|
A peer-reviewed
electronic journal published by the Institute for Ethics and ISSN
1541-0099 21(1)
– January 2010 |
The Overhuman in the Transhuman
Max More
Strategic philosopher, The Proactionary Project
max@maxmore.com
Journal
of Evolution and Technology - Vol. 21 Issue 1 – January 2010 - pgs 1-4
http://jetpress.org/more.htm
Abstract
Stefan
Sorgner (2009) says that on becoming familiar with transhumanism, he “immediately thought that there were many
fundamental similarities between transhumanism and
Nietzsche’s philosophy, especially concerning the concept of the posthuman and that of Nietzsche’s overhuman.”
In contrast to Bostrom (2005), Sorgner
sees significant and fundamental similarities between the posthuman
and the overhuman. (I will adopt his use of “overhuman” in place of “overman”
or Übermensch.)
This overall view seems to me highly plausible. I agree with most of Sorgner’s comments in this respect. My intent is to give
further support to the conceptual parallels. In addition, I argue that these
are not merely parallels: transhumanist ideas were
directly influenced by Nietzsche.
Introduction
Should transhumanists
look upon Friedrich Nietzsche’s thought as an embarrassment – just as Nietzsche suggested
the ape was to man? Is there an abyss between his “philosophy with a hammer” and the philosophy of transhumanism? Stefan Sorgner (2009)
says that on becoming familiar with transhumanism, he
“immediately thought that there were many fundamental similarities between transhumanism and Nietzsche’s philosophy, especially
concerning the concept of the posthuman and that of
Nietzsche’s overhuman.” In contrast to Bostrom (2005), Sorgner sees
significant and fundamental similarities between the posthuman
and the overhuman. (I will adopt his use of “overhuman” in place of “overman”
or Übermensch.) This overall
view seems to me highly plausible. I agree with most of Sorgner’s
comments in this respect. My intent is to give further support to the
conceptual parallels. In addition, I argue that these are not merely parallels: transhumanist
ideas were directly influenced by Nietzsche.
First, it is
necessary to note that an enormous range of ideas can be found in Nietzsche’s
writing, some of which – especially comparing different periods of his work – may
be inconsistent. Although there are clear parallels between Nietzsche’s
thinking and some core transhumanist ideas, the
latter are inspired very selectively by the former. Perhaps the most
salient example of
a Nietzschean idea alien to transhumanism
is his “eternal recurrence.” Nietzsche thought this idea
inseparable from that of the overman (or overhuman).
Many scholars
have been puzzled at this connection and have often rejected eternal recurrence.
Nietzsche’s attachment to the concept probably results from his seeing it as
the ultimate affirmation of the real world as against the Christian (and
Platonic) denial of the primacy of the actual, physical reality. Not only is
eternal recurrence a bizarre piece of metaphysics in itself, it was part of
Nietzsche’s denial of the idea of progress. Both for its inherent
implausibility and for its opposition to progress, this concept cannot be
reconciled with transhumanism. Nevertheless, several
other concepts can be so reconciled. As a strong opponent of philosophical
systems, Nietzsche could hardly object to transhumanism’s
picking and choosing from among his thoughts.
Direct influence
Sorgner’s
essay establishes parallels between transhumanism and
Nietzsche’s thought, but does not address the question of whether transhumanist ideas were directly influenced by
Nietzsche. I can state with complete confidence that such an influence does
indeed exist. I know that because his ideas influenced my own thinking. That
thinking led to my introduction of the term “transhumanism”
(only later did I discover Huxley’s prior use of the term), to the publication
of my essay, “Transhumanism: Towards a Futurist
Philosophy” (More 1990), and to my original transhumanist
statement, “The Extropian Principles” (later “The
Principles of Extropy”, More 1990b). While these
essays are far from the only sources of contemporary transhumanism,
these seminal writings have been influential. Since they were themselves
influenced by some of Nietzsche’s core ideas, the direct connection between transhumanism and Nietzsche is established.
In “Transhumanism: Towards a Futurist Philosophy,” for
instance, I wrote that “The religionist has no answer to the extropic challenge put by Nietzsche’s Zarathustra:
‘I teach you the overman. Man is something that is to
be overcome. What have you done to overcome him?’” Sorgner
notes, “The overhuman represents the meaning of the
earth. The overhuman is supposed to represent the
meaning-giving concept within Nietzsche’s worldview which is supposed to
replace the basically Christian worldview.” He also states that “Nietzsche
upheld that the concept of the overhuman is the
meaning of the earth. I think that the relevance of the posthuman
can only be fully appreciated if one acknowledges that its ultimate foundation
is that it gives meaning to scientifically minded people.” This again agrees
closely with my “Transhumanism” essay in which I
wrote: “I agree with Nietzsche (in The
Will to Power) that nihilism is only a transitional stage resulting from
the breakdown of an erroneous interpretation of the world. We now have plenty
of resources to leave nihilism behind, affirming a positive (but continually
evolving) value-perspective.”
Critical rationalism
Reflecting its
humanist and Enlightenment roots, transhumanism
places an extremely high value on rationality. Especially popular among transhumanists is critical rationalism. This form of
rationalism differs from the foundationalist
certitude of Descartes. In its most consistent form it becomes pancritical rationalism (Bartley 1984). As Sorgner points out, Nietzsche, too, had an immense respect
for critical thinking and valued scientific inquiry highly.
