|
A
peer-reviewed electronic journal published by the Institute for Ethics and ISSN
1541-0099 25(1)
– May 2015 |
The Future of Education: Genetic Enhancement and
Metahumanities
Stefan
Lorenz Sorgner
University of Erfurt
Journal of Evolution and Technology - Vol. 25 Issue 1 – May 2015 - pgs 31-48
Abstract
Habermas has criticized the position that educational
and genetic enhancements are parallel events (2001, 91). I, on the other hand, will
provide reasons for the position that there is a structural analogy between
educational and genetic enhancement such that the moral evaluation of these two
procedures should be seen as analogous, too. I will show that an affirmation of
educational enhancement suggests an affirmation of genetic enhancement. In
addition, I offer reasons why both types of enhancement ought to be affirmed. I
will progress as follows. First, I will explain the relevance of the question
by considering transhumanism and posthumanism. Both are contemporary
philosophical and cultural movements in which the question concerning
enhancement is central. Second, I will compare educational and genetic
enhancement, showing that Habermas’ arguments concerning their relationship are
implausible. In the conclusion, I will refer to the relevance of this insight to
the future of education, when the humanities will need to be transformed into
metahumanities.
Introduction
Habermas has criticized
the position that educational and genetic enhancements are parallel events
(Habermas 2001, 91). In response, I will provide reasons in favor of the
position that there is a structural analogy between educational and genetic
enhancement such that the moral evaluation of these two procedures ought to be
viewed as analogous (contrary to Habermas 2001, 87). I will show that an
affirmation of educational enhancement suggests an affirmation of genetic
enhancement. (By genetic enhancement, in this context, I am referring to
genetic enhancement by modification, but not to genetic enhancement by
selection, e.g. by selecting fertilized eggs after in vitro fertilization and preimplantation genetic diagnosis.) In
addition, I offer some reasons why both types of enhancement ought to be
affirmed.
I will progress as
follows. First, I will explain the relevance of the question by considering
transhumanism and posthumanism. Both are contemporary philosophical and
cultural movements in which the question concerning enhancement is central.
Second, I will compare educational and genetic enhancement, showing that
Habermas’ arguments concerning the relationship between them are implausible.
In the conclusion, I will refer to the relevance of this insight to the future
of education, when the humanities will need to be transformed into
metahumanities.
1. Transhumanism, posthumanism, and genetic enhancement
It needs to be
clarified how one employs the notions of transhumanism and posthumanism, or the
transhuman and the posthuman, as there are probably as many meanings of these
concepts as there are thinkers dealing with them. I will stress and focus on
certain similarities that can be found among most transhumanist and
posthumanist thinkers.
Transhumanism and
posthumanism are contemporary philosophical movements. Transhumanism is
connected more closely with the enhancement debate that takes place in the
English-speaking world among analytical ethicists (see Ranisch and Sorgner 2014).
Posthumanism is a movement that is more closely connected to the so-called
continental tradition of philosophy, and there is a close link between
posthumanist and postmodern thinkers. However, transhumanism and posthumanism
have in common that they both reject the special status of human beings that has
been connected with humanism (Sorgner 2014). This implies that they hold that
human beings are not categorically different from other beings, and that we do
not possess a Factor X that is distinct and separate from nature. Thereby, both
movements reject central elements of the concept of “human dignity” as found in,
for example, the German constitution. Even if few thinkers explicitly hold that
human beings possess a special Factor X, this assumption is implicitly present
at a fundamental level of the German constitution, which includes a rigid
distinction between human beings and other living beings, i.e. these two types
of living entities belong to two categorically separate ontological levels. On
this approach, only human beings possess dignity. Legally animals are thus to
be treated as mere things. Hence, human beings are implicitly attributed a Factor
X that makes them distinct from animals and other natural beings (Sorgner
2010b).
Transhumanism
affirms technological means for increasing the likelihood of altering human
beings – regarded by transhumanists as “works in progress” – in order to bring
about the transhuman or the posthuman (Bostrom 2005, 1). The meaning of the
concepts of the trans- and the posthuman differs significantly among
transhumanist thinkers (Sorgner 2009). However, quite a few transhumanists
uphold the fully rounded personality as an ideal, which is similar to the
Renaissance ideal for humanity (e.g. Bostrom 2001).
Posthumanism, on
the other hand, is characterized by an attempt to move culturally beyond
categorical dualities concerning ethical and ontological issues, and by a type
of perspectivism. Posthumanists do not necessarily have any fundamental
objections to technologically altering human beings. They do not uphold the
absolute validity of the Renaissance ideal. Yet, there are concepts of the
posthuman within the posthumanist discourse, too, which, have different
meanings than within the transhumanist discourses e.g., that of Katherine
Hayles in How We Became Posthuman
(1999) or the cyborg of Donna Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto” (1991, 149-181). Sloterdijk
is another philosopher who can be described as posthumanist, as he employs a
concept of the posthuman, e.g., in his speech “Regeln für den Menschenpark” (2001, 302–337).
The importance of
trans- and posthumanism is founded on at least three historical events: 1. The
inclusion by Darwin of human beings in natural processes (Rachels 1990); 2. the
destruction by Nietzsche of the supernatural world (Sorgner 2007); 3. and the
advancement of the natural sciences, in particular the developing power and
potentials of gene technology (Knoepffler, Schipanski, and Sorgner 2007).
Hence, thinkers in both the English-speaking and the continental world have
realized that a paradigm shift concerning the concept of the anthropos is taking place. Only some
backward-minded thinkers committed to rigidly religious worldviews – or members
of the Frankfurt school – still believe in the rational subject that is somehow
distinct from nature. Even though Habermas claims to propose a “soft naturalism,”
he sticks to the concept of a special subject (Habermas 2004, 877) that cannot
be reduced to neuronal processes (2004, 876). His naturalism is non-scientific
(2004, 872), which implies a special status of the subject, as it cannot be
analyzed by means of the natural sciences. I doubt whether this is a sensible
way of applying the concept “naturalism.”
2. On the relationship between educational and genetic
enhancement
Before any
intellectual enterprise, the concepts one uses need to be spelt out: for
example, it needs to be clarified what is genetic enhancement and what is
educational enhancement. Both are difficult to define, and have to be described
in a broad manner.
