|
A peer-reviewed
electronic journal published by the Institute
for Ethics and ISSN
1541-0099 20(2)
– August 2009 |
Psychological and Ideological
Aspects of Human Cloning:
A Transition to a Transhumanist Psychology
Nestor Micheli Morales
The
Journal of Evolution and Technology -
Vol. 20 Issue 2 – August 2009 - pgs 19-42
http://jetpress.org/v20/morales.htm
Abstract
The prospect of replication of
human beings through genetic manipulation has engendered one of the most
controversial debates about reproduction in our society. Ideology is clearly
influencing the direction of research and legislation on human cloning, which may present one of
the greatest existential challenges to the meaning of creation. In this
article, I argue that,
in view of the possibility that human cloning and other emerging technologies
could enhance physical and cognitive abilities, there is a need for a different
way of thinking about life, new technologies and creation. New scientific
discoveries require a shift in the way psychology takes responsibility to help
individuals and society. Today, psychology needs to follow the progress that
humans are taking toward a transhuman stage of development as a transition to a later posthuman stage.
Introduction
Science and technology are advancing so
fast that society has difficulties in keeping pace with the complexities that new developments
bring.
Human reproductive techniques have progressed rapidly in the past three decades, and other new
techniques such as cloning have been introduced (Kirkman, 2001; Roberts, 1998;
Williamson, 1999b).
Speculations about the idea of
cloning emerged in the early 1960s, and ideas of human cloning in particular were discussed in the 1970s,
followed by some innovations in nuclear transfer in the early 1980s. Human
cloning represents asexual reproduction, and the critics of human cloning often assume that the
result of cloning is not a unique individual. This has led to condemnations of
human cloning from the politicians’ side and to fear, ignorance, and “clonophobia”
from the public’s side (Pence, 1998b).
The cloning debate has also been reinforced
with ethical, religious, scientific, moral, medical, and political issues,
since human cloning became a more plausible prospect in the late 1990s (Baird, 1999;
Fiddler, Pergament, and Pergament, 1999; Fung, 2000; Madigan, 1998; Shannon, 1998; Shapiro,
1999; Vastag, 2001; Wills, 1998).
Emotional responses have
dominated the debate on human cloning, and although emotions can sometimes be justified, many
times they can be caused by prejudice. Gregory E. Pence (1998b) maintains that physicians,
bioethicists, and scientists have done poorly in helping to reduce the public’s
fears and misconceptions. For several years, research on cloning has been placed at
the center of interest and debate among scientists of different disciplines.
Albee (2002),
for example, argues that there is increasing political pressure on science and
scientists in respect of issues such as cloning and genetic engineering, whose
implications are important and gradually affect major national and political
decisions.
The critics of human cloning, however,
argue that there are many unaddressed problems, among them the implications of
the harm issue (Kassirer and Rosenthal, 1998). Other important concerns are
related to family, such as family interactions (in the case of a cloned family
member), adults’
rights to procreative liberty, children’s rights to privacy and equality, and commercial
surrogacy. These are only a few of the areas of concern that can be related to human
cloning. Some reports have also indicated that it is important to study
the possible psychological and emotional state of individuals produced by
cloning, the social aspects of their families, and the possible effects on
society (President’s Council, 2002).
In this paper, I argue that an
individual created through the application of human cloning techniques, or other similar
techniques,
or any other type of genetic manipulation, will not show the donor’s
characteristics to the extent of compromising uniqueness. The creation of
genetically identical individual/s will never lead to the replication of the
donor’s experiences. In addition, human experiences are not independent of
space and time, and,
since every human clone, or multiple clones, of an individual will be born
in a unique context, cloned human beings’ experiences will be unique in each case. Therefore, cloned
individuals will
be able to develop their own identities, their own personalities, and the uniqueness of any other human being.
Furthermore, advances in biotechnology will offer human beings the possibility of enhancing their physical and
cognitive abilities, as well as extending their life spans. These changes
will not be able to take place without similar advances in the social sciences.
I also argue that a
different approach to psychology is necessary to accompany the profound changes in society, and in the concept
of human nature,
that these biotechnological advances will bring. A new and different approach
is imperative, in order to help human beings with new challenges and with the
new mental processes they can be expected to face during a transition from a transhuman
stage, which is already taking place on our planet, toward a future posthuman stage that appears
to be inevitable.
Criticism of human cloning
In regard to criticism of human cloning,
Lipschutz (1999) has suggested that the debate should not be labeled with a question about whether cloning is
wrong, but rather with the question, “When is cloning wrong?” Some of the
objections to human cloning that have been presented are to the effect that it would have
compromising effects on the welfare of the child (Burley and Harris, 1999;
Yanagimachi, 2001). Burley and Harris (1999) describe the different forms
of harm that, according to the critics of human cloning, a cloned child could
suffer. The three types of harm they consider are:
1. Clones will be harmed by
the prejudicial attitudes people may have towards them.
2. Clones will be harmed by
the expectations and demands from parents or genotype donors.
3. Clones will be harmed by their
own awareness of their origins.
In addition, Burley and Harris
argue that the above objections to human cloning, based on child welfare, are misleading.
They do not question the motivation of the objections, but consider that these formulations of
the anti-cloning position do not provide a convincing argument. They do not deny that
cloned individuals might indeed suffer some welfare deficits. However, they suggest, these deficits are
not sufficient to warrant state interference with the choices of people who
wish to clone their genes.
From a standpoint very critical of human cloning,
presented in testimony to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission on
Even though opposition to
reproductive cloning is shared by many, the supporters of cloning have pointed
out that the arguments
presented by Kass are an emotional response to a new technology, and they do
not provide a sufficient analysis of the risks, and the technology’s benefits
(Caplan 2002/2003; Kimberly, 2002; Reynolds, 2001; Rosen, 2003). In
addition, according to Caplan, the arguments against cloning, endorsed by Leon Kass,
Francis Fukuyama and others, are presented as if their authors hold the moral high
ground in the public debate. Caplan suggests that these arguments are
mostly based on pseudoscience, ideology, and plain fear mongering, which are then used to manipulate
public opinion.
