|
A peer-reviewed
electronic journal published by the Institute for Ethics and ISSN
1541-0099 21(1)
– January 2010 |
Editorial: Nietzsche and European Posthumanisms
Russell Blackford
Editor-in-Chief, Journal of Evolution and Technology
russellblackford@bigpond.com
Journal
of Evolution and Technology - Vol. 21 Issue 1 – January 2010
- pgs i-iii
http://jetpress.org/v21/blackford.htm
In issue 20(1) of The Journal of Evolution and Technology, we published “Nietzsche,
the Overhuman, and Transhumanism” by Stefan Lorenz Sorgner (March 2009). In
this intriguing article, Sorgner argues that there are significant similarities
between the concept of the posthuman (as typically deployed in transhumanist thought)
and Nietzsche’s celebrated notion
of the overhuman (often referred to, perhaps misleadingly, as “the Superman”). Sorgner does not claim that late twentieth-century
and contemporary transhumanist thinkers were knowingly influenced by Nietzsche:
this is a question that he explicitly leaves open. Nor does he depict transhumanism
as monolithic, or the concept of the posthuman as unambiguous. For all that, he
suggests that the similarity between the two concepts – overhuman and posthuman
– is not merely superficial: it lies at a fundamental level.
Sorgner compares the posthuman and overhuman
concepts in a way that is calculated to bring out a deep similarity. He discusses,
for example, how the relevant systems of thought are alike in viewing humanity
as merely a work in progress, with only limited potential in the absence of a
radical transformation. Humanity is, in other words, not an evolutionary culmination but something
that cries out for improvement. Sorgner adds, however, that the idea of the
overhuman provides Nietzsche with a grounding for values that appears to be missing
in transhumanist thought.
As Sorgner develops his thesis, Nietzsche
rejects any concept of transcendent meaning, but finds value in the interest of
“higher
humans” in permanently and
continually “overcoming”
themselves. On this approach, the ultimate “overcoming” consists in surpassing the
human species itself. The prospect of success in creation of the overhuman is
thus supposed to give meaning to human beings who are immersed in the efforts of
self-overcoming. For individuals with a scientific materialist view of the
world, or a scientific “spirit,” and who have rejected the epistemic and moral
authority claimed by Christianity, this is supposed to provide an alternative
source of meaning. Sorgner’s thesis, then, is that Nietzsche’s thought contains
an important value dimension. Further, he suggests, this is missing from the
transhumanist movement, which would do well to incorporate it. As Sorgner puts
the matter:
Transhumanists, at least in the articles which I have
consulted, have not explained why they hold the values they have, and why they
want to bring about posthumans. Nietzsche, on the other hand, explains the
relevance of the overhuman for his philosophy. The overhuman may even be the
ultimate foundation for his worldview.
Is this correct? The intellectual focus for
this journal – its own foundation for being – is the increasingly familiar idea
that the human species is about to commence, or has perhaps has already
commenced, a new form of evolution that is powered by technology. Of course, we
acknowledge the facts of biological evolution, as described in contemporary,
well-evidenced neo-Darwinian formulations (see, for example, my review of
Coyne's Why Evolution Is True in issue
20(2)). There is no legitimate controversy about this. Our role, however, is to
present and examine genuinely the controversial idea of a transformation of
humanity through means far more rapid than the mechanisms of survival,
reproduction, and adaptation, or other evolutionary mechanisms recognized in
the current synthesis, such as genetic drift.
On geological timescales, the various
biological mechanisms can produce vast diversity in life forms and the
appearance of intricate design. Biological evolution postulates no intelligent
designer or teleological causation. By contrast, the new form of evolution, imagined
by transhumanists and many others, would be far more rapid and driven by very different
mechanisms. It would be, at least to an extent, deliberate, and powered by new
technologies (products of intelligence) that increasingly work their way into
the human body.
It is unclear what Nietzsche would make of
such a technologically-mediated form of evolution in human psychology,
capacities, and (perhaps) morphology. Nonetheless, he advocated a program for overcoming
the human that is at least superficially
similar to the calls of transhumanists to enhance human capacities through technological
interventions. How deep, then, does the resemblance go?
With Stefan Sorgner’s paper in hand, we thought
it worthwhile to seek further insights and reactions. To what extent does
transhumanist thought resemble that of Nietzsche? Is there any direct (or even
indirect) line of influence? Beyond Nietzsche, what about other European (and
perhaps other) thinkers who postulated an imperative to overcome human
limitations and surpass what we have experienced, to date, as “the human”?
Accordingly, we called for papers
responding to the issues raised by Sorgner, or to issues that arise naturally
from his discussion. We announced that we were looking for papers of two kinds:
(1) short responses (under 2000 words; these would not be peer-reviewed, but
selected by the editors on the basis of merit); and (2) full-length articles (which
would be peer-reviewed in the normal way).
We’ve received a pleasing
range of responses, and will be publishing them in this issue of the journal,
beginning with the shorter responses, which will be included under the heading “Peer Commentaries,” then going on to the
full-length articles. As has become our practice, we will generally publish
papers as they are ready, and will certainly not wait for an entire issue to be
uploaded on line at once. Hence, this issue will be a work in progress for the
next few months. We’ve also invited Sorgner to reply to the papers, including
this editorial, once they are all published. We are looking forward to this –
knowing already how much variety will confront him.
Even after the current issue of the journal takes its
final form, we expect the debate to continue. Does modern transhumanism contain
adequate resources for a meaningful life, as Nietzsche evidently thought he was
providing in his body of philosophical work? Should it even attempt to do so –
or should it aim at something more modest, perhaps at accurate prediction, or
at flexible thinking about the future, or some circumscribed utilitarian goals?
What, after all, is the point of the
transhumanist movement? If the vision of posthuman beings, with capacities
greatly exceeding our own, is realistic at all, what moral responsibility do we
have, collectively or as individuals, to bring such beings about (or perhaps to
avoid doing so)? Overall, is a vision of the coming “posthuman” an adequate
source for meaningfulness in our lives? Why, or why not?
As always in
Please join us as our special Nietzsche and European Posthumanisms
issue takes form online. And stay with us beyond the next few months as the
discussion of these issues continues and evolves … into our unknown future.