In the secondary
literature on education, there are probably as many definitions as there are
experts in the field. The definition I am employing is a traditional one, one
that is open and not too controversial. Concerning the ethical debate on
enhancement, the situation is slightly different, since “enhancement” as terminus technicus is a fairly new
philosophical concept. Many ethicists who use the concept leave it undefined it
in order to avoid the definitional challenges. I will put forward a definition that
is closely connected to the concept of eugenics, in order to best evaluate the
argument offered by Habermas. He was talking about liberal eugenics and not
about “enhancement.” However, it has become fashionable to use the word and
concept “enhancement.” There seems to be a tendency for bioconservative
thinkers to use the term “eugenics,” due to its negative historical connotations,
and for bioliberal thinkers to prefer the term “genetic enhancement,” as it is
difficult to object to bettering people.
By the concept
“education,” I refer to processes that can be described as the general
transmission of culture by parents, whereby culture is closely connected to an
ideal of the good (e.g. Eames 1977, 194; Ottaway 1999, 9; Olson 2003, 173; Sorgner
2004). Obviously, I am not implying that education takes place only if a
specific ideal of the good gets transferred. This definition is open to various
ideals of the good, so it can be valid for various historical and contemporary
settings. I often employ the expression “educational enhancement” instead of “education”
because, as in other cases of enhancement, the procedure aims at an improvement
of the life of the child. An improvement or enhancement is related to a conception
of the good, which does not necessarily imply that this conception is a stable
one or one that can be described using words (see Sorgner forthcoming).
In the definition
of education, I used the concept “parents” and I will employ it again when I
specify the concept “enhancement.” I wish to stress that the concept “parents,”
as it is used here, is an open notion that can be specified by talking about
biological or cultural parentage. In addition, the concept is limited to neither
heterosexual couples nor heterosexual and homosexual couples: instead, it is
conceivable that children can come about by compiling genes from three people
of the same sex or by bringing together a sperm cell with an egg cell containing
genetic material from two mothers (given a specific mitochondrial disease, this
option was legalized in the UK in February 2015). In these cases, all three
people involved would be the parents. Opening up the concept of parenthood does
not render the concept meaningless, and it is needed to differentiate between
state regulated education (or enhancement) and liberal versions.
What about genetic
enhancement? It needs to be stressed that eugenics and enhancement are not
identical concepts. Eugenics relates specifically to the improvement of genes,
whereas enhancement has to do with various types of improvement, whether genetic
or otherwise. Eugenics can turn up in a liberal and a state-governed version.
The use of the concept of enhancement in bioethical debates, on the other hand,
presupposes a type of liberalism. However, the extensions of the two concepts overlap.
I assume that “liberal eugenics” is a concept that can be subsumed under the
concept “enhancement.” A fundamental, but oft-neglected, distinction concerning
enhancement is that between ex post and
ex ante enhancement. If a Quality X that
represents a good is promoted successfully, the outcome is an ex post enhancement. If one consciously
attempts to promote Quality X, then the attempt (or the process employed) can
be described as ex ante enhancement.
In this case, the outcome is uncertain. This is also the case concerning
education. On this occasion, I am dealing with ex ante enhancement (compare Sorgner 2009).
The decision
concerning an enhancement can be made either by oneself (autonomous enhancement)
or by one’s parents (heteronomous enhancement). Autonomous enhancement is less
problematic than heteronomous enhancement. However, primarily in the case of
heteronomous genetic enhancement, there is an analogy with educational
enhancement. In both of these cases, parents decide what happens to their
offspring.
It is never a case
of genetic enhancement if the state or a government decides what ought to be
done with people, as was done during the Third Reich, since this falls outside
the concept of “enhancement.” As employed in bioethical debates, the notion
presupposes a type of liberalism. The notion of “liberal eugenics” that Habermas
employs can be distinguished analogously. The fundamental difference between
“liberal eugenics” and “enhancement” is that enhancement applies to all types
of human qualities. The term “liberal eugenics” can be employed meaningfully
only when genes are altered. Thus, penis enlargement by means of an operation
is a type of enhancement, but not an example of liberal eugenics. In this
paper, I am focusing solely on some problematic cases of genetic enhancement that
have the same extension as liberal eugenics, but different connotations. (Recall
that I am dealing solely with genetic enhancement by modification in this
context. I have dealt with genetic enhancement by selection in other publications
(e.g. Sorgner 2013a).)
Many further
distinctions concerning enhancement can be made (compare Sorgner 2006), and I
cannot deal with them all. Yet, there is one more that I must mention at least
briefly, as it will become relevant later on: the distinction between positive
and negative genetic enhancement. Positive genetic enhancement is the conscious
attempt to promote good genes. Negative genetic enhancement, on the other hand,
refers to an attempt to hinder disadvantageous genes from spreading. The distinction
is a problematic one, as the concept “disadvantageous genes” depends upon a
concept of “disease” that is even more problematic. The more general relationship
between positive and negative enhancement is likewise unclear. I will tackle
this issue when I turn to Habermas’ proposals concerning therapeutic and
nontherapeutic uses of enhancement.
Having defined
genetic and educational enhancement, I need to be spell out why there could be
parallels between these two procedures. In both cases, decisions are being made
by parents concerning the development of their child, at a stage where the
child cannot yet decide for herself or himself. In the case of genetic
enhancement, we are faced with a choice between genetic roulette and genetic
enhancement. In the case of educational enhancement, we face the options of a
Kaspar Hauser lifestyle or parental guidance. Given these options, it seems
most plausible to claim that genetic enhancement and parental guidance usually
bring about better results for the offspring than the alternatives, since the
qualities brought about by means of enhancement are based upon parental choices
that are normally made on the basis of experience. Parents usually love their
children and want them to have the best possible starting points in life. Of
course, parental decisions do not always produce good results. But as a rule of
thumb, parental influence most often leads to better outcomes than those from chance
or without any guidance. Parents uphold qualities on the basis of their experience,
and having experience in the context of ethical decisions is necessary for
making good ethical decisions, as Aristotle remarked about the foundation of
prudence (NE 1142a).
One difference
between the procedures of educational and genetic enhancement could be that
education deals with the mind, whereas genetic enhancement relates to the body.
