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A peer-reviewed electronic journal published by the Institute for Ethics and ISSN 1541-0099 22(1) – December 2011 |
Memory Enhancement: The Issues We Should Not Forget About
Laura Y.
Cabrera
Institute
for Biomedical Ethics Basel
Basel, Switzerland
Journal of Evolution and Technology - Vol. 22 Issue 1 – December 2011 - pgs 97-109
Abstract
The human brain is in
great part what it is because of the functional and structural properties of
the 100 billion interconnected neurons that form it. These make it the body’s
most complex organ, and the one we most associate with concepts of selfhood and
identity. The assumption held by many supporters of human enhancement, transhumanism, and technological posthumanity
seems to be that the human brain can be continuously improved, as if it were
another one of our machines. In this paper, I focus on some of the ethical
issues that we should keep in mind when thinking about memory enhancement
interventions. I start with an overview of one of the most precious capacities
of the brain, namely memory. Then I analyze the
different kinds of memory interventions that exist or are under research. Finally,
I point out the issues that we should not forget when we consider enhancing our
memories. In this regard, my argument is not against memory enhancement
interventions; rather, it concentrates on the need to “keep in mind” what kind
of enhancements we want. We should consider whether we want the kind of
“enhancements” that will end up making us lose synapse connections, or the kind
that promote more use of them.
Human
memory: an overview
The human brain is in great part
what it is because of the functional and structural properties of the around
100 billion interconnected neurons that form it. Considering that, on average,
each of the neocortical neurons has 7,000 connections to other neurons (SFN
2008), the brain is undeniably the body’s most complex
organ. One very important core faculty associated with our brains is memory.
When talking about the kind of technological
interventions that are becoming available, we need to understand memory as more
than just stored information in our minds. I am not trying here to fully
explain what memory is, as memory has been studied in many different
disciplines, from neurobiology to philosophy, and there is no obvious consensus
on what it really is or how it really works. Thus, for my analysis here I will
focus mostly on a brain-based account of memory (a neurobiological approach to the
subject).
In the past, memory was viewed as
a unitary system performing recall and learning of information, and associating
related pieces of information with each other (Bear et al. 2001, Liao and
Sandberg 2008). This unitary view was later replaced by an approach that divided
memory into a number of functional systems, each with more specialized
functions. As a result of this, memory is viewed now as the result of multiple
systems that have different logics and neuroanatomical bases, which give us the
capacity for retaining, recalling and “storing” experiences (Bear et al. 2001, Kandel and Squire 2000). This conception of memory allows for
interventions to focus on particular functional systems, for instance memory
consolidation or memory retrieval.
In the literature, one of the
most influential classifications to date of memory’s component systems is that
developed by Atkinson and Shiffrin.1 The
Atkinson and Shiffrin model of memory, also known as the
multi-store model, distinguishes between: sensory memory (SM), short-term
memory (STM), and long-term memory (LTM). According to this model, our senses first
receive stimuli from the environment. The sensory memory, which lasts just a
few seconds (1-2s), translates this information into interpretable elements.
The translated information is either relayed to STM or lost forever. Most biological
theories of memory agree with the idea that STMs are first stored in the medial
temporal system in the form of particular self-sustaining neural activity
patterns with different synaptic weights). Some of these short-term memories
(particularly, but not necessarily, those that persist) go through a process
called memory consolidation, in which they are transferred out of the medial
temporal system and distributed across networks in cortical regions, forming
long-term memories (Kandel and Squire 2000). In LTM,
the neurons involved in the patterns of neural activity become more strongly
connected through a process called long-term potentiation (LTP), which alters
the structure of the synapses involved (Bear et. al 2001, Kandel
and Squire 2000). Thus, when we say we store memories, it is not that we have a
particular area of storage in our brains; rather, this expression conveys that
our memories are kept in the form of distributed networks of potentiated
synapses across different regions and structures of our brains.
The outcome of all these processes
is what we commonly perceive as “memory,” that is to say, the capacity to
retain information and to reconstruct past associations and active states,
usually for present but also for future purposes. As Michael Gazzaniga has put it, our memories are “not so much a
mechanism for remembering the past as a means to prepare us for the future” (2005,
142).