The
implication of the harm issue in human cloning
The implications of the harm issue, as presented by the
critics of human cloning, have played an important role in moulding the attitudes of
the public. According to Kass, these implications have also played an important role
for the policy makers and the researchers themselves (Kass, 1997; Kass and Wilson,
1998). Certainly, harm to offspring needs to be assessed before evaluating
the choice of whether to clone in a specific instance, and in evaluating these
choices the expected burdens and benefits need to be weighed against each other
(Roberts, 1998).
There are numerous
implications and consequences of advanced technologies such as human cloning
and genetic engineering (Satava, 2002). For instance, what are the implications
for individuals’
behavior? What will the societal implications be, and what fundamental ethical
principles will be challenged? There are also many unanswered questions
related to human cloning, such as possible psychological harm to children, and
attitudes toward cloned children (Burley and Harris, 1999; Pence,
1998a). Other aspects linked to the harm issue are identity formation,
gender identity, and other topics related to developmental psychology (Annas,
1998; Gonnella and Hojat, 2001).
According to Pence (1998b),
cloning can be associated with both physical and psychological harm, and the
physical harm can be related to genetic harm to the child. Other scholars,
among the critics of cloning, also argue that human cloning could create serious
psychological issues, which might include identity and individuality issues, as well as
other aspects related to how we define ourselves (Annas, 1998; Andrews, 2000;
Baird, 1999; Evers, 1999; Fung, 2000; Kass, 1997, Kass and Wilson, 1998; McGee, 2000a;
Williamson, 1999a; Wills, 1998).
Unresolved
social and psychological aspects of human cloning
According to McGee (2001),
society needs to resolve many questions about human cloning, such as those relating to
its social, reproductive, therapeutic, and ethical aspects. For example,
concerning social aspects, cloning might challenge the social responsibility of
parenthood and the nature of the family (Andrews, 1999). Children produced by
cloning might have psychological problems of identity and individuality (President’s
Council, 2002).
Many have speculated that
human clones would lack the necessary traits for true independence from
progenitors. McGee (2001) questions whether a clone could feel that her/his progenitor,
who genetically would be its monozygotic twin, might become an appropriate parent.
Baird (1999) argues that there would be social consequences from human cloning and
questions how to organize and provide financial resources and services for
cloned people. So far, there are no developed plans about how to place cloned
individuals in society. Broader societal interests also need to be taken
into account in designing policies for human cloning, and it would be
misleading to view decisions about cloning solely as matters of individual choice. Many aspects of human
cloning may
bring
uncertainties about how the relationship between parent and child will develop. The child’s
interest should be considered an important factor in human reproductive cloning
(“Biological uncertainties”, 2001).
Problems related to the concept of uniqueness
Opponents of human cloning have
stated that it is problematic because it would deny the cloned person his or her
uniqueness and identity. Some of the possible psychological problems that
cloned individuals might experience are related to these (Annas, 1998; Baird, 1999; Evers, 1999; Fung,
2000; Kass and Wilson, 1998; McGee, 2000b; Williamson, 1999a; Wills, 1998). Baird
(1999) and Robertson (1998b) conclude that it is not known whether cloned humans will
have psychological problems; however, Baird mentions some issues related to possible
psychological/social harm:
2. Individuals originating
from embryo splitting carried in the same pregnancy, such as twins or triplets,
may have problems in defining expectations of themselves and for their future,
because they know there is another genetically identical individual.
3. Individuals originating
from embryo splitting, where embryos are frozen and implanted at different times or in different women, may have to deal
with the knowledge that they have not originated from an undirected combination
of two particular genomes (instead, someone has determined who they are
genetically).
This position maintains that
many adopted children or children born with donor insemination have a need to
know about their biological origins. Critics of human cloning argue that cloned
children may not have the sense of coming from a maternal and paternal line
with attributes coming from both parents, and may not feel that they are unique
individuals. In that case, clones will have a psychological need to have a personal history and a
sense of self. The first person born through nuclear transfer cloning would
have to deal not only with being a genetic copy of another person, but with the
fact of being a person who did not come from the joining of egg cell and sperm.
An opposing view to the
critics of human cloning is presented by Madigan (1998), who states that a person who
has been cloned will not be a simple replica of another human being but a
unique person. According to Madigan, a human clone is an identical twin delayed in time. She is a much younger
identical twin, reared in a different environment, at a completely different
time and with the benefits of not being treated in the same way. The basic fear
of cloning is in regards to the nature of a newly created person. Specifically, the
fear is that
human cloning will be the creation of an identical copy of a particular person; however, this does
not have to be so.
Although human clones may have
the same nuclear genes as others, as in the case with monozygotic or identical
twins, there is no evidence or reason to believe they will not be unique
individuals with their own personalities and philosophies of life (Evers, 1999; Madigan, 1998;
McConville, 2001; Pence, 1998a; Shannon, 1998; Strong, 2005a; Wills,
1998). Taking into consideration the extensive research on twin studies, especially
on monozygotic twins, there is evidence to support the idea that
personality differences, identity development and the uniqueness of human
clones, created through somatic cell nuclear transfer (
Some
answers related to human cloning, the concept of uniqueness, and twin studies
In regard to the concept of
uniqueness, several authors (Elliott, 1998; Jamieson, 1998; Resnik, 2001) emphasize that people with
the same genes, such as monozygotic twins, who are supposed to be genetically identical, are not
the same people. The
same can be said about cloned human beings, who will have physiological differences, as
well as different behavioral traits. This led Shermer (1999) to question
why moralists are not “crying” for legislation against twinning, when nature has already done
the cloning, and the result is called identical twins. In addition, some
authors such as Pence (1998a) indicate that a cloned person would not be an
exact copy of an adult human being. Although the gene structure would be
very similar, at the molecular level there will be many
differences. Moreover, Pence (1998a) and Strong (2005b) point out that the
brain cannot be cloned or duplicated, and most importantly, the experiences of
a human being cannot be replicated at all by cloning. Many of these wrong ideas, such as those to do with the duplication of
the mind, are captured from
pure science fiction, poorly informed politicians, and irresponsible
journalism.