However, this point is not raised by Habermas, and it could be answered easily,
because 1. it implies a rigid separation between mind and body that is no longer
plausible; 2. education also includes physical education; and 3. intelligence
and related phenomena that can be enhanced genetically are properties of the
mind as well as the body. In addition, 4., I have pointed out that the two
procedures are parallel, but not that they are identical.
Habermas has other
challenges concerning the differences between genetic and educational
enhancement. His main point is that genetic changes are irreversible, whereas
educational ones are reversible (Habermas 2001, 90, 110). As a consequence, he
sees genetic changes as endangering the autonomy of the person in question. He
regards the enhancement process as an illegitimate type of instrumentalization
of the person, and he holds that the consequences of genetic enhancement
procedures question the equality of all human beings.1 However, he regards
genetic enhancement as a morally legitimate method insofar as it is employed
for clearly therapeutic uses, because in such cases it is not supposed to
attack the autonomy of the person (Habermas 2001, 91). I will deal with these
various points one by one. In the end, I will briefly address a final, but
invalid, counterargument that has often been raised as a response to one of my
presentations on this topic.
Habermas’
arguments against genetic enhancement would not be plausible if educational and
genetic enhancement were parallel processes, because then the subject status of
the enhanced being is touched no more or less in the case of genetic
intervention than in the case of educational intervention. The self-perception
and understanding of a person who has been genetically enhanced depend upon his
evaluation of the enhancement process and his perception of the relationship
between education and genetic enhancement. Of course, there is a choice to
accept or reject enhancement processes, whether the interventions made are educational
or genetic. It is always uncertain whether genetic enhancement will be beneficial.
However, it is also an open question whether education will have beneficial
consequences in any specific case. It is, however, probable in both kinds of cases
that the results will turn out better with parental involvement than without it
– given that the enhancement methods are reliable.
2.1 Irreversibility of genetic enhancement2
One claim against a
parallel between genetic and educational enhancement is that genetic
enhancement is irreversible (Habermas 2001, 90, 110). As recent research has
shown, however, this claim is implausible, if not outright false.
Let us consider
the well-known case of a lesbian couple who were both deaf and chose a deaf
sperm donor to have a deaf child (see Agar 2004, 12–14). Actually, the child
can hear a bit in one ear, but this is unimportant for my current purpose.
According to the couple, deafness is not a defect; it merely represents being
different. The couple were able to realize their wish, and managed to have a
mostly-deaf child. If germ line gene therapy worked, they could have chosen a
non-deaf donor, modified the appropriate genes, and brought about a deaf child
in this way. Note, however, that
if the deafness was one of the inner ear, it would be possible for the person
in question to go, later on,
to a doctor and ask for a surgical procedure in which he receives an implant
enabling him to hear. It is already possible to perform such an operation and insert
such an implant.
Of course, it may
be argued that in that case the genotype is not reversed, but merely the
phenotype. This is correct. However, the example illustrates how qualities that
came about due to a genetic intervention can be reversible. In this example, they
can be changed by means of surgery. But, depending on the type of deafness
involved, deaf people may be able to undergo surgery enabling them to hear
again.
One could object
that the consequences of educational enhancement can be reversed autonomously,
whereas in the case of genetic alterations one needs a surgeon or external help
to bring about a reversal. This is also incorrect, as I will demonstrate.
Meanwhile, it is not true that all consequences of educational enhancement can be
reversed. In addition, the availability of somatic gene therapy means that it is
even possible to change a person’s genetic makeup. One of the most striking
examples in this context is siRNA therapy, by means of which genes can be
silenced. In the following paragraph, I give a summary of what siRNA therapy
has achieved so far.
In 2002, the
journal Science referred to RNAi as
“Technology of the Year,” and McCaffrey et al. published a paper in the journal
Nature in which they specified that
siRNA functions in mice and rats (2002, 38–39). Evidence that siRNA therapy can
be used successfully in animals was published by Song et al. in 2003. By means
of this type of therapy (RNA interference targeting Fas), mice can receive protection
from fulminant hepatitis (Song et al. 2003, 347–51). A year later, it was shown
that genes at a transcriptional level can be silenced by means of siRNA (Morris
2004, 1289–1292). Due to the enormous potential of siRNA, Andrew Fire and Craig
Mello were awarded the Nobel Prize in medicine for discovering the RNAi
mechanism in 2006.
Given the
empirical data concerning siRNA, it is plausible to claim that theoretically
the following process is possible, and, hence, that genetic states are not
necessarily immutable: 1. An embryo with brown eyes can be selected by means of
preimplantation genetic diagnosis; 2. The adult does not like his eye color; 3.
He asks medics to provide siRNA therapy to change the gene related to his eye
color; 4. The alteration brings about an eye-color change.
Another option
would be available, if germ line gene therapy worked, which it does not so far.
In that case, we could change a gene using germ line gene therapy to bring
about Characteristic X. Imagine that this characteristic is disapproved of by
the later adult. Hence, he decides to undergo siRNA therapy in order to silence
the altered gene again. Such a procedure is theoretically possible. However, we
do not have to use fictional examples to show that alterations brought about by
genetic enhancement are reversible; we can, instead, simply look at the latest
developments in gene therapy.
A 23-year-old
British male, Robert Johnson, suffered from Leber’s congenital amaurosis, which
is an inherited blinding disease. Early in 2007, he had surgery at Moorfields
Eye Hospital and University College London’s Institute of Ophthalmology, which
represented the world’s first gene therapy trial for an inherited retinal
disease. In April 2008, the New England
Journal of Medicine published the results of this operation, which revealed
its success, as the patient gained a modest increase in vision with no apparent
side-effects (Maguire et al. 2008, 2240–2248).
This case involved
a therapeutic use of genetic modification. However, genes that can be altered
for therapeutic purposes could also be altered for non-therapeutic ends (if we wish
to uphold the problematic distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic
ends). The examples mentioned here clearly show that qualities brought about by
means of genetic enhancement do not have to be irreversible. As we’ll see, the
parallels between genetic and educational enhancement go even further.