The multi-store model brings to
light some important points for thinking about memory interventions. First, it
is not the same to alter memories that can easily be forgotten compared with altering
memories that can last a life time (LTM is less likely to be forgotten). This should
exert some weight when we assess the ethical aspects of memory modification
interventions. Second, memory is already affected by our different experiences
even when we are not conscious of the way this is done. Third, memory plays a
crucial role in cognition. Here, I am referring to cognition as the process or
processes by which an individual gains knowledge, or becomes aware, of events
in his/her environment, and uses that knowledge for comprehension and problem
solving about him or herself and about the world. Fourth,
there is evidence that the action of remembering itself quite often relies on
information outside our brains (i.e. the external world). And finally, there is
also evidence that the same mental state never occurs twice, at least for some
classes of mental states. That is, we never remember the same event in the same
way, as the recall is influenced by information available at the moment of
recollection (Schacter 2001), the aims we have at that
moment, our reinterpretations, our intervening experiences (Levy 2007, Popper
and Eccles 1985), and our emotions (McDonald 2008, McGaugh
2000) and desires (Frankfurt 1984). Consequently, it seems plausible that in
most cases we create a memory rather than actually recalling it (Engel 1999). Thus,
connections between events and memory traces, and between memory traces and
recollection, may be indirect, context-dependent, multiple, and sometimes not
necessary at all.
Summarizing, memory is one of the
most central capacities we have in as much as it: (a) relates to the core of
who we are in the most direct way (identity and continuity of the self); (b)
helps us to build an interpretation of ourselves and our environment (it gives
us a story, hopefully a coherent one, of ourselves and our world by
interpreting, constructing, and condensing life experiences); and (c) gives us a
sense of continuity and connection to ourselves and others. All these are
important insofar as our moral lives depend on the peculiar ways in which we
are embedded in time (our past experiences enable us to find a narrative of how
we come to be who we are now). It is because of all these characteristics that
memory interventions should be taken seriously. In the next section, I will
explore different memory enhancement interventions.
Memory enhancement:
between the possible and the imaginable
As mentioned above, memory
involves many mechanisms, and so there are many ways in which memory can be
affected. In a broad sense, every technology, starting with painting and
writing, has altered our ability to remember and our understanding of what it
means to remember (Zoloth 2006).
Some methods for affecting memory
have been used for thousands of years, and most people do not have any deep
intuitive feelings for or against them. They include, for example, education
and training (Bostrom and Sandberg 2009). Doing different
exercises (e.g. playing video games or putting together jigsaw puzzles), practicing
meditation, taking creativity courses, and drinking or eating certain herbs or
food supplements are also among the common methods for affecting memory. There
is also an expanding list of prospective biomedical enhancements, such as
pharmaceuticals and neuromodulation techniques (Bostrom and Sandberg 2009, Farah et al. 2004). However,
some researchers have argued that it is through non-biomedical means (e.g.
advances in information technology and computing) that the most dramatic
advances have been achieved, and will be achieved in future (Bostrom and Sandberg 2009).
The following are some examples of
different kinds of memory interventions that are being researched and
envisioned:
Chemical
interventions
Considering that memory processes
involve many different chemical messengers (neurotransmitters), one possible
way to modify memory is by chemical interventions. These kinds of interventions
are aimed at promoting or abolishing the formation of long term memories, or weakening
patterns of potentiated synapses that would affect memory retrieval. A good example, and not precisely high-tech, of how to weaken
memories is drinking alcoholic beverages. After a considerable amount of
these substances, people seem to remember less details, and in some cases do
not even remember anything at all.
It is already possible to observe
a wide range of memory enhancing drugs (although not all of them are medically
indicated for that particular purpose) that influence memory performance. The
most common ones – including hormones, stimulants, nutrients, neuromodulators,
and other drugs – improve memory encoding (Farah et al. 2004, Greely et al. 2008, Lynch 2002). These
drugs improve recall of any episode experienced shortly after they are taken
(e.g. modafinil improves working and episodic memory,
while methylphenidate improves working memory).