In the field of psychology, we have no
evidence that it is possible to replicate individual human experience in exact detail. Many studies on
monozygotic twins (Baker, Mazzeo and Kendler, 2007; Button, et al., 2007; Brent and Melhem, 2008; Eley, et al., 2007; Ge, et al. 2007; Hicks, et
al., 2007) indicate that, even when they share a high correlation in terms of
intelligence, personality features, and mental disorders, these correlation
values are not equal, their behaviors and cognitive functions are not
identical, and the twins are different in terms of individual experiences
(Bouchard, 1997). The majority of the studies provide evidence of moderate
heritability, non-shared environmental influences, and modest shared
environmental influences (Asbury, et al., 2008; Hansson, et al., 2008; Harlaar, et al., 2008; Kato and Pedersen, 2005;
Kovas and Plomin, 2007;
Saudino, 2005; Simberg, et al., 2009; Su, et al., 2005). The experiences of identical twins are
individual, unique,
and always different, even when they have been reared together, with the same
mother, the same father, and in the same environment.
In general terms, there are two
kinds of environmental effects to be considered: family effects that are
usually shared by siblings, and make them prone to be similar; and nonshared
environmental effects. Nonshared environmental effects are the type of
environmental influences that affect individuals, and in this case monozygotic
twins, in a unique fashion. In spite of the fact that monozygotic twins, like potential human
clones, are genetically
identical, and although they will typically share the same family environment, these
identical twins or potential human clones do not have identical
personalities. They are not able to experience or interpret an event in exactly the same manner, even though they are
genetically identical. Radical differences between identical twins are caused by nonshared
environmental effects.
Nonshared environmental
effects are found in most studies of monozygotic twins to be more significant
than shared environmental effects. Based on the available evidence, we can conclude
that the experiences of monozygotic twins, or the experiences of potential
human clones,
can be more similar than average. However, there is no evidence in the field of
psychology that the experiences of monozygotic twins, or the experiences of future
human beings created through genetic manipulation, can be identical or that they can
be replicated. Since most of a human being’s personality and identity development is built on
experiences of life events, monozygotic twins and potential human beings
created through any type of genetic manipulation will have the uniqueness of any
other human being.
Furthermore, kinship research
that compares identical twins with fraternal twins in regards to the
contribution of heredity and environment on complex human characteristics, such as intelligence and
personality development, also show no significant results that could be used to
support the idea that complex human characteristics would be exactly replicated
when using genetic manipulation to create human clones. For example, research
based on kinship studies supports only a moderate influence of heredity. Twin studies
show that the correlations between the scores of monozygotic twins are higher
than the scores of fraternal twins in terms of intelligence, personality
characteristics, mental disorders, and disorders usually first diagnosed in
infancy, childhood, or adolescence (Kas, et al., 2007; Kato and Pedersen, 2005;
Kovas and Plomin, 2007;
Polderman, et al., 2007; Scarr, 1997; Van Hulle, Lemery-Chalfant, and Goldsmith, 2007;
Wade, Gillespie, and Martin, 2007). However, even when the studies show that the
correlations between the scores of monozygotic twins are high, they also show that the
scores are not identical correlations, and that gene-environment interaction
and nonshared environmental influences are important to explain these differences,
which will lead those twins to become unique individuals.
Identity
and human cloning
Among the critics of human
cloning, Baird (1999) claims that human cloning presents a threat to our concepts
of human identity and individuality. Baird argues that when a child of a
particular genetic constitution is deliberately made, it is easier to consider
the child as a product rather than a gift of providence. Kass (1997) also
writes about some of the psychological consequences that a cloned human might experience in
her/his life in society. He states that cloning will create serious issues of
identity and individuality. According to Kass, a person who has been cloned
may experience serious concerns about her or his identity, not only because of
identical appearance to another human being, but because her identical twin
might be her father or mother. In addition, Kass suggests that people in
society will be prone to compare the performances of a cloned person with the
performances of her alter ego.
However, according to Caplan
(2002/2003),
the arguments against cloning endorsed by Kass and other critics of human
cloning are presented as if they possess the moral high ground in the public
debate. Caplan argues that the arguments of Kass and others are, instead, mostly based on
pseudoscience, ideology, and plain fear mongering, which are used to manipulate
public opinion. Evers (1999) has also criticized the opponents of human cloning, and maintains that the concept
of identity is ambiguous. Accordingly, the statement that cloning produces identical
individuals is not meaningful, unless the concept is clarified.
Identity is defined as an
organized conception of the self, in which the person can define his or her own
values, goals, and beliefs. It is the immediate perception of one’s
selfsameness and continuity in time, with the simultaneous perception of
the fact that others recognize one’s sameness and continuity (Erikson, 1959).
Identity is also defined as a clearly expressed theory of oneself as someone who can
act on the basis of reason, can explain her or his own behavior and own
actions, and take responsibility for these actions (Moshman, 1999). Identity is
reached through a series of stages in life (Marcia, 1966, 1980), and each of these is experienced differently
by each individual during development and throughout the entire lifespan
(Erikson, 1950, 1968).
Identity is also the result of
a continuous enriching process in which our entire personality acquires those individual
characteristics that differentiate us from others.
The idea that creating another
human being with exactly the same genotype would mean creating another human
being with the same identity, and the same personality, is fundamentally wrong. At this point, the latter is impossible for us
as human mortals. Furthermore, in the hypothetical case that scientists one day
could create multiple human beings with exactly the same genotype, the creation
of these genetically identical individuals would not lead to the production of
individuals with the same identity and personality. The creation or production
of human beings with the same personality, and without uniqueness, will not be
possible, at least based on all the evidence from research on human beings with
identical or nearly identical
Furthermore, even if two or more human
beings could
acquire
the
same brain
structures through genetic manipulation, this would not provide a
basis for
them to
develop identical personalities. Even the same brain in those human beings
would never allow them to have the same experiences, since events are always
experienced in relationship to time and space. Experiences, of course, are also
related to perception. However, the perception of time and space is for us
human beings, in this universe, a subjective individual experience. Even if space and time are not the ultimate structure
of the objective world, they are necessary parts of a framework within which we
organize our experiences.