2.2 Reversibility of educational enhancement
According to
Habermas, character traits brought about by educational means are reversible
(2001, 110–111). Because of this assumption, he rejects the idea that
educational and genetic enhancement are parallel processes. Aristotle
disagrees, and he is right in doing so. According to Aristotle, a hexis, a basic stable attitude gets
established by means of repetition. (NE,
1103a). If you continually act in a brave manner, you become brave. By playing
a guitar, you turn into a guitar player. By acting with moderation, you become
moderate. Aristotle states that, by repeating a certain type of action, you
establish the type in your character: you form a basic stable attitude, a hexis. In the Catagories, he makes clear that the hexis is extremely stable (Cat. 8, 8b27–35). In the Nichomachean Ethics, he goes even
further and claims that, once one has established a basic stable attitude, it
is impossible to get rid of it again (NE
III 7, 1114a19–21). Buddensiek has interpreted this passage correctly by
pointing out that once a hexis, a basic
stable attitude, is formed or is established, it is, according to Aristotle, an
irreversible part of the individual’s character (Buddensiek 2002, 190).
Aristotle’s
position receives support from Freud, who put forward the following claim: “It
follows from what I have said that the neuroses can be completely prevented but
are completely incurable” (Freud quoted by Malcolm 1984, 24). Angstneurosen were supposed to be
particularly striking examples (Rabelhofer 2006, 38).
Much time has
passed since Freud, and further research has taken place. In recent
publications concerning psychiatric and psychotherapeutic findings, however, it
remains clear that psychological diseases can be incurable (Beese 2004, 20).
Psychiatric disorders are not, of course, intentionally brought about by
educational means. However, much empirical research has been done in the field
of psychiatric illnesses and their origin in early childhood. The robust
finding that irreversible illnesses can come about from events or actions in
childhood entails that irreversible outcomes can happen by means of proper
educational measures.
Medical research
has shown, and most physicians agree, that posttraumatic stress disorders can
not only become chronic, but also lead to permanent personality disturbances
(Rentrop et al. 2009, 373). They come about as a result of exceptional events that
represent an enormous burden and change within someone’s life. Obsessional
neuroses are another such case. According to the latest numbers, only 10 to 15
per cent of patients get cured, and in most cases the problem turns into a
chronic disease. (Rentrop et al., 2009, 368). Yet another example is provided
by the borderline syndrome, which is a type of personality disorder. It can be
related to events or actions that have taken place in early childhood, such as violence
or child abuse. In most cases, this appears as chronic disease (Rentrop et al.
2009, 459).
Given these
examples, it is clear that actions and events during one’s lifetime can produce
permanent and irreversible states. In the psychiatric examples, the outcome is
a disadvantage to the person in question. In the case of an Aristotelian hexis, by contrast, it can be advantageous
if the person establishes a virtue in this manner.
To provide further
intuitive support for the position that qualities established by educational
enhancement can be irreversible, simply think about learning to ride a bike,
tie one’s shoe laces, play the piano, or speak one’s mother tongue. Children are
educated for years and years to undertake these tasks. Even when one moves into
a different country, or if one does not ride a bike for many years, it can be
difficult, if not impossible, to remove the acquired ability. Hence, it is very
plausible that educational enhancement can have irreversible consequences, and
Habermas is wrong again. Genetic enhancement can have consequences that are
reversible, and educational enhancement can have consequences that are
irreversible. Given these insights, the parallel between genetic and educational
enhancement obtains additional support. However, I will consider some further
points that Habermas raises.
2.3 Autonomy
To support his
main point of critique – his denial of a parallel between educational and
genetic enhancement – Habermas raises many further questions. According to him,
genetic (but not educational) enhancement limits the potential for an
autonomous way of life (Habermas 2001, 45). To support this claim, he explains
that there exists a clear distinction between something that has grown and
something that was made in the life world (2001, 83). Only human beings who
have solely grown are supposed to have their full autonomy.
The distinction
between what has grown and what was made is problematic. It seems highly
implausible to hold that human beings who grow up are solely growing up. Human beings are in a permanent interaction with
their environment and their culture, and they are also influenced by whatever
they get to eat and drink. In addition, could one not argue that we are already
making human beings? This happens if a woman goes to a sperm bank and asks for
the sperm of a Nobel Prize winner, which can be done in the US, although sperm from
good-looking, intelligent, and athletic Ivy League students has proved to be more
popular (Agar 2004, 1–2; Sandel 2007, 74).
In another sense, we
are already making human beings whenever we choose partners with whom we can
have children. When we decide to have unprotected sex at a certain time, we are
potentially making human beings. To hold that only human beings who are
genetically enhanced are being made is too simple and rigid a position to be
plausible, particularly if we consider the consequences of educational
enhancement in more detail. For example, a child who grows up in an extremely religious
environment, and so receives a religious education, can be indoctrinated
irreversibly. In such a case, we might claim that the child was made, as it
acquired characteristics that it cannot remove. Habermas might not agree that this
is possible, since he might reply that the grown autonomous subject decides
which educational means he or she does or does not accept. This would accord
with his emphasis on the rationally motivated affirmations of an independent
subject (2001, 99). At this point, however, it becomes clear that he clings to an
anthropology within which human beings have a special status, since they and
only they are supposed to be rational and independent subjects. Although
Habermas claims explicitly that he is in favor of a “soft naturalism,” he uses the
concept of a special subject that is beyond any empirical analysis (see Habermas
2004, 876–77). He puts forward a view of human beings that is extremely
implausible after Darwin, Nietzsche, and Freud, and after post- and
transhumanism.
Habermas draws
further inferences. He holds that genetic enhancement might cause a break
within humanity: it might divide us into human beings who are grown and
autonomous, and human beings who were heteronomously made and are therefore
less autonomous. His description implies that the less autonomous ones are
somehow inferior (compare the 1997 film Gattaca,
which depicts a situation in which genetically selected humans regard
themselves as superior). No matter what the consequences would be, Habermas
holds that genetic enhancement touches a question concerning the identity of a
species (2001, 45). In a way, he is correct, since genetic enhancement could,
in principle, bring a new species into existence. Some transhumanists refer to
human beings who develop the potential of becoming members of a new species as “transhumans,”
and to the members of a new species as “posthumans.” However, we cannot exclude
the possibility that the same result could come about by educational
enhancement. Nietzsche held that, by means of educational enhancement, we can establish
preconditions for the next evolutionary step to occur, so that a new species of
overbeings can come into existence (Sorgner 2009). Hence, the identity of our
species could be altered not only by genetic enhancement, but also by educational
enhancement.