Another group of drugs has an
effect on memory consolidation, affecting long-term memory. Connected to these
kinds of drugs, recent findings of specific neurons involved in the formation
of memories are being used to develop new chemical strategies that can weaken
responses connected to memories (Netherlands Organization for Scientific
Research 2009). More recently, the finding of a molecule (PKMzeta)
known to preserve memories (Serrano et al. 2008, Shema
et al. 2011) and the role of calcium-permeable AMPA receptor dynamics in
synapses (Clem and Huganir 2010) are intended to be
used in the creation of therapies for treating depression, general anxiety,
addictions, post-traumatic stress, and phobias. This kind of memory
modification has received great interest from the military, particularly to
treat soldiers with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Even though the
long-term effects of these kinds of memory enhancement interventions in healthy
individuals remain largely unknown, their potential clinical significance in
the field of cognitive enhancement has been acknowledged by researchers (Greely
et al. 2008, Shema et al. 2011).
Genetic
intervention
Advances in genetics have made it
possible to relate specific genes to memory and to synaptic plasticity
(Carnegie Mellon University 2007). There are techniques now that allow us to
turn genes on and off and to delete specific genes in specific brain regions. A
recent example is the research of professor Li-Huei
Tsai and colleagues, which shows that the gene HDAC2 regulates the expression
of many genes implicated in brain plasticity and memory formation (Guan et al. 2009).
This suggests that the HDAC2 gene could play a major role in eliciting memory
enhancement.
Similar to most pharmacological
interventions, most genetic interventions affect LTP at synapses, having an
effect on certain aspects of declarative memory tasks, such as memory for space
and objects (Kandel and Squire 2000). While some
researchers have argued that genetic interventions are not likely to be very
efficient methods for memory enhancement (Craig and Plomin
2006), more research is needed to support their claims. Moreover, more research
is needed in order to understand the possible negative and positive effects of
memory enhancement obtained by using genetic intervention. This option does not
seem to be viable in the short-term as it would require more research outside
lab conditions and would need to be tested on humans.
Other
There are other ways to
manipulate memory that do not necessarily use chemical or genetic
interventions, such as exploiting some memory error features (e.g. inducing
false memories or bias). Memory errors make our memories vulnerable to added or
missing information. We can be led to confuse perceived and imagined events, and
in some cases even to “remember” things that actually never happened (Garry and
Gerrie 2006). In this regard, psychological
manipulation, without being a high technology memory technique, has worked quite
efficiently in inserting and manipulating memories (Levy 2007, Loftus 2003).
More sophisticated memory interventions
include: (a) brain stimulation, such as transcranial
magnetic stimulation and deep brain stimulation; (b) neural interfaces, such as
brain computer interfaces (BCIs); and (c) enriched environments, such as augmented
reality. In the case of brain stimulation, there is evidence, as showed by Hamani and colleagues (2008), that hypothalamic stimulation
could be used to improve certain memory functions. Hamani
and colleagues found, while using deep brain stimulation for morbid obesity,
that stimulation also increased the recollection capacity of their patient.
Less invasive methods of memory stimulation, such as transcranial
magnetic stimulation, have been used by other research groups to demonstrate
improvement in learning, better memory for names, and temporary boosts in
memory for patients with Alzheimer’s disease (Avril
2010, Chi and Snyder 2001, Kadosh et al. 2010).
One example of neural interfaces
with the potential for memory enhancement is the use of carbon nanotubes
attached to specific neurons for enhancing their natural signal-processing
capabilities (Johnson 2008). Most of the current BCIs are predominantly
non-invasive devices (Donoghue 2008), but the goal is to improve them so they
can not only be implanted but also fully integrated within the brain and
capable of interfacing with several other devices (National Academies Keck
Futures Initiative 2007, National Research Council 2008).
In the case of enriched
environments, there is evidence showing that they can enhance memory function
in various learning tasks, as they promote an increase of the number and levels
of certain neurotransmitters involved in memory (Ali et al. 2009, van Praag et al. 2000). Enriched environments can sometimes
present us with more effective cues for retrieval of memories than those
created by our own thought processes (Clark 2007, Wagenaar
2008); in particular, these can be beneficial when we are under conditions that
are known to impair recollection capacity (such as too much stress or advancing
age). The World Wide Web, virtual reality interfaces, and some basic augmented
reality interfaces (such as those available for smart phones) are some common
examples of enriched environments that are already available. Considering the
amount of research taking place and advancing quickly in this area, on both the
hardware and the software side, web-based applications are among the most
realistic and widely available means for enhancing memory.