An event is something that
happens at a particular point in space and at a particular time (Hawking, 1988), and two or more
human beings with the same brains could never have the same experience of an
event at the same time and in the same space or location. When I am referring
to space, I am also referring to the three-dimensional region in which matter
exists. If we include time as a fourth dimension, I note that two or more
human beings cannot simultaneously occupy the same temporal and spatial coordinates in the
four-dimensional continuum where all events and physical objects are located. As an example, my
experience will be different depending on my location on Earth. In addition,
the experiences
of two identical people who saw the same movie in identical theatres or in the
same theater will be different
experiences.
Moreover, when we mention the
environment, we also need to include the participation of the human sensory
system. If two or more brains are identical, from a sensory point of view, we
could conclude that both brains have the capacity to process sensory stimuli equally. But this would not be
possible, since identical sensory systems in human clones would never be able
to process the sensory stimuli from the same space, or location, at the same
time. In other words, the experiences of human clones in regards to the
environmental stimuli will be always individual and unique. As an example, the
place and time in which any person on earth is located, let’s say person (A),
will make person (A) have different perspective and life experiences from those
of person (B) or any other persons on earth. Person (B), or any other
persons on earth, will never be able to occupy the same time and space of
person (A). For that reason, the experiences of events of any human being will
be individual, and unique, different from those of anyone else, including those of
humans with the same genetic structure or
The effects of early
experience on brain, body, mind, and behavior in newborns have been shown in
different studies (Diamond and Amso, 2008; St. Petersburg-USA Orphanage Research
Team, 2008). Furthermore, empirical evidence confirms the role of experience in
brain development of newborns. These studies demonstrate how experience induces
changes in the developing brain shortly after birth, and how cognitive
abilities differ in terms of neural plasticity and the length of time during
which experience can affect brain development (Elbert, Heim, and Rockstroh, 2001;
Nelson, 2000; Nelson, Thomas, and de Haan, 2006).
In terms of twin studies, no
monozygotic twins are born at exactly the same time; and no clone of any person
will come to life at the same time or occupy the same space as the person from
whom he or she was cloned. Any difference in time and space could make an
enormous difference with respect to the way any newborn, identical twins or
eventually human clones, could be stimulated by the environment. As in the
case of monozygotic twins, there will always be differences between human
clones with respect to the time and space in which they will be born. These
particular and small differences could lead to differences in novel experiences
which will provide critical input into a nervous system, which in its turn
would mean significant differences between these human clones in terms of how
their brains will process new signals, and perceive subsequent novel stimuli. This will also lead to
considerable differences in terms of self concept, identity and personality
development.
The
uniqueness of a human being, independently of the method of creation
Fung (2000) states that a main
concern regarding human cloning is the loss of individuality in producing
genetically identical beings, but argues that, if nobody questions the
spiritual uniqueness and individuality of naturally occurring twins, why would
one suppose that a clone should suffer from a diminished sense of individuality? Furthermore,
studies with identical twins show that having identical
It is well known in the field
of psychology that identical twins reared apart have a high correlation in
regards to intelligence and personality features. However, none of these
studies has
concluded
that identical twins may acquire “identical minds,” “identical personalities,” or identical
levels of intelligence. Therefore, we can conclude that there is no evidence
that human beings created through genetic manipulation or genetic recoding will
lack the uniqueness of
any other human being. Several twin studies have shown the importance of
gene-environment interaction and the importance of non-shared environmental
influences to explain personality characteristics, behavior, identity and
individuality issues, general intelligence, behavioral adjustment and mental
disorders in dizygotic and monozygotic twins, as well as in unrelated
siblings reared together (Brent and Melhem, 2008; Button, et al., 2007; Eley, et al., 2007; Ge, et al., 2007;
Hicks et al., 2007; Kas, et al., 2007).
Evolutionary psychologist and
behavioral geneticist, Nancy Segal (1993, 1999, 2000, 2006), points out that
the discussion of behavioral aspects of intergenerational cloning would benefit
from reference to the rich psychological literature of twin studies and from the diverse theoretical
and methodological analyses that researchers have produced of the unique social
features of monozygotic twins and experiential differences between monozygotic
and dizygotic twins. In a study of genetic and environmental influences underlying
general intellectual development of virtual twins (VTs), Segal, et al. (2007) found
decreasing influences of shared environmental factors and an increased
influence of genetic and non-shared environmental factors on general mental
skills during development. The research included 43 virtual twin pairs between
the ages of 8 and 13 years. According to Segal, et al., virtual twins are
siblings who are not biologically related; however, they make the
equivalent of twinship. These “twins” are of the same age, and have been reared
together from infancy.
The study of Segal, et al., shows that the
influence of genetic, and non-shared environmental, factors on intelligence, and on the development of general
intellectual skills, increases over time, while the influence of shared
environmental factors decreases throughout childhood. The study underscores the
influence of non-shared factors on mental development, and also underlines the
importance of non-shared factors on the general development of unrelated
siblings, fraternal twins, and monozygotic twins. In addition, it serves as a
point of reference in order to predict the influence of the interaction between
environmental and genetic factors on the social, physical, and cognitive development of
cloned human beings. The study is relevant since non-shared factors will also
contribute to identity and personality development, as well as the
individuality and uniqueness of cloned human beings.
In a study designed to examine
children’s perceptions of the school environment, as related to academic
achievement, Walker and Plomin (2006) found a moderate genetic influence on their perception of the
environment of the classroom. The study included 3,020 pairs of identical and
fraternal twins aged nine. Data were collected on their perception in six
domains: social integration, opportunity, adventure, general satisfaction,
negative affect, and teachers. The study found a limited genetic influence on
the perception of the children with respect to the environment in the
classroom, which was an average of .33, .06, .25, .27, .19, and .20 of the
variance, respectively. However, non-shared environmental influences accounted
for an average of .58, .78, .64, .60, .69, and .65 of the variance
respectively.
According to the researchers,
the results imply that the perceptions of the environment in the classroom are influenced
by the specific individual experiences of the children. Another finding is
that shared environmental influences had no significant impact on the
perceptions of the children with respect to the environment in the classroom,
even when the twins were living in the same family, attending the same schools,
and in the same classroom. According to Walker and Plomin, these findings
suggest that children’s experiences of the primary school classroom environment
are partially mediated by genetics. Moreover, the findings also show that there
is an important contribution of non-shared environmental experiences, which indicates that, in spite of
genetic similarities, an individual experience of a child in the classroom truly is “an individual
experience.”