Habermas goes even
further in his critique. He correctly holds that people have the right to an
open future, but then claims that genetic enhancement limits the life plans of
the enhanced people, as their freedom of choice will have been limited
(Habermas 2001, 105). To be autonomous, human beings must be the sole authors
of their way of life (2001, 109). Habermas’ claim is simply false, however, as
the freedom of choice of a genetically enhanced human being is not limited, but
is merely altered compared to the non-enhanced person.3 Every human
being has a genetic makeup. The question is who decides upon, and brings about,
the genetic makeup. In the one case, it is chance, and in the other case it is
a parental decision. The parents do not limit the decisions of their child, but
merely alter the preconditions. A child who is not genetically enhanced also
has a genetic makeup that determines some of her or his strengths and
weaknesses.
2.4 Instrumentalization
Habermas raises still
another issue. He claims that in using genetic enhancement parents will instrumentalize
their children, as a child cannot object to what happens to him. Yet,
instrumentalization takes place whenever Person X uses Person Y merely as a means
to an end. For comparison, consider some problematic cases of educational
enhancement, for example little girls living dreams of their mothers (perhaps becoming
a model, being a nun, or being absolutely spoiled with luxury goods). Habermas
explains that it might make us sick to imagine that our nature was
instrumentally altered before birth (2001, 94), as such a procedure might have
significant consequence upon our self-understanding. But this does not have to
be the case if we understand educational and genetic enhancement as parallel
events. If they are understood as parallel, then the consequences of the one
would not be better or worse than those of the other.
In addition, we
can doubt that it ought to be prohibited to use a person solely as a means to
further ends. Hoerster has presented a good example against the absolute
validity of that prohibition, and has suggested plausibly that we can distinguish
between morally legitimate and morally illegitimate types of
instrumentalization (2002, 15). Still, one further thought needs to be added:
If we prohibit genetic enhancement, because human beings are instrumentalized
during the process, then educational enhancement should also be forbidden. However,
we can reject the central accusation that during the process of genetic
enhancement parents merely instrumentalize their child. The accusation is
false: it is (usually) not a case of a mere instrumentalization, since the
parents also love and respect the child, and this influences the process of
genetic enhancement. The parents might partly
instrumentalize the child, but that is not, in itself, morally wrong. By way of
comparison, an employer partly instrumentalizes his employee, but this does not
entail that he treats the employee immorally. In short, there are many
plausible reasons that explain why Habermas’ position – his accusation that a
child is treated immorally during the process of genetic enhancement – is highly
implausible.
Although there are
many reasons for rejecting Habermas’ position concerning instrumentalization,
the most important one is more fundamental than anything discussed to this
point. The moral objection to using persons solely as a means presupposes a
radically dualistic ontology that is highly dubitable. To explain this in more detail,
I propose to present a slightly longer argument.4 In 2.4.1. I will
analyze the challenges related to the prohibition of treating a person solely
as a means.
2.4.1. Why treating a person solely as a means is not morally
problematic
The concept of human
dignity is central in many constitutions worldwide. It plays a particularly
central role in the German foundational law (Sorgner 2010b, 23–29), where Kant’s
conception of dignity is particularly influential (Sorgner 2010b, 82–108). In
fact, there are two aspects that German law inherited from Kant, both of which
are highly problematic.
First, even though
that it is acknowledged by the German constitution that non-human animals are
not objects, they are supposed to be treated like objects. Hence, the law
implicitly includes a categorical dualistic separation of animals from human
beings.
Second, it is
legally forbidden to treat a person solely as a means. This insight applies
both to oneself and to other persons, as becomes clear in the following two regulations.
First, peep shows in Germany are legally forbidden, even if it is the dancer’s
autonomous wish to earn money in that way (Welti 2005, 397). Second, it is
forbidden to shoot down a hijacked airplane, even though it seems to be flying
directly into a nuclear power station, as long as there are innocent persons on
board (BVerfG, 1 BvR 357/05 from 15.2.2006). In each case, the regulation was
justified by reference to the Kantian thought that it is morally wrong to treat
a person merely as a means. In the following reflections, I will, first,
question a basic assumption on which these regulations rest; second, consider
what options follow from these reflections; and, third, analyze the challenges
from those options. I will show clearly that the German law needs to be altered
with respect to its prohibition of treating a person solely as a means.
2.4.1.1. Challenging Kant’s basic assumptions
The Kantian moral
prohibition of treating a person solely as a means rests on a distinction
between persons and things. Persons participate in the world that is governed
by the laws of nature and the laws of freedom. Things, however, participate
solely in the world that is governed by the laws of nature. This distinction
implies that only persons do not belong solely to the natural world (Kant
1902ff, vol. 4, 428–34). Kant did not affirm an anthropocentric conception of
personhood, but a logocentric conception of personhood, since it was not
necessary for him that only human beings can be rational beings, and hence persons.
In the German legal context, however, the distinction between persons and
things turns into an anthropocentric conception, since only human beings are
seen, and legally treated, as persons.
Is this a
plausible anthropology today? Darwin, Nietzsche, and contemporary trans- and posthumanist
thinkers might all have reasons to doubt it (Badmington 2000, 9). Given recent
biological research, given that human beings and great apes have common
ancestors, and given a basically naturalist understanding of the world, it is
more plausible to hold that there is merely a gradual difference between human
beings, great apes, plants, and maybe even stones.
Nietzsche’s
anthropology provides a possible non-dualist anthropology that attempts to
grasp the relevant concepts philosophically. On this approach, all entities
turn into constellations of power-quanta, and human beings are seen as a
specific type of animal, sometimes even a “sick animal” (KSA, GM, 5, 367).
However, this sickness identified by Nietzsche is not necessarily a deprecation
of human beings. It has several implications. It means that humans have
developed a special capacity, namely that of not immediately having to follow
their instincts. This can have both beneficial and problematic consequences. It
can be beneficial, as it enables human beings to create culture, develop
technologies, and realize sublimation processes. It can be problematic, though,
as it separates acts from the immediate realization of instincts – although instincts
are often more reliable, concerning one’s own interests, than intellectual
reflections (Sorgner 2010b, 184–91).
