Becoming More
Than Human: Technology and
the Post-Human Condition Introduction Sky Marsen Journal of Evolution and Technology -
Vol. 19 Issue 1 – September 2008 - pgs i-v Humans have always
imagined states of existence different from the ones that they experience in
their everyday lives. In fact, the pervasive feeling of dissatisfaction with
our physical constraints could be seen to be the main motivating factor for
religious as well as scientific thought. From ancient mythologies to modern
popular culture, humans have created myriad images of transformations of the
body and mind into forms that allow them to interact with the world
differently. Why do humans
search for perfection? This is by no means an easy question to answer: in fact
it directs us to the numerous definitions that have been given to the question what makes us human? Dostoyevsky, after
spending some time in a Siberian prison, came to the conclusion that the human
is the creature that can adapt to anything (Dostoyevsky 1985). This is a
significant definition because it highlights the human propensity to change in
response to external circumstances – with both positive consequences (it helps
us to survive), and negative ones (it induces us to blindly accept injustice).
The harsh situation in which this definition was created also points to a major
incentive that humans have for adapting: to avoid suffering – the suffering
that comes from disease, isolation, poverty, oppression and prejudice. We could therefore
say that one reason that humans search for perfection, and for what the
spiritually inclined would call transcendence, is because they are not only
aware of suffering (arguably most animals are), but also, and more importantly,
because they critically reflect on their suffering, and can recognize and
reflect on the suffering of others. Deliberately changing what we are means, in
many ways, letting go of what makes us suffer. Transhumanism (or
Human Plus, H+) is a social and philosophical movement that explores the uses
of technology for the positive transformation of human capacities, and the
social, political and ethical implications that such a transformation would
carry. Its ideological uniqueness lies in an almost existentialist
interpretation of science: while acknowledging the value of the scientific
method – based on the principles of precision, objectivity and falsifiability –
it foregrounds its relevance for social justice, self-determination and
personal fulfilment, in other words, for improving the human condition. In
transhumanism, therefore, science is “owned” differently than in humanism,
where it was a symbol of human intellect, ingenuity and a key to the “truth.”
The transhumanist perspective, generally, begins with the question of human
experience and then takes an activist approach, looking to science to find how
it can alleviate suffering and thereby improve this experience. The writers in
this Special Issue agree that the use of science to alter and ameliorate human
capacities is certainly not a new phenomenon. Looking only at the last hundred
years or so, for example, we find scientific breakthroughs that have radically
altered human existence, even though they are now so closely assimilated into
our lives that we often take them for granted. To name just a few of these
changes: the contraceptive pill has liberated women from the demands of
reproduction and changed the structure of the workforce, antibiotics have
obliterated previously fatal diseases, and aviation technology has facilitated
rapid global travel. Because of such developments we have better control over
our bodies, enjoy longer life spans and can make multiple and fast relocations
to different parts of the planet, radically changing our life experiences. What these writers also recognize, however, is that
recent scientific developments have accelerated the rate of change, taking it
into areas that cannot be predicted. Genome research, the imaging of the brain
and the creation of more and more intelligent computers are re-defining and
re-adjusting the level of control we have over our bodies, our lifestyles and
the environment in which we interact. This context makes it imperative that we
theorize science-driven changes so as to integrate them more rationally and
effectively in our policies, social regulations and individual life plans
(Hughes, 2004). This Special Issue offers a flavor of transhumanist approaches
to this endeavor, and a glimpse into the transhumanist vision of the future of
humanity. In considering
transhumanism, we should keep in mind that it is essentially a human (even if not humanist) movement. As Patrick Hopkins points out in his essay,
transhumanist ideals stem from the propensity of humans to imagine themselves
to be other than what they are. This propensity hides a paradox: what humans
often strive to escape is what they have in fact evolved to be. The imagination
creates environments that seem desirable but that may not be suitable for
humans, which means that “we can long for what we are not actually any good at”
(such as a state of existence with no struggle and adversity). Realizing this
can lead either to an attempt at changing our evolutionary heritage into a
literally trans-human state
(something other than human), or to equating improvement with enhancement. The
latter implication means we would aim to strengthen, rather than surpass, our
evolved traits, thereby making ourselves super-human
– what Hopkins aptly calls “superprimates.” Therefore, when considering
technologies that can transform the human constitution, we need to decide
carefully what we want to keep and what we want to discard, and what the
assumptions and beliefs are behind each choice. What are some ways
in which such transhuman transformations can occur? A major theme of
transhumanist discourses is the development of specific technologies aimed at
assisting our quest to lead fulfilling lives. One area that has received much
attention in this regard, both from transhumanist and cultural theorists, is
computer technology and the electronic media. Cyberspace and the Internet, in
particular, have been hailed as signalling the emergence of new conceptions of
identity. There is widespread agreement that the Internet has produced new
social settings and re-structured communication patterns and perceptions of
space. Some have even paralleled its influence on social behavior to
architectural changes and the effects of migration and urbanization (Meyerowitz
1985). At the same time, there is an increasing concern by others that such
non-physical spaces encourage escapism, addictive behavior and emotional isolation.