Furthermore, these results
also suggest that it is impossible to predict the behavior of cloned children,
and that, although children’s
experiences to a large extent are governed by genetics, it is also impossible to predict
the behavior of cloned human infants, based on the numerous studies on
monozygotic twins. Most of these studies have shown that there is an important
contribution of environmental experiences that explain the behavior of twins. This is especially so in regard to the
influence of individual experiences and interpretations of the environment,
suggesting that even though many people could share an identical genetic
structure, these human beings would indeed develop unique identities and personalities.
The experiences of clones will
be different from the experiences of a genetically identical other, and will be
triggered by the different environments they are exposed to. From this point of
view, nonshared factors
are a powerful influence for identical twins but also an essential part of what
appears to be an inevitable process that shapes the uniqueness of social,
cognitive, and physical development of nonbiological siblings, fraternal twins, and identical twins,
as well of human beings who could eventually be created by genetic manipulation.
Personality,
identity, and uniqueness in human cloning as a result of the interaction
between genetics and the environment
It is also important to point
out that many similarities in behavior and personality among human beings, including
potential human beings created by genetic manipulation, can be explained by the influence of
interaction with the environment. The environment, in this case, will be an individual’s culture, parents, and neighborhood; the type of social
organization and/or
social institutions an individual experiences, in the form of education, family, religion,
government, and economic system; and the social interactions that they will have with
the different groups and individuals in the society. Biological factors, such as nutrition, and maternal
factors while in uterus would also influence the overall development of
genetically identical clones (Fung, 2000).
According to McConville (2001), the expectations
of the parents, the constant comparisons, and the narcissistic
motivations, could psychologically affect the cloned child, and this situation
could result in a child suffering constantly oppressive expectations and
psychological damage. The actions by these parents could undermine the autonomy
of the children as well as their privacy, affecting their sense of dignity and
self-worth. However, Shermer (1999) points out that behavioral geneticists and
evolutionary psychologists in their research show very specifically how
environment and heredity interact to shape personality and behavior, “and all of this
happens in a complex interactive feedback loop between genes and environment
throughout development and into adulthood” (58).
Behavioral geneticists have
pointed out that non-shared factors are important in personality development and
a child’s uniqueness
(Braungart, Fulker, and Plomin, 1992; Crawford, et al., 2007; Emde, 1992; Hansson, et al., 2008;
Plomin, 1994; Vink, et al., 2007). As an example, in a study of identical twins
(three-year-old monozygotic), the mothers treated each identical twin differently, and the
differential treatment by the mothers produced some effects in the twins in
terms of psychological adjustment, mood and prosocial behavior (Deater-Deckard, et al., 2001).
Heritability estimates and
concordance rates used by behavioral geneticists, and obtained from kinship
studies of intelligence, mental disorders and personality traits, are often used to
compare identical twins with fraternal twins. These studies support a moderate
role for heredity (Braungart, Fulker, and Plomin, 1992; Braungart, et al., 1992; Loehlin,
1992; Subbarao,
et al., 2008). Although heritability estimates averaging around .50, and high
concordance rates, show the important role of genetic factors for complex human
characteristics in identical twins, kinship studies suggest that environment
also plays a very important role (Brent and Melhem, 2008; Rothbart and Bates, 1998;
Saudino, 2005).
Environmental influences have
major effects on the psychological aspects of human individual. Even when genetic
factors may account for approximately half of the variance in different aspects
of personality, intelligence, and other developmental characteristics, this
implies that environmental factors are accountable for the other half.
Therefore, to claim that a cloned human being is “less unique” erroneously
dismisses the distinctive and dynamic interactions between the human mind and
its environment (Hines, 1999).
The environment can be defined
as the influence of any external circumstances or conditions that affect
physical, social, and cognitive development, such as the culture, the parents,
the neighborhood, and the type of social organizations and/or social institutions that
shape the experiences of human beings. These external circumstances or
conditions can also exert influence on education, family, religion,
governments, economic systems, and the social interactions that baby clones, or adolescent or adult
human clones,
will have with the different groups and individuals in the society. In
addition, non-genetic
biological factors,
such as nutrition, exposure to disease, and maternal factors while in the uterus, are also
environmental factors that will influence the overall development of any
individual, including genetically-identical
twins and/or
human clones.
In later development, a clone’s
sense of style and preference would be influenced by environmental factors, as
occurs with natural twins (Fung 2000; Green, 2000). Furthermore, it is
important to point out that several twin studies underscore the gene-environment
interaction as an important factor that influences physical development, social
and cognitive development, and many other specific behavioral tendencies and mental
disorders of human beings (Brent and Melhem, 2008; D’Onofrio, et al., 2007; Narusyte, et al., 2006; Saudino,
2005; Simberg,
et al., 2009; Tsuang, et al., 2004; Tuvblad, Grann, and Lichtenstein,
2006). Moreover, gene-environment interaction can also be considered to
explain identity development, personality and the uniqueness of human beings
created through genetic manipulation or genetic reprogramming.
In a recent study of common genetic and
environmental influences on conduct disorder (CD) and major depressive disorder
(MDD) in adolescents,
Subbarao et al. (2008) show moderate genetic and shared environmental, and substantial
nonshared environmental, influences on MDD. The study also shows moderate
genetic and nonshared environmental influences, and little or no shared
environmental influences, on CD. The study was based on a sample of 570
monozygotic twin pairs, 592 dizygotic twin pairs, and 426 non-twin siblings,
aged 12-18 years,
who were recruited through the Colorado Twin Registry. In addition, the study
found that there was a significant correlation between the non-shared environmental
influences on lifetime CD and lifetime MDD. Furthermore, it found that there
was no evidence of a significant correlation between shared environmental
influences on MDD and CD.
In this study, the researchers
conclude
that
the data demonstrate the importance of nonshared environment in the etiology of
disorders diagnosed in adolescence. This study of adolescent psychopathology is
valuable, as are many other studies of adult psychopathology and disorders diagnosed in
infancy, childhood,
and adolescence, because of the focus on the significance of non-shared
environment in each of the three areas of developmental psychology, namely
cognitive, physical and social development. These three areas will also be relevant in
relation to the psychological aspects of human cloning.