2.4.1.2 Moving beyond Kant’s basic
assumptions
As both
philosophical and scientific reflections lead us to doubt the Kantian
anthropology on which the German foundational law rests, what can be done to
take these insights into consideration?
Posthumanist
insights are not generally accepted in Germany. Instead, many citizens still
uphold a Christian understanding of the world that tends to confirm the basic Kantian
assumptions. Still, it must be asked whether a social-liberal democracy ought
to be based upon a premise that affirms a strong metaphysical anthropology,
namely one that regards human beings as constituted of a material body and an
immaterial soul. By contrast, animals, plants, and stones are regarded as
objects and as not participating in any world outside the material naturalist
one. This seems to go against the fundamental norm of freedom on which
democracies rest. In the case of Germany, over thirty per cent of citizens can
be classified as naturalists, skeptics, or atheists who are being treated
paternalistically by a Christian-Kantian form of legal regulation. Unfortunately,
this group of people is not politically organized enough for effective resistance.
Members of the Catholic and the Protestant churches, on the other hand, have
strong institutions and hence an enormous amount of power to influence
political decision. Consequently, the current form of legal regulation treats at
least one third of the German population with an aggressive type of paternalism.
This runs counter to the central value that the norm of freedom ought to have
within a democracy. In conclusion, the German approach to legal regulation
ought to be revised.
What does it imply
to revise the premises of the foundational law? In its current form, the
foundational law has a strong metaphysical implication: only human beings are
seen as participating in a material as well as in an immaterial world. It is,
however, problematic for the foundational law of a liberal-democratic society to
have an ontological basis, so it cannot be appropriate to simply replace this
form of regulation by another in which human beings and animals are seen as
merely gradually different. That would be swapping one ontological position for
another. It would, instead, be more appropriate to stress a political norm of
negative freedom. However, the main question that I propose to address here
concerns the prohibition of treating a person solely as a means.
So far, I have shown
that the Kantian moral prohibition implies an ontological distinction between
persons and things. Persons have autonomy, and hence dignity, which implies
that no finite value can be attributed to them. Things, on the one hand, can
have a merely finite value, which is the reason why they can be treated solely
as a means. Persons, on the other hand, cannot be identified with a finite
amount of value, and consequently must not be treated solely as a means.
Hence, the
intellectual basis on which Kant’s moral prohibition rests is a highly
problematic ontological understanding that is currently not shared by at least
one third of the German citizens. Still, they are forced to be judged on this
basis, since this approach to regulation is part of the German law. It has
consequences such as the prohibition of peep shows as well the prohibition of shooting
down hijacked airplanes with innocents on board.
If the prohibition
of treating a person solely as a means rests on a dubious and politically unacceptable
ontological foundation, we need to address the consequences of the prohibition.
Two immediate options come to mind: First, due to there being merely a gradual
difference between human beings and other entities, there are no more mere “things,”
and hence it will have to be morally prohibited to treat any entity merely as a
means. Second, it can be argued that the prohibition of treating a person
solely as a means is not applied, even currently, as a universally valid
regulation: for instance, if someone commits a criminal offence, he can be put
into prison, or even killed in specific circumstances (let us say, if he is threatening
to kill someone else). Hence, treating a person solely as a means can be both
morally legitimate and morally illegitimate (Hoerster 2013, 11–23). If this
judgment applies to persons, then it applies to all other entities, given that
there is only a gradual distinction between all the entities in question.
2.4.1.3.
Challenges related to these moves beyond Kant’s basic assumptions
What follows if we
distinguish morally legitimate and morally illegitimate ways of treating a
person solely as a means? If we take this approach, the question has to be
asked anew: What is moral and how can we conceptualize morality? Alternatively,
there are different questions if we postulate only a gradual distinction
between human beings and other entities. What are the implications, on this
approach, of a prohibition on treating solely as a means? Does it imply that I
must no longer eat salmon? Is it morally problematic to walk on grass?
A further issue arises,
one that I have mentioned briefly. If the moral prohibition is altered in one
of these two ways, does this not imply that one ontology has simply been
replaced with another in the legal context? If so is it not problematic to allow
any ontology to influence legal
decisions, since social-liberal democracy implies openness to a great variety
of rival ontologies that are legitimately available to its citizens? If this is
so, it may be advisable to move beyond any ontological discourse when dealing
with matters of legal discourse, as this is the only way for the state to
remain ontologically neutral and avoid morally problematic intrusions into its
citizens’ personal decisions.
2.4.1.5 Intermediate conclusion
By this point, several
challenges have become clearer that have particular relevance to the German
legal context. It seems appropriate and necessary to move beyond the
prohibition of treating other persons solely as a means, and also beyond the
tradition of allowing ontological positions within the constitution of a
social-liberal democracy. In each case, there is a looming contradiction of the
initial premises of liberal democratic constitutions.
2.5 Equality
A related but
distinct issue is that of equality. Habermas claims that genetic enhancement –
but supposedly not educational enhancement – destroys symmetrical relationships
among free and equal people (2001, 45). He supports this by reference to his
distinction between the grown and the made, along with his reflections on autonomy.
If the genes of someone, Person X, are altered irreversibly by someone else, Person
Y, but X cannot bring about the same type of changes in Y, then this creates an
asymmetrical relationship that will, supposedly, destroy the relationship of
equality. As genetic changes do not have to be immutable, however, this is a
false concern. Furthermore, even if such an intervention created an
asymmetrical relationship between Person X and Person Y, this need not have any
effect upon equality as a normative ideal.
In addition, ordinary
kinds of education can bring about states that are irreversible. Hence,
processes are currently being used that create asymmetrical relationships
without any grave moral problems. Simply being a parent necessitates being in
an asymmetrical relationship with one’s children. It does not follow, however,
that equality as a normative ideal will have to be abandoned just because some
human beings are related in an asymmetrical manner.
We might wonder what
type of equality Habermas has in mind. If equality can exist only between
identical entities, and we assume the strongest version of the Leibnizian
concept of identity, then we have to conclude that no equality can exist in the
empirical world between two distinct objects. If Habermas has a type of
normative equality in mind, then I see no compelling reason why it would have be
given up if some human beings were genetically enhanced.
