved. He does not achieve courage,
but a drug-mediated calm. This
reasoning is wrong-headed and dangerous. What matters in this case is the result—the optimal state of
arousal for the soldier to perform at peak capacity. Prior to battle, he rationally asseses his own ability—he knows
that in battle he suffers from paralyzing panic that will impair him and jeopardize
the lives of his comrades. It would be
immoral not to use a beta-blocker to enhance his performance—this is a case of
rational character planning. The drug
is used to obtain the optimal arousal level—total fearlessness could lead to
recklessness and needless casualties.
In the calm before battle, the soldier still displays courage by
choosing to use a mechanism that lets him overcome arbitrary physiological
limitations that otherwise threaten the mission he is morally committed
to.
Michael Sandel (2007) suggests there is some
intrinsic contradiction in engineering our offspring because it makes it
impossible for us to accept their existence as a gift. This “giftedness” objection does not meet
the standards necessary to establish that there is an intrinsic moral objection
here. On the basis of this argument
Sandel makes a case “against perfection.”
Taken literally, this argument is absurd—there can be no true argument
against perfection if such a state is attainable. It is almost as silly as making an argument against “the
triangle,” on the basis that Euclidian geometry is not actually an accurate
description of reality. The word
“enhancement” already entails a positive evaluation—without an argument of what
elements make up an individual’s well-being, we can’t debate whether a given
augmentation advances or diminishes morally significant qualities such as
agency. Sandel offers no detailed
theory of intrinsic value that would explain why consciously designing one’s
child necessarily corrupts the parent-child relationships. Instead, he cites
existing trends—competitive, controlling parents traumatize their children—and
makes the unjustified pessimistic induction that enhancement technology will
exacerbate this. His argument is purely
empirical, projecting into the future based on current behaviors. A philosopher should know better than to
fall into the classic problem of induction.
Worries about economic injustice or
“homogenization” also ignore the evidence of what is likely. If we survive, the future will be an age of
abundance, where customization and niches, not mass culture, is the rule. This trend has been extensively documented
by Chris Anderson’s (2006) study of the “Long Tail,” the phenomenon that when
tastes are not filtered through the lens of scarcity (physical shelf space and
distribution bottlenecks), individuals have a near infinite demand for varied,
specialized, songs, films, books, and other types of culture. What is true of culture is true of physical
expression (just look at fashion). If
anything, the opposite worry—that post-humans will be so morphologically
diverse as to fragment into different mutually unintelligible subcultures—is
concerning.
Given the higher stakes, new technological
possibilities arguably will prompt greater reflection and more responsible
behavior. Certainly, they offer us the
ability to augment our own moral failings, increase our empathy, and correct
our character flaws through rational character planning. Furthermore, it is unlikely that there will
be a significant period of time during which parents are called on to make
decisions for future generations with germ line engineering. Other technologies allowing individuals to
radically alter themselves—implants and nanotech—will quickly overtake what can
be done with biology alone. I have
observed that critics of cosmetic surgery tend to fall into two camps: very beautiful women who claim to be
concerned about social coercion but who, consciously or not, perhaps harbour
guilt at their “unearned” beauty while simultaneously being threatened at the
possibility of losing their positional advantage; or, very ugly women who adopt
a “sour grapes” mentality. Deep down,
both groups know that beauty matters a lot, but rather than acknowledge this
and support individual freedom, they oppose technology that would make beauty
universally attainable.
Enemies of enhancement often fall back on an
argument of last resort—“meaninglessness.”
Somehow suffering or struggle is required for meaning. If a world of beautiful, brilliant artists,
poets, philosophers and scientists exploring the realm of mind is devoid of meaning, simply adding ugliness, spite, disease,
frailty, problems of physical and economic survival, and arbitrary limits to
ability will not make it meaningful. It
is easy to make something hard, it is hard to make things easy. If challenge is lacking, one can always “tie
one hand behind one’s back.” The point
of technology is to constantly expand our capabilities. “Freedom is not an
unchangeable space to be conquered once and for all: it is a permanent process
of new and ever new liberations” (Amery 1999, 125).
It is much easier for bio-conservatives to
fear-monger from their pulpits than to offer a constructive vision. I am reminded of a quote by an intellectual
hero of mine, Karl Popper. Throughout
history, men have feared change, especially the kind of dynamism and
uncertainty that characterize Popper’s Open Society.
Unwilling
and unable to help mankind along their difficult path into an unknown future
which they have to create for themselves, some of the ‘educated’ tried to make
them turn back into the past. Incapable
of leading a new way, they could only make themselves leaders of the perennial revolt against freedom. It became necessary for them to assert their
superiority… as they were misanthropists and misologists—incapable of that
simple and ordinary generosity which inspires faith in men, and faith in human
reason and freedom (Popper 2003, 201).
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