Identity, individuality,
personality development, and all the characteristics that would make a person
unique, are
the
result of the interaction between genetics and the environment. The uniqueness
of each
human
is shaped from the first moment the brain of the particular person is
stimulated by the environment through her senses (Elbert, Heim, and Rockstroh, 2001; Nelson, 2000;
Nelson, Thomas, and de Haan, 2006). That would also be the case for humans beings created
through genetic manipulation. With monozygotic twins or cloned human babies, even
small differences in the time of birth could lead to differences of handling and treatment by their
primary care givers, which in turn would lead to differences in the way the identical
twin or baby clone would experience the contact. This initial contact that is part of the
attachment process is important, especially in regard to the manner in which
monozygotic twins and/or baby clones will be adjusted at home, and will
interact with their parents and/or family environments in the first moments of life.
Psychology and other social
sciences, as well as the natural sciences, need to work together
to find standards of behavior to help the health care system,
potential parents, and primary caregivers to interact with human babies
created through genetic manipulation (including cloned newborns). Those standards
of behavior should be the focus of attention in any further studies related to
identity and personality development of human beings created through genetic
manipulation. The basis of these standards, designed and prepared to be used
during the first moments of life after the birth of children created by genetic
manipulation, and for the following period of postnatal care, should not be so different from the
standards that have been proven to work best so far for ordinary human beings. The
mind of a human being is not only the result of genetic programming, but the result of
an interaction between genetics and the stimuli of environmental forces. In
other words, a cloned human will be an individual who will have his or her own
mind, identity and personality. A cloned individual created by genetic
manipulation will be an individual human being.
Society,
culture, ideology, forms of government, and the manipulation of the mass media
are more a threat to the uniqueness of a human being than human cloning
Society and political systems,
cultures and forms of
government, certain ideologies, and the manipulation of attitudes and beliefs of
citizens by powerful economic, ideological and political structures can induce
citizens to have similar attitudes and belief systems, and can influence the way
people think, feel, and behave. According to Chomsky (2002), these powerful
interests in the society and its political systems use effective mechanisms of
persuasion to manipulate the beliefs and attitudes of the individuals in their
concrete life; these are the real threats to the independence of thought of the people in a
society.
We do not need human cloning
to generate similar attitudes, belief systems, and behaviors in society that
can make people look
and sound similar. Many of us know that when we meet people with similar
backgrounds (in
terms of culture, education, and religion, among other environmental factors) they have a tendency to
appear and sound similar in general terms, since they have a tendency to share
similar opinions, attitudes, and interests. Science, biotechnology, and human cloning are
not the threat to individuality and the uniqueness of a human being. Foucault
(2000) points out that the real threat to individuality and uniqueness comes
from institutions of subjugation, new technologies of the exercise of power,
and the highly complex systems of manipulation and conditioning that are embedded in the
persuasive messages of power structures.
It is not through human
cloning that attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors can be replicated in society, and that people can develop
a “cloned mind.”
The “cloned mind” phenomenon has always existed as the product of oppressive institutions that
restrict uniqueness and individuality in order to maintain power and control. Paradoxically, the
representatives of power structures in society are the ones who limit new
discoveries and technologies, since new discoveries in science and
revolutionary technologies often create new scientific paradigms or
paradigm shifts (Kuhn, 1962/1996). These are a challenge to the traditional institutions, the
elite culture, and the “propaganda model” that indoctrinates, controls society, and supports the existing power structures.
Moreover, the individuality
and uniqueness of the person are also affected in societies where the system expects
people to sacrifice individual needs and their own expectations in order to satisfy the
expectations of institutions or governments. However, even when the
individuality and uniqueness of human beings are threatened in this way, the similarities
do not make these human beings identical, since genetic and environmental
factors interact and influence different areas of human development. This
gene-environment interaction creates differences between human beings that are
the basis for individuality and uniqueness.
Ideology,
human cloning, and social change
The objectivity of science and
how the results of science should be applied in society have been always, in one way or
another, compromised by the
ideology of the scientists. Researchers often find themselves, directly or
indirectly,
supporting the ideology of the structures of power in society. These structures
of power are the major economic, cultural, and political institutions of the
given social order, and its dominant ideologies. They are also the dominant
institutional network of the established order, which defends, maintains, and protects the social status
quo, the self-reproductive
mechanisms of society, the ruling class (or classes) of the established order,
and the power of its ruling ideology (Althusser, 1971/2001; Chomsky, 2002;
Foucault, 1971/1982, 2000; Meszaros, 1989).
The dominant ideologies of the
prevailing social order enjoy a privilege, and an important positional
advantage, within the framework of the ideological discourse in the society,
and they can also dictate the overall conditions, and the rules of the
ideological discourse itself (Meszaros, 1989). In the case of the highly
controversial issue of human cloning, ideology is playing a very important
role. This
is not
only because of the ethical issues involved, but for the important changes
human cloning will bring to this planet at the scientific, social,
psychological, economic, and political levels.
Those changes, which can affect the
nature of social institutions and change social behaviors, do not have to be
negative, but may very well be the result of radical changes in terms of
fundamental principles and facts within many sciences. These radical changes can be understood
as paradigm shifts
that several sciences are experiencing (Kuhn, 1962/1996). Such changes will
probably lead to a new perspective in understanding life on this planet.
We will probably experience social change as a result of
paradigm shifts
and radical and revolutionary changes in sciences. However, even when these changes
could be beneficial for humanity, they may create anxiety within the structures
of power and dominant ideologies. Reactions to changes as a result of new
discoveries may not exclude the possibility that certain groups in the
scientific community may actively support the status quo, maintained by existing power structures,
or feel threatened by new directions in science that require fundamental
changes in the way humans understand the world and interact with it.
We probably cannot expect that
these new directions in science will take place without political, economic, and psychosocial
changes in the society. These changes will affect the process by which
different groups of people make decisions in society, and the new directions in
science will lead to
psychosocial changes that will entail new patterns of behavior as a result of
unique internal processes at individual and group level. These changes will
affect the concepts that people have of social institutions, and the way we think about
religion, education, family, relationships, welfare, legislation, and forms of
government. Defense and policy planning may be also affected by the fast development of
science and technology.