2.6 Therapy and enhancement: a problematic distinction
In contrast to his
negative remarks about genetic enhancement, Habermas does accept that gene
therapy can be morally legitimate in at least some cases (Habermas 2001, 109),
even though it has the consequences discussed above. This seems to be a
self-contradictory, or at least highly problematic, position. Gene therapy is
morally legitimate according to Habermas, as it does not undermine the autonomy
of the subject. But this judgment does not apply to
genetic enhancement, since it technically alters human nature (Habermas 2001,
92). This position seems problematic, if he regards it as dangerous that the
limits of our species get altered by means of genetic enhancement per se. We could wonder if this worry
does not already apply in the case of gene therapy.
Habermas is
skeptical concerning most all-purpose goods (intelligence, humor, patience…),
which are goods that support all conceptions of a good life. Consequently, he
is critical of genetic enhancement, as he does not think that we can have a
catalog of goods that are actually beneficial for all human beings, but he
thinks that such a catalog would be needed for the process to be a morally
legitimate one. Despite all this, he upholds the values of health and a longer
life (Habermas 2001, 91), and regards parental care for these qualities as
corresponding with the autonomy of their child (Habermas 2001, 48). Many
critical questions must be raised concerning this judgment:
1. First, I wonder
why genetic enhancement aimed at promoting the life span is morally illegitimate.
Habermas has clearly said that it is legitimate for the parents to make
decisions for the child that promote the child’s life span, and that such
decisions do not interfere with the child’s autonomy. He claims the same
concerning decisions about the child’s health, which suggests that he does not
regard gene therapy as morally objectionable. If this is correct, then he
should not object to genetic enhancement that aims for a longer life span of
the child.
2. Second, it
needs to be stressed that a gene diagnosis that is a prerequisite to genetic
enhancement, and gene therapy, already includes an alteration of the genes
(Koechy 2006, 75–77). Hence, gene therapy, of which he approves (in some cases,
at least), presupposes a process, the alteration of genes, of which he
disapproves. This looks like an unstable position.
3. Third, I need
to stress that there is no clear-cut distinction between therapy and
enhancement. The concept of therapy presupposes a concept of the disease.
However, the definition of the concept “disease” is highly problematic: 1. If
we wish to give an objective definition of “disease,” then we need to have a
natural understanding of what human beings are. As disease is a normative
concept, this creates problems, because we would get statements like: A natural
being is so and so tall, has capacities A, B, and C and has such-and-such a
sexual orientation; 2. Subjective definitions of the concept “disease” include
many problems. Someone is ill, if he feels bad. But this definitely does not
have to be the case with cancer. One can have a malignant tumor without feeling
it in the beginning; 3. The concept “disease” changes over time. This becomes
particularly clear if we consider the history of the concept, particularly
concerning psychological diseases. Experience shows that the concept can be
manipulated to further the interests of the political leaders. Given all these
reflections, I conclude that Habermas’ position concerning disease is highly
problematic. This insight gets further support due to the fact that Habermas’
notion of therapy on the one hand seems to include processes which represent
prime examples of enhancement procedures (prolonging the health-span or
preventive measures, Habermas 2001, 91), but on the other hand seems to be
limited solely to extreme maladies (Habermas 2001, 109).
As Habermas does
not provide us with any clear definition of what a disease is, we can use a
concept of “disease” which implies that procedures that many would refer to as
genetic enhancement are actually merely a type of therapy. Insofar as Habermas
regards gene therapy as morally defensible, he would have to approve the
actions in question.
2.7 Educational enhancement is necessary but genetic enhancement
is not
Finally, I wish to
address a counterargument against my thesis concerning the parallel between genetic
and educational enhancement. Though Habermas does not put this forward, it has
been raised against my position at quite a few presentations that I have given on
this topic. It does rely on a point mentioned by Habermas – that all newborns
are in need of help (2004, 884). Accordingly, one could argue:
1. Newborns need human support to survive.
2. All human support is a type of education.
3. Genetic enhancement, on the other hand, is not
necessary for survival.
Therefore, genetic and educational
enhancement are not parallel processes.
On this argument,
genetic enhancement is distinguishable from morally supportable forms of
educational intervention in not being necessary for the survival of the child.
One can reply in
various ways. However, the most important reply is associated with the latest
epigenetic research, which reveals the intimate interconnectedness between
educational and genetic enhancement. Nietzsche put forward education as a means to
bring about the posthuman. Given epigenetics, he thereby implicitly also
affirmed genetic enhancement. Still, one could wonder: Can education bring
about changes that have an influence on the potential offspring of the person
who gets educated? As inheritance depends upon genes, and genes do not get
altered by means of education, we used to believe that education cannot be
relevant for the process of evolution. Hence, Lamarckism, the heritability of
acquired characteristics, has not been very fashionable for the same period of
time. However, in recent decades doubts have been raised, based upon recent
research in epigenetics. Together with Japlonka and Lamb, I can stress that
“the study of epigenetics and epigenetic inheritance systems (EISs) is young
and hard evidence is sparse, but there are some very telling indications that
it may be very important” (Japlonka and Lamb 2005, 248).
Besides the genetic code, the epigenetic code, too, is supposed to be
relevant for creating phenotypes, and it can be altered by means of
environmental influences. The epigenetic inheritance systems belong to three
supragenetic inheritance systems that Japlonka and Lamb distinguish. These
authors stress that “through the supragenetic inheritance systems, complex organisms
can pass on some acquired characteristics. So Lamarckian evolution is certainly
possible for them” (Japlonka and Lamb 2005, 107).5
Given recent work in this field it is likely that stress,6
education,7 drugs, medicine, or diet can bring about epigenetic
alterations that, again, can be responsible for an alteration of cell
structures (Japlonka and Lamb 2005, 121) and for the activation or silencing of
genes (2005, 117).8 In some cases, the possibility cannot be
excluded that such alterations might lead to an enhanced version of evolution.
Japlonka and Lamb stress the following:
The point
is that epigenetic variants exist, and are known to show typical Mendelian
patterns of inheritance. They therefore need to be studied. If there is
heredity in the epigenetic dimension, then there is evolution, too. (2005, 359)
They also point out that “the transfer of epigenetic information from
one generation to the next has been found, and that in theory it can lead to
evolutionary change” (Japlonka and Lamb 2005, 153). Their reason for holding
this position is partly that “new epigenetic marks might be induced in both
somatic and germ-line cells” (2005, 145).