Many people are already taking
advantage of enriched or augmented environments that help to improve memory
processes and extend the relevant mechanisms of memory beyond the implicated
areas of the brain, such as when we use of smart phones and computers to remind
us about things. These are more than merely useful tools; they can become
integral elements in our memory processes (Clark and Chalmers 1998). The
environment and context-based aspect of memory has been acknowledged by many
scholars (Clark 1997, Clark and Chalmers 1998, Popper and Eccles 1985). This
presupposes the idea that memories are not disembodied logical reasoning
outcomes of the isolated brain, but are, rather, embodied (they are partially
dependent upon extra-cranial bodily processes) and embedded (they are partially
dependent upon extra-bodily processes), and as such are affected by the social
system and by the environment.
Finally, the most radical forms
of memory enhancement interventions are those suggested by people who see the
human brain (and the different mental capacities it enables) as something that
can continuously be improved as if it were another one of our machines. Within such
a view, memory is reduced to the transfer of informational patterns from the
environment to the brain. A common example of a memory enhancement intervention
envisioned by these people is mind-uploading, in other words uploading and
downloading of memories to our computers at will (Bostrom
2005, Kurzweil 2005). Such a process, according to its supporters, would enable
us to edit, erase and add new memories.
The idea of uploading a human
mind to a computer, by replicating in silico the
detailed computational processes that would normally take place in a particular
human brain, also fits with the transhumanist desire for
immortality. Insofar as we regard our neural pattern as the essential aspect of
who we are, we could upload our memory’s pattern to a
computer and “live” in cyberspace even after our biological bodies have died. If
this kind of memory intervention were to become possible, the ethical and
philosophical issues related to memory interventions would become more urgent.
For instance, what happens to the subject – to the idea of a self – if we
reduce the human subject to just a particular pattern of information?
Some
important issues we should not forget
There are important issues to be considered
regarding memory enhancement interventions, particularly those that are radical
and directly affect the brain. This is particularly so, considering that at present the detailed cellular and molecular mechanisms
underlying memory formation, encoding, consolidation, and retrieval remain
largely obscure. Supposing that in the future we manage to overcome the
technical limitations around memory enhancement interventions, there is another
set of issues to be considered, ones we should not forget about – the ethical
issues. Memories are not discrete objects; this imposes limits on the exactness
of memory “editing” and creates uncertainty about the consequences for
subsequent retention and encoding of new memories.
For instance, an increased
ability to remember every event could overflow our capacity to categorize
memories, which could then impair our selectivity process, our ability to form abstractions
of our lived experiences, and our ability to distinguish larger patterns (Liao
and Sandberg 2008, Luria 1987). An “enhanced” memory could also end up in our
remembering things that we do not want to remember, such as painful events or
just trivial things that we do not consider important. Consider the case
described by Alexander Luria, a Russian psychologist, in his book The Mind of a Mnemonist:
A Little Book About A Vast Memory (1987). In this
case, an individual had the ability to recall individual experiences with great
clarity and after long periods of time, but also experienced difficulty in drawing
any meaning from them (1987).
Furthermore, some memory
enhancement interventions could impair our creativity and imaginative capabilities.
In relation to this point, Hassabis and colleagues
(2007) have published a study in which patients with hippocampus amnesia suffered
an impaired capacity to imagine future scenarios. Memory interventions can also
bring undesired side effects (e.g. greater sensitivity to pain or addiction),
as it has been demonstrated by experiments with genetically modified mice (Wei et
al. 2001).2 Based on these cases, it can be concluded that altering
memories, either by enabling more memory capacity or deleting certain memories,
is likely to have direct implications for our ability to understand the meaning
of the past and imagine the future. Given the role memory has in our lives, there
are four specific ethical issues that deserve serious consideration and attention,
and thus should not be forgotten when assessing memory enhancement
interventions. I am not arguing that these are the only ethical issues around
memory enhancement interventions, but they are the ones that seem to be closely
related to brain interventions. Moreover, even though the issues are grouped in
four different clusters this is essentially for presentational purposes, as I
acknowledge they are interlinked in many ways.