MIT media theorist Sherry Turkle represents this view when she says that “for
those who are lonely yet afraid of intimacy, information technology has made it
possible to have the illusion of companionship without the demands of
friendship” (Turkle, 2004, n.p.). Another way to
explore information technologies, however, is through their potential to
accurately assess an individual’s cognitive and/or emotive weaknesses or
difficulties, and then offer the means to overcome them. In his article, William
Bainbridge describes numerous examples of personalized information
technologies, where computer systems act as guides and mentors for the users.
Originally developed to replace lost or damaged functions in the physically or
cognitively disabled, such technologies are now being generalized to enhance
“normal” human abilities. For example location-aware mobile computing has
successfully helped cognitively impaired people to move around without getting
lost. In the future, the functions of this technology could be expanded to
include showing the users not only where they are, but also how close they are
to locations that are suited to their disposition and values – where to go and
where not to go. Also, computer
games are increasingly challenging traditional narrative form through increased
user participation. Now, players must follow the dictates of the system and
play a game “correctly,” if they are to enjoy the experience. One cannot play a
game such as the hugely popular Grand
Theft Auto, for example, non-aggressively or oppositionally, by leading the
protagonist to perform charitable acts, or by propelling the story through the
actions of marginal characters (Barr, Marsen and Noble 2005). The narrative
structure of the game assumes certain values with which the player must comply
in order to progress the action, making it more a case of the game playing the
player than vice versa. Current computer game development, however, aims to
change this and increase interactivity to the point where the player can give
the story different endings, and direct the narrative action from different
perspectives. Having started as
visual media with limited interactivity, computer games are becoming immersive, engaging more of the user’s
senses, and even pervasive, where the
simulated environment links with a person’s daily life. Virtual Reality is
already being used to treat physical and emotional trauma, and Bainbridge
imagines a future therapy, which he calls Displacement Therapy, where the
system analyzes a user’s weaknesses and creates a pervasive environment where
the user can safely perform actions that will enable him/her to overcome these
weaknesses. In a similar vein,
Sam Kenyon examines the significance of the interface as a meeting ground
between humans and machines, in a future where individuals will need to engage
intimately with technology. Taking his lead from the prototypical conflict
scenarios of Humans-Against-Machines and We-Become-Them, Kenyon shows how the
perceived dichotomy between the machinic and the human is being bridged by
implants that re-define boundaries of self, relationship with other, and
perceptive ability. Other writers look
beyond the types and uses of emerging technologies to their philosophical and
social implications. Comparing the transhumanist with the humanist approaches
to science, Riccardo Campa raises the question of the motivations of the
scientific endeavour itself. In its history and philosophical underpinnings,
science emerged as a spiritual activity aimed at reaching the “truth” and pure
knowledge. Is the transhumanist perspective changing science into an instrument
for improving the human condition, and what are the epistemological
implications of such a shift in attitude? In a parallel way, improving the
human condition does not only entail developing technologies that overcome
human limitations, but also involves satisfying existential concerns, which
leads to a personally meaningful life.