Manipulation
of the public opinion and attitudes toward human cloning
Research in genetics has been
advancing rapidly in the last few years, and it is important that a broader
understanding of its possible repercussions or consequences follow these
scientific advances. The scientific aspects of human cloning have been affected
by the
strong
beliefs of
different
groups within
society.
Ideology is clearly influencing the direction of the societal debate, research,
and relevant
legislation. Religion,
morality, and political and ethical thought are also trying to respond and accommodate to the new
challenges presented by human cloning.
It is essential to mention how
the manipulation of the public opinion to implant ideology and pseudoscience is
facilitated by power structures that use the mass media to achieve their goals
(Korten, 2001). I would use not only the term “propaganda,” to explain the
negative messages associated with human cloning, but the concept of
“fragmentation of information” for the manipulation of attitudes within a
social context. Fragmentation better exemplifies the way in which power
structures use the mass media to disaggregate and split messages so that
incomplete information reaches the public.
It is through the systematic
implementation and dissemination of “fragmented information” that the attitudes
and the willpower of the population can be manipulated. When important pieces
of information do not reach the public, or when that information as a whole is
split or separated from other links of information, the audiences cannot
properly assess the information and arrive at appropriate conclusions. They cannot
exercise their own volition and rational control. When the information is fragmented,
the message is always incomplete, out of context, and placed without the
important links and pieces of information that would make the material
intelligible.
When pieces or fragments of
information about stem cell research and human cloning technology are
distributed to the public in a “fragmented” fashion, isolated from other pieces
of information that are important for the public to understand these
technologies, then the information is fragmented and atomized, and becomes
unintelligible. Fragmented information about stem cell research and human
cloning technology deprives the population of having control over the
information received, and of the ability to make a rational and healthy
distinction between their values, their interests and beliefs, and to exercise rational
control.
When information about
controversial,
but important,
topics relating
to science
and technology is “fragmented,” the systematic implementation of new practices alienates
the population, and takes from the citizens the right to exercise rational
control of the information that they receive. Disinformation, propaganda,
and fragmentation of information transform audiences into masses that can be
easily manipulated. These extremely powerful practices are not independent of
the form of government; they are a central feature of a democratic system and the
leading doctrine of modern liberal-democratic intellectual thought (Chomsky,
2002). In countries where the power of the government is centralized, or
under the control of a state bureaucracy, the control of the media is under
official censorship. When that is the case, it is more clear and evident that
the work of the mass media is at the service of the dominant elite. It is much harder to
see a propaganda system at work where the media are private and there is no
official censorship (Herman and Chomsky, 2002; Chomsky, 2002).
In regards to human cloning,
stem cell research,
and other advances in biotechnology, the propaganda model and the fragmentation
of information involve the manipulation of data related to important
developments in biotechnology. This redirects the attitudes of the people, in order to create
support for the political, economic, and ideological interests of the existing structures of
power, in
a manner that is not always in the best interest of the people or of society as a whole.
Human
cloning, the mass media, and the social sciences perspective
In an attempt to address these
issues from the social sciences perspective, Petersen (2001) designed a study
to investigate how the print news media cover stories relating to genetics and
medicine, including therapeutic cloning and reproductive cloning. Petersen
found that the print news media play an important role in influencing the
public response to health problems.
In another study of the
public’s perception of media coverage of genetic research, Geller, Bernhard and Holzman
(2002) also found that the media play an important role in influencing the public
response, and that,
despite widespread media coverage, the public may not be well informed about
new genetic advances. Geller et al. indicate that a lack of accuracy in media
coverage, focus on the negative aspects of genetic discoveries, and omission of
important facts, can lead to misconceptions and fears about the applicability
of genetic advances.
According to Mahowald (2003), there are three key aspects of the
debate about
educating
the public concerning advances in biotechnology. These are the involvement of
bioethicists, terminological difficulties, and problematic arguments. Mahowald
states that the media educate non-scientists about biotechnological advances. The
media have
little
knowledge of
these issues,
but rely on the opinions reported from bioethicists. On the other hand, bioethicists
have usually not been trained in biological sciences and have only superficial
knowledge of
the issues addressed. Mahowald also argues that, even when some bioethicists
are knowledgeable, the credibility of their conclusions depends on the
credibility of their premises and the use of pertinent and current data from
respected scientific sources.
Petersen (2001) and Geller et al. (2002) mention that, with the emergence
of the new genetic technologies, which are becoming more integrated into preventive
medicine and public health, it is important to study how the coverage of these
new technologies can help stimulate public debate. Etkin (2002) wonders how scientists should consider the impact of
human cloning technology on society. At the same time, it is important that the
coverage of these profound issues take place not only in the medical,
ethical, and social sciences, but also in the field of psychology. The coverage of new
technologies such as human cloning can help to stimulate debate and research on cloning’s psychological
aspects.
Human
cloning and the creation of clones are inevitable
In 1997, Ian Wilmut and his
associates at the Roslin Institute in
There is awareness in the
scientific community, including the medical community, that human cloning and
the creation of clones are inevitable (Khan, 2003; Murray, 2002; Van
Steenbergen, 2002). There is also a belief that the medical community will one
day have to address the care of and respect for people created by cloning
techniques, and that the discussion of issues related to human cloning must begin now,
before the first person born in this manner becomes fact (Bonnicksen, 1998;
“First principles”,
1999).
Psychology and human cloning
Some scientists think that
there should be more connection between the behavioral sciences and
biology.
The new advanced technologies, such as genetic
engineering and human cloning, are bringing unprecedented challenges in terms of
their behavioral, political, and ethical implications. These implications must
be addressed on time, or society risks the consequences of an uncontrolled future (Resnik,
1998; Satava, 2002). In other fields of learning, such as
sociology, history, medicine, genetics, and philosophy, the issues concerning
human cloning and its implications on human behavior have been a focus of
study. Many scholars in these fields have pointed out the need for debate
(Breyer, 2000) and discussed a variety of concerns relating to various aspects of
human cloning that include psychological aspects and the perceptions and attitudes of the public.