(a) Identity:
the core of who we are
It is because our existence takes
place in time, and because our awareness of it requires self-reflection, that
our memories are considered to be significantly constitutive of our identities
(Locke 2004, Parfit 1971, Schechtman
1996). Most enhancement interventions affect our identities, even if only in
very subtle ways (Brey 2009, DeGrazia
2005, Glannon 2007). For
some researchers, the prospect of transforming an existing individual into a
new one (altering his or her identity) is the most worrisome aspect of
“enhancement technologies,” perhaps exceeded only by the fact that we can end
up pathologizing our identities as syndromes and
disorders to be treated (Elliot 1998). Nonetheless, some researchers, such as DeGrazia (2005), find flaws in arguments that locate
something highly problematic in enhancement technologies, based on their
relationship to ideas of identity. For DeGrazia, these
arguments fail to establish what they claim by appealing to different aspects
or forms of identity, e.g. by confusing what he calls numerical identity and
narrative identity.
We might think (as DeGrazia does) that it is highly implausible that enhancing
a person’s mental features would create a numerically distinct individual. It
is more likely that a post-enhancement individual will still remember life
before the intervention without any major alteration to her memories, goals,
unique skills, and many important aspects of her personality. If so, we may be
able to claim that she is the very same person that she was prior to the
intervention: they are not numerically distinct individuals. However, with
novel forms of increasingly sophisticated and precise memory enhancement
interventions, this reasoning is not as stable as it might have seen. Clear
examples, although still fictional ones, would be cases of fusion and brain
duplication, which are implicit in the idea of mind-uploading.
Coming back to DeGrazia’s point, even if he is right in that there is
currently no real threat to numerical identity, we still have the issue that
enhancement interventions affect one’s self-conception and thereby one’s
narrative identity. This is not only a more common concern, but also, given its
plausibility, to some degree a more important one (Zoloth
2006, Schechtman 1996). In this regard, the idea of
an “identity crisis” can be understood as an instance in which there is no
coherence between an individual’s values and projects and the kind of things she
authentically identifies with. For instance in cases where an individual values
and projects are more the result of societal pressures and trends rather than
the individual own convictions. Moreover, we cannot discard the possibility
that certain memory changes could alter someone’s self-narrative so profoundly,
that they could result in a different individual altogether.
Whether or not a better distinction
between the different aspects of identity could play a crucial role in moving forward
the debate about identity in the moral discussions of memory enhancement interventions,
what is important here is that these interventions do impact in one way or
another on identity. Considering that identity has become essential to
contemporary political discourse (including models of the self, possibilities
for solidarity and resistance, and political inclusiveness), it seems we have sufficient
grounds to consider memory enhancement interventions carefully.
Some final remarks connected to
identity. We live in times in which our identities are shaped by the way the
boundaries between the human and the technological are blurred, and those
concepts are seen as coextensive, mutually defining and co-dependent (Bukatman 1993). At the same time, the collective is harder
to distinguish from the individual self, as our identities are dissolved,
simulated, and reconstructed (Hayles 1999). Given
that these identities are “an unmistakably doubled articulation in which we
find both the end of the subject and a new subjectivity” (Bukatman
1993, 17), they are also regarded by some as cyborg or posthuman
identities (Gray 1995, Hayles 1999). This new type of
identity brings along changes related to our representation for others and
ourselves in terms of social influence, and relationships of power, pleasure,
virtuality and reality. All of these also deserve serious consideration.
(b) (Self-)knowledge and learning
It is through our memories that
we can appreciate the uniqueness of each situation (once they’re located in the
past we cannot live events again, only remember them) but also the similarities
of different situations that we have been confronted with. The memories we have
about ourselves and the world shape our views and beliefs about the world and
ourselves. Thus, the crucial role that memory plays for (self-)knowledge and learning is generally accepted (Hoerl 1999). While it is plausible to think that some
memory enhancement interventions will enable people to acquire more
self-knowledge, for instance by adding emotional valence to a past learning
memory or experience, there are cases in which the results might not be so
encouraging.