As Campa asks, can living forever replace knowing the sense of one’s
life? And is it appropriate to look to science for the answer to this
question? In this trajectory
into the meaning of science, Campa explores the relations between individual
existence and the world in which this existence unfolds. It could be that the
world is really alien to us, but it could also be that we are just not
intelligent enough to understand it and in doing so re-negotiate our existence
within it. In fact, it could be that our existential dissatisfaction and
anxiety stem from cognitive underdevelopment, and should be seen as obstacles
to overcome rather than as defining criteria of human sensibility. Taking his lead
from C. S. Lewis’ essay The Abolition of
Man, Gregory Jordan also visits this theme, by pondering the concepts of
“motivation,” “rationality” and “value,” and positing them against the model of
the technologically enhanced human. Jordan considers the possibility that by
technologically modifying our minds we may have better access to the qualities
that make us human. This access may in turn enable us to strengthen the
characteristics that we consider as defining us positively. In some ways
paradoxically, we may transcend human weaknesses by embracing essential human
qualities such as benevolence, exuberance and tolerance, and gaining more
control over them: the trans human
may well be the very human. How do changes in
the human body and mind affect attitudes towards oneself and towards others,
and what would their implications be for the norms and ethics of social
interaction? Joseph Jackson invites us to re-consider our ideas of morality and
aesthetics in the backdrop of a future world where physical appearance, sexual
orientation and gender are no longer evolved or genetic traits but matters of
choice and preference. In this world, “preferences are morally inert,” and all
evaluation of individually selected enhancements should be seen as an aesthetic
appreciation rather than a moral judgement. However, such a
world where an individual is empowered to choose his/her ability and appearance
cries out for a socially recognized balance between one’s preferences and
another’s – a monitor that would ensure that one’s preference does not become
another’s obligation, such as in a “you have to become what I like” scenario.
In fact, such a world cries out for a developed capacity to empathize. PJ
Manney stresses the importance of empathy in any community that claims to be
ruled by social justice and equal rights to happiness for all its members.
Manney rightly points out that we already have a technology enabling us to
develop empathic capacity. This technology is the universal trait we share as a
species – our storytelling capacity. Storytelling, in particular in the form of
sophisticated written narratives, such as novels, offers us a creative and safe
space in which to hypothesize, project different outcomes to events, reflect on
causal processes, and consider the effects of different emotions. Actually, and
perhaps in some ways paradoxically, by developing empathic inter-subjectivity,
the ability to see the world from another’s perspective, we also become more
objective and realistic. One of the greatest lessons to be learnt from empathy
is that “otherness” is not something one has to deal with (but would rather not
have to), but is actually a way through which one can conceptualize one’s own
potential as more-than-self. The “other” can offer the “self” many occasions to
reflect on what it would be like to live in a different physical form with its
own strengths and weaknesses, as well as its own wishes, desires and fears. In
this context, tolerance for “diversity” is transformed into something else: the
potential to experience, even if vicariously, different possibilities of life.
This potential in turn enables us to choose more appropriately our own social
performances, and, in a transhuman future, perhaps even our forms of
embodiment. What are the
implications of all these transhumanist ideas and possibilities for us humans
as we exist now? Taking a practical perspective, George Dvorsky describes his
daily habits as reflective of his transhumanist principles. From a description
of what he eats every day to how he uses technology, Dvorksy gives an example
of life choices informed by expectations of the future – what a human may do
now in hope of leading a transhuman life in the future. In a parallel way, a
possible perspective of the transhuman being itself is imaginatively narrated
by Nick Bostrom, who takes a future perfect angle on existence, addressing the
reader from a position of completion and arrival, set in a post-human future,
rather than from a position of departure and uncertainty. As Cory Doctorow
points out in his essay, transhumanist ideas are as much about the present, and
the human, as they are about the future, and the trans-human. More than merely
describing an evolutionary inevitability, they mirror actual human desires and
fears, and show us what we already possess, and what we would like to possess
in our quest for perfection and the abolition of suffering. In doing this,
transhumanist thought does more than just promote technology as a catalyst for
human improvement. The insights it offers into our potential can absolve us
from the primitive and paralyzing guilt that plagues our search for happiness,
pleasure and beauty, encouraging us instead to seek freely and purposely
“sights more majestically beautiful, music more deeply soul-stirring, sex more
exquisitely erotic, mystical epiphanies more awe inspiring, and love more
profoundly intense” (Pearce 2007, n.p.) References
Barr, P., Marsen,
S. and Noble, J. 2005. Oppositional Play: Gathering negative evidence for
computer game values. Proceedings of the
Second Australasian Conference on Interactive Entertainment, Sydney, Australia, pp. 3-10. http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1109181 Dostoyevsky,
F. 1985 (original 1862). The House of the Dead. Translated by David McDuff. London: Penguin Hughes, J. 2004. Citizen Cyborg: Why democratic societies
must respond to the redesigned human of the future. New York: Westview
Press. Meyerowitz, J.
1985. No Sense of Place: The impact of
electronic media on social behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pearce, D. 2007. The Hedonistic Imperative (Introduction). http://www.hedweb.com/hedethic/hedonist.htm Turkle, S. 2004.
How Computers Change the Way We Think. The
Chronicle of Higher Education. January 30, Volume 50, Issue 21, Page B26. http://chronicle.com/weekly/v50/i21/21b02601.htm |