A
transhumanist psychology and the need for a
different way of thinking about life, new technologies and creation
Research on human genetic
engineering will facilitate human beings reaching another stage in history
where all the expressions of science will be used to enhance our physical, social,
emotional, and cognitive abilities. A civilization that uses genetic
manipulation to enhance human beings’ physical capabilities will make a
transition to another stage in human evolution. This will be called a posthuman
stage, and
is one in
which psychology should play a very important role.
With all the changes that
human cloning will precipitate, we may conclude that ideology and the
convergence of natural sciences with the social sciences will play a
fundamental role in the transition from a transhuman society, in which advances
in physics, biotechnology and medicine will help the human race to overcome
physical
and
social limitations that hinder humans in their search for harmony within the universe.
Psychology should be a science that helps us to understand and incorporate
any methods or technologies that help to enhance the physical and cognitive
abilities of human beings. It is imperative for psychology to cooperate with
other sciences for the incorporation of the responsible use of human cloning
techniques, and the use of diverse biotechnological advances, genetic
manipulation, and the development of therapies that have the potential to
eliminate serious diseases that bring so much pain and suffering.
Advances in biotechnology will
bring not only the possibility of using genetic manipulation for physical and
mental augmentation. New techniques also have the potential to eliminate the
need for organ transplants, and hence the corruption and crime involved in the illegal
traffic of human organs. It may also alleviate the psychological suffering of
childless couples, who are reluctant to initiate what is sometimes a long and
emotionally conflictive adoption process. Advances in biotechnology, and more
specifically in human cloning techniques, have countless applications from
which humanity can obtain benefits. Contrary to what the critics of human cloning have stated, and
paradoxically, the perfection of human cloning techniques could become a safe
harbor for the preservation of the human species and the entire
human genome. The perfection of human cloning techniques could provide the
possibility to preserve and replicate the genetic code of a human being, as it
is today, in the case that unwanted or unknown events could mutate, or threaten to
mutate, a genomic region,
or the entire human genome.
Obviously, for those who
believe and trust that advances in science and biotechnology will bring only
something positive to humanity, the hope is that human augmentation will help human
beings to interact better with our environment and within this universe that we share with other
living things. At that point, we will have reached a
posthuman stage. Human enhancement is a period of transition, a transhuman
stage, in which humans will be able to enhance the capacity of their bodies, in
order to cope better with the continuous demands of the environment, and which will bring human
beings closer to becoming an integral part of the unity of this universe.
If we are to reach a posthuman
stage, all sciences – social sciences
and natural sciences together –
will have to work through a transitional period in which we recognize and accept
that we have reached a point of no return in the course of the human history in
this planet. We have already started a transition, a transhuman stage, which we
should consider a transition to a posthuman stage, where humans will transcend
their inherited
body,
with all its physical, social, emotional, and cognitive limitations, and
convert it to an enhanced body, which will have more chance to deal with the continual pressures and
demands of our rapidly developing human civilization.
A transhumanist psychology will
examine the
internal
mental processes that will emerge from the new existential issues that humans
will face when confronted with the possibility of using any available
technologies to enhance cognitive, physical, and social functions, in order to
overcome biological limitations. Human beings who are considering the idea of accepting
human cloning, and treatments that will reduce their biological limitations,
will experience conflicts, ethical dilemmas, and existential problems that
may require short-term or long-term
psychological support or even, sometimes, psychotherapy. The psychological support
or treatment will not be there to make decisions for the client, but to help the
client to find her or his own decisions. This approach will try to reflect the
client’s feelings, thoughts, and existential dilemmas, will provide and amplify
information about the technologies available, and will facilitate support, and reflect
existential, ontological, and epistemological issues and questions.
This psychotherapeutic – though sometimes only
supportive – approach will use a transhumanist terminology within
the framework of a transhumanist philosophy. A transhumanist psychology,
although possessing an eclectic character, may need to use, depending on the client's resources, needs,
and issues, a psychodynamic, existential, and sometimes cognitive approach, and
will make use of extensive information about neuropsychology, biology, basic
laws of physics, and philosophy.
A transhumanist psychology
should use information from different disciplines in order to inform appropriately,
and support psychologically, the client in his or her transition through a
transhuman life. Today, the psychology
profession is facing unprecedented challenges presented by biotechnology and
other practical disciplines such as chemical engineering, robotics,
nanotechnology, computational neuroscience, and information technology. It is
imperative to recognize that we are entering a new era, with distinctive events
and characterized by particular scientific discoveries. These require a shift
in the way psychology takes responsibility to help individuals and society.
Psychology needs to follow the progress that humans are taking in transition to a
posthuman stage.
Final
thoughts
Among the technological
advances that have brought the most intensive debates and controversy in
society, we find stem cell
research and human cloning. They are examples of the types of research that
have created strong reactions from different groups within society. The
cloning debate has been reinforced with ethical, religious, scientific, moral,
medical, and political issues, since human cloning became a real prospect in the late
1990s
(Baird, 1999; Fiddler, Pergament, and Pergament, 1999; Fung, 2000; Madigan, 1998;
Shannon, 1998; Shapiro, 1999; Vastag, 2001; Wills, 1998).
Technological advances are
also affecting human attitudes to the notions
of time, space, life span, longevity, spirituality, the meaning of life,
suffering, and the concept of death, and the notion of creation. It is precisely
when we are confronted with an overwhelming range of new technologies, and with so many
possibilities to use them, that different feelings, many new thoughts, different
attitudes, and anxiety can all develop.
According to Obermann (1999), creation of human
clones is inevitable. Creation is a concept that some view with respect, others
with fascination, others with fear (Dyens, 2002/2003; Porter-O’Grady, 2003) or
curiosity. McGee (2001) states that human cloning offers an insight into the
power of creation. Indeed, attitudes toward cloning may be related to some
basic human feelings, such as the fear of facing something as challenging as creation, and from
a totally different perspective. Instead of expanding the concept of
creation and adapting ourselves to a new reality, with an open mind, and with
flexibility, some may choose for a mystification of the concept.
Science may help us get closer
to finding new meanings for creation and expanding its concept. That
possibility creates many fears, and psychology has its own challenge if it is to be of help. Human cloning
may present one of the greatest challenges to humans, which is to deal with a
difficult question: What is creation? Perhaps one of the greatest fears humans
may have about human cloning is related to the possibility of expanding even
more the concept of creation.
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