An important aspect for knowledge
and learning has to do with the truthfulness of our memories. Our memories help
us to build a frame of things we believe to be true about ourselves and the
world (Bublitz and Merkel 2009, Elliot 1998, Taylor
1991). Therefore, the authenticity of our memories becomes an important
concern, in particular, for those holding that the authenticity of our memories
is based upon the individual actually having experienced the remembered things.
According to this view, it is reasonable to think that by editing our memories,
or allowing others to insert false memories into our minds, we are not only
threatening the authenticity of what we know about the world and ourselves. If
we go down this path, it might even amount to living in falsehood.
Imagine remembering a life and
finding out that our “memories” are not really memories of our life
experiences. We can have conflicting memories, such as remembering being in two
different places at the same time on the same day, remembering that my car is
blue when in fact I am looking at my red car, or having a memory of me and my
sister at the beach when I was little while also knowing that I do not have a
sister. Such conflicts would certainly put into question the truthfulness of
our memories and what we know about ourselves and the world. In response to
this, some authors have argued that, given the social nature of remembering,
there must be a limit “to how inconsistent our false memories can be” (Liao and
Sandberg 2008, 91). This seems like a reasonable point, unless, of course, we
all live in a type of simulation or in a society in which the memories of a
large proportion of the population have already been altered. Given the way our
memories are kept in the form of distributed networks of potentiated synapses across
different regions and structures of our brains, it might be argued that, even
if a particular memory were crucial to our self-knowledge, it would be highly
unlikely that we could achieve a radical alteration of it. Nevertheless,
because of our memories’ distributed nature even small changes to certain
memories might end up distorting others.
A related concern is connected to
the idea of what would happen if many different people were to share their
memories through being permanently connected to databases. What happens to the “uniqueness”
of the individual as it merges with the communal? In the words of Bert Gordjin, this “could blur the borderline between the self
and the cyberthink community” and “between the real
world and the virtual world” (2006, 730).
If memory interventions meant
that people did not need to go through experiences themselves in order to learn
from them, this might plausibly challenge common understandings of learning.
Consider, for instance, that you might have a brain implant that enables you to
speak Spanish without having had any Spanish lessons. For some people, the fact
that no learning process was involved is not a source of special concern: what
matters is that the individual has useful information available to her. Against
this view, however, it can be argued that the learning process itself is
important because it is what distinguishes us from being mere cogs in a
machine. Learning something involves more than the acquisition of new
knowledge, and thinking otherwise would imply a mechanistic and reductionist
account of what it means to be human. Likewise, memory is more than keeping the
newly acquired information in our heads so we can make use of it at some point
in the future. More importantly, learning is a process that seems to be
designed so that only things that are meaningful, important, or enjoyable are
remembered. Thus, merely having more capacity to remember more things – without
being able to grasp their meaning, or being able to know how to use all this
information in the relevant context – could be considered an instance in which
memory enhancement actually impairs our ability to learn.
(c) The
moral agent and agency
Closely connected to
(self-)knowledge and learning is the importance of memory for enabling the
moral agent, particularly if we agree that agency is shaped by our knowledge
about ourselves and the world, as well as by our learned experiences (Levy
2007, Liao and Sandberg 2008). Some memory enhancement interventions precisely
exploit the links between memory and agency in someone’s best interests. For
example, there could be cases where the harm done to us is so traumatic and
damaging to our well-being that we might need to forget the event by weakening,
or in the future even deleting, the associated memories. Think of soldiers who
“may not just want to forget that they killed; they may also want to forget how
to kill” (Liao and Sandberg 2008, 93), or cases of destructive habits (such as
drug abuse), in which, even when the person desires to break free of them, it
is difficult so long as she retains the memories (a type of reward-based
conditioning) associated with her habits.