In my 1994 talk
on pancritical rationalism at the first Extropy Institute conference (More 1994), I started by
citing Nietzsche’s statement: “A very popular error: having the courage of
one's convictions; rather it is a matter of having the courage for an attack on
one’s convictions!” I might just as easily have cited another passage:
“Convictions are more dangerous foes of truth than lies.” Or the passage from The Gay Science (Nietzsche 1882): “Not to question, not to tremble with the
craving and joy of questioning … that is what I feel to be contemptible, and this feeling is the first thing I seek in
everyone: some foolishness persuades me ever and again that every human being
has this feeling, as a human being. It is my kind of injustice.” Although
Nietzsche is not essential to critical rationalism, he does provide inspiration
for what might otherwise seem a dry epistemology.
Self-Transformation
One of the core
transhumanist principles of extropy
has been that of Self-Transformation. In a later version of the Principles,
this was complemented by the principle of Self-Direction. Both of these are
highly compatible with Nietzsche’s thinking. They are also influenced by his
work, along with that of many other thinkers. Most centrally, I would point to Zarathustra’s declaration (Nietzsche 1885): “And life
itself confided this secret to me: ‘Behold,’ it said, ‘I am that which must always overcome itself.’”
From both the
individual and species perspective, the concept of self-overcoming resonates
strongly with extropic, transhumanist
ideals and goals. Although Nietzsche had little to say about technology as a
means of self-overcoming, neither did he rule it out. And, as a champion of
what he saw as a coming age of science, it is not difficult to see technology
as part of the process of self-overcoming, so long as it is integrated firmly
with will and self-assertion. Self-assertion in this case, of course, being not assertion of an existing self to preserve
itself, but a striving to “become who you are”. New technologies allow us new
means of becoming who we are – another step toward posthuman
ideals – and new ways of “giving style” to our character. As
Nietzsche put it: “a great and rare art!”
Utilitarianism,
slave-morality, and heroic transhumanism
The sole reason
Bostrom (2005) gives for saying that transhumanism has merely “some surface-level similarities
with the Nietzschean vision” is that transhumanism – thanks to its Enlightenment roots – has an
emphasis on individual liberties and a “concern for the welfare of all humans
(and other sentient beings).” Bostrom is correct about
this emphasis, as reflected, for instance, in the principle of Self-Direction
in the Principles of Extropy. Bostrom
concludes that transhumanism therefore “probably has
as much or more in common with Nietzsche’s contemporary J.S. Mill, the English
liberal thinker and utilitarian.”
Nietzsche
famously had nothing positive to say about the utilitarians.
When he mentioned them, it was to say something caustically critical, such as:
“Man does not strive for pleasure; only the Englishman does” (Nietzsche 1889).
Should we infer from Nietzsche’s distaste for the slave-morality of
utilitarianism (which
turns every moral agent into a slave yoked to the task of maximizing the
greatest good of the greatest number) that transhumanism
has little in common with Nietzsche’s thinking? I think not.
What we can
infer is that differing variants of transhumanism are
possible. Certainly there is no inconsistency between transhumanism
and a utilitarian morality. But neither is there any inconsistency between transhumanism and a more Nietzschean
view of morality. While Nietzsche viewed morality as essentially perspectival, we can easily enough fit him loosely within
the virtue ethics approach classically represented by Aristotle. Yes, transhumanism can be sanitized and made safe so that it
fits comfortably with utilitarian thinking. Or we can take seriously
Nietzsche’s determination to undertake a “revaluation of all values.”
This not need imply
any kind of illiberal social or political system. It may simply lead to a
version of transhumanism that champions the
self-overcoming of the individual without an obligation to “the masses.” Many sound pragmatic reasons exist for
each of us to want to uplift everyone – at least for those of us who reject the
idea of society and economy as a zero-sum game. Pragmatic considerations are
not the only reason a Nietzschean transhumanist
may have for benevolence of this kind. Unlike a utilitarian transhumanist
who must regard uplifting others as an obligation, a Nietzschean
transhumanist would look upon the prospect of
uplifting the masses as an expression of overflowing personal power or
well-being or health.
Neither a
utilitarian nor a Nietzschean transhumanism
can plausibly claim to be the true transhumanism.
Both share the central elements of the radical transhumanist
worldview. My goal has not been to show that transhumanism
must be Nietzschean.
It has been to show that central elements of Nietzsche’s philosophy are not
only compatible with transhumanism, but have
historically had a considerable direct influence on major strands of this
philosophy of life.
References
Bartley,
W. W.
Bostrom,
N. 2005. A history of transhumanist
thought. Journal of
Evolution and Technology 14 (1).
Kaufmann, W. A.
1974. Nietzsche: Philosopher, psychologist, antichrist. 4th edition;
More, M. 1990,
revised 1996. Transhumanism: Towards a futurist philosophy.
Extropy 6.
<http://www.maxmore.com/transhum.htm>
More, M. (1990b
revised 2003). The principles of extropy,
version 3.11. Extropy 5.5 (1990 version).
<http://www.extropy.org/principles.htm>
More,
M. 1994. Pancritical rationalism:
An extropic metacontext for
memetic progress. Proceedings of the Extro-1 Conference, Extropy Institute.
Nietzsche, F.
1889. Twilight of the idols.
(Available in various editions.)
Nietzsche, F.
1885. Zarathustra
II 12. (Available in various editions.)
Nietzsche, F.
1882. The gay science.
(Available in various editions.)
Sorgner, S.
L. 2009. Nietzsche, the overhuman,
and transhumanism. Journal of Evolution and
Technology 20(1): 29-42.