However, there are cases in which
the interventions might not be in someone’s best interests. When we are not
able to recall the things we have experienced, we are missing the opportunity
to form ideas of how we should act when confronted with similar situations in
the future. George Santayana captured this idea when he said that “those who
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” (1905). Hence, if we
cannot remember, or are not able to grasp and reflect about, the moral of our
previous experiences, it is likely that we will keep committing over and over
again the same mistakes. Moreover, as Hoerl pointed
out, “sensitivity to the fact that certain deeds cannot be undone is
inseparable from the insight that we have to live with the consequences of our
past deeds (and of past events in general” (1999, 245).
Some memory enhancement
interventions, such as neural prostheses, also suggest a different
configuration of agency, as they are not just a medium but materially
reconfigure “the intersubjective unit body and
technology as an intrasubjective entity” (Cartwright
and Goldfarb 2006, 138). In the past, most of our mental world was just for ourselves; however, certain memory interventions are likely
to put at risk the privacy of our mental world. Consider, for instance, the use
of mind-reading technologies for screening whether or not someone is telling
the truth. It is significantly different to search a house compared with going
into someone’s brain in search of memories and thoughts.
Modifying our memories could also
affect our normative status as agents (Liao and Sandberg 2008, Glannon 2007). Retaining certain memories gives us an
opportunity to think through them for ourselves and to address them. This seems
to be part of exercising appropriate agency and respecting ourselves as agents.
Therefore, modifying memories before we have come to realize the underlying
moral of the experience could impair our development as moral agents. This, in
turn, would impair our ability to react in an “appropriate” moral way (forgiving
someone after s/he has harmed you, for example, or feeling regret after having
harmed others). For this reason, having the capacity to reflect upon our
memories for ourselves and address them accordingly, is crucial for exercising
appropriate agency (Glannon 2007, Liao and Sandberg
2008) and respecting ourselves as agents (Taylor 1991).
(d) Memory
enhancement as moral obligation
There might be cases where our
memories are about certain events, or certain people, and it is important for
others that we retain those memories (e.g. the case of someone who is the only
witness of a crime or the only person who could have some important information
about the criminals). These cases seem to imply a duty not to lose those
memories (Levy 2007, Liao and Sandberg 2008). In such cases, we might have an
obligation to use memory enhancement interventions to assure the preservation
of the relevant memories. However, if the memory is adversely affecting its
holder, it is hard to see, once the memory has been materialized in a different
format (such as a book), why the person still has a duty to keep it in his or
her mind.
At present, one is generally not
held responsible for forgetting. However, this might change once memory
enhancement (in the form of retaining memories longer) becomes widely available.
This problem is exacerbated if we consider that half of the ten leading causes of
disability around the world involve some form of memory impairment. Thus, while
it would be unethical to force people to use memory enhancement technologies in
order to remember things we regard as important, we might, as a society, have a
moral duty to make these technologies accessible for those who desire to keep
their memories and need assistance.
Conclusion
My main theme here is cautionary.
I have argued that technologies which would bring memory enhancement to the
fore may be much more imminent than is often thought. Secondly, the issues
involved are complicated ones, but we already have examples of the crucial role
that memory plays in our lives. In this sense, there is a contrast with other technological
interventions where we do not yet understand the ethical issues at stake. For
instance, people suffering from amnesia or Alzheimer’s disease, both disorders
in which memory is greatly impaired, provide clear examples of how the quality
of human life and the range of opportunities are affected by memory. Moreover,
people who are closely connected to them (i.e. family and friends) also suffer as
a result of a person’s memory impairment.
My limited aim has been to draw
attention to issues that should not be forgotten when dealing with memory
enhancement. Thus, we need to “keep in mind” the kind of memory enhancement
interventions we promote in society. In particular, we should question the use
of high technological interventions when we already know there are less
problematic ways to enhance our memories (such as a diary, notes or even smart
environments) that involve neither direct nor radical changes to our brains. Finally
we should ask ourselves whether we want the kind of memory “enhancements” that
will end up making us lose synapse connections, or the kind of enhancements that
promote more usage of them.
Notes
1. Although
it has been criticized for being too simplistic, mechanistic, and reductionist,
this model explains well how information is processed. However, it does not
explain how behavior is affected, and that is the main
source of the different critiques.
2. However, some
researchers think the results presented by Wei and colleagues just show that
mice learn about pain and thus seem to react to it differently (Tang et al.
2001).
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