A “mother’s diet” can also bring about such alterations, according to
Japlonka and Lamb (2005, 144); hence the same potential as the interventions
previously discussed (genetic enhancement and education) logically applies to the
next method of bringing about a posthuman: i.e. non-genetic enhancement by
means of drugs, medicine or diets. As has become clear already, such measures
can lead to an enhanced version of evolution, given recent research in the
field of epigenetics. Given these insights, it is clear that educational and
genetic enhancements are processes that do not exist independently of one
another. If one process is necessary, this also applies to the other.
3. Conclusion
Given the above
analysis, I conclude that Habermas is wrong when he denies that educational and
genetic enhancements are parallel events. In addition, I have mentioned some
reasons why educational enhancement in most cases is better than undergoing a Kaspar
Hauser type of development (I deal with this issue in more depth in other
articles, e.g. Sorgner 2013a). We can also conclude that genetic enhancement
ought to be affirmed – analogously to our affirmation of educational
enhancement – with no need to settle distinguishable questions, such as the moral
status of the embryo or which conception of the good to employ when making
decisions about education and enhancement.
In order to reach
a clearer understanding of which types
of genetic enhancement should (and should not) be undertaken, we would need to
consider the moral status of the embryo and which conceptions of the good ought
to apply on a political level. I have addressed both questions elsewhere (Sorgner
2013c; forthcoming). For current purposes, I stress that negative freedom is a
precious achievement. During and since the Enlightenment, we freed ourselves
from the paternalistic oppression of religious and aristocratic leaders.
Thereby, we established the right to live according to our respective conceptions
of the good, as long as this does not interfere with the rights of someone
else. Consequently, I suggest that In
dubio pro libertate is an adequate principle for a democracy. If there is a
conflict between several groups beyond a certain significant size, then the
opinion ought to be legalized in favor of more freedom. Hence, the state should
refrain from making demands based upon metaphysical and religious prejudices.
If we apply this
norm to questions concerning the status of the embryo, it follows that this is unclear
metaphysically. On this occasion, I cannot provide an in-depth discussion of
the moral status of the embryo, but I will make a few brief comments. There is
a group that identifies embryos with adult human beings. However, there are
other large groups that regard an embryo as a collection of cells that ought to
be given special consideration because of their implicit potential, but not the
same rights as a human being. A liberal state would have to allow both groups
to live in accordance with their principles, as long as they do not interfere
with the rights of others. Here we can identify another parallel between
genetic and educational enhancement: In both cases, parents make decisions
about the lives of other human beings that do not yet have all human rights.
If it is accepted that
genetic enhancement by modification and education are structurally analogous
processes, this insight needs to be considered when thinking about the future
of parental education under the altered cultural conditions of recent decades. Emerging
technologies, human-machine interfaces, and new scientific insights are
changing our way of grasping the world. Transformative sciences and
technologies seem to dominate the way the world works, and to carry out whatever
projects are feasible. The humanities seem to be out of place amidst rapid scientific
and technological developments, and consequently their relevance seems to
diminish.
We are living in an age of bioengineering and emerging
technologies. However, the most fundamental and urgent questions concerning
ethical, ontological, legal, political, social, and cultural issues cannot be
addressed appropriately solely by means of the natural sciences and
engineering, as this task lies outside the scope of their expertise. To approach
all the latest questions in a thoughtful and comprehensive way, we need informed
intellectual reflections, insights concerning our place in cultural history,
and an awareness of the great plurality of philosophical, ethical, and
religious positions that have been dominant in human history. At the same
time, it is an open question whether specialists, experts, and scholars from
the humanities in its traditional form possess all the necessary skills. I
doubt that they do, and I also doubt that they start from appropriate premises,
because they assume that solely human beings are categorically ontologically
separate from all other natural beings.
The concept of “humanities” in its traditional sense
is connected to the term humanitas and to the artes liberals. Both
concepts are closely related to ancient times about 100 BCE: to Varro, Cicero,
and others. Since then, these concepts have been connected to the affirmation
of categorical dualities. Thanks to Kant’s account of issues relevant for the
humanities, categorical dualities are still associated with the central
concepts in question: for example, mind/matter, culture/nature, genes/environment.
Yet, it is this aspect of the humanities that has been challenged by the latest
scientific insights and discoveries, and by technological developments.
Epigenetics, posthumanism, transhumanism, embodied theories of mind, and
further scientific research all cast doubt on the affirmation of categorical
dualities, and have inspired attempts to move beyond this way of
conceptualizing the world. This has severe consequences for many different
fields of inquiry, even for ethical, legal, and political issues: for example, questions
relating to autonomy and the supposed moral prohibition of treating a person
solely as a means. To consider all of these implications with due seriousness, we
will have to move away from the traditional humanities toward an approach that we
can helplessly refer to as “metahumanities.” This move has particularly
relevant implications for the question of education in an age of transformative
sciences and emerging technologies. I suggest that the following three insights
need to be considered as implications of founding education upon the emerging metahumanities,
whereby the initial two suggestions are relevant for parental education and the
final suggestion is one that needs to be considered in schools and
universities.
First, genetic enhancement by modification and
education are structurally analogous processes. In this paper, I have argued in
detail that this is the case. Second, gene analysis will become a prerequisite for
a well-informed education. A future publication of mine will explain and
clarify many aspects relevant concerning this insight. Bioprivacy, and big gene
data will be the keywords in this context, and I expect these keywords to lead
to intense future discussions, as well as enormous revisions in the field, of
the future of occupations and insurance companies as well as education. Third,
the categorical distinction between genetic and environmental influences will
dissolve, and the relationships between these influences will form an additional
school subject within the metahumanities. It will involve consideration of all
the following: bioarts; evolutionary epistemology, aesthetics, ethics,
economics, and so on; embodied theories of the mind; epigenetics; new types of
spirituality and mysticism; non-dualist accounts of rights and dignity; revised
concepts of the family; naturalistic conceptions of the good life; the
relevance of cultural history with respect to norms, values, etc.; and
difficult questions relating to non-anthropocentric ontologies and the
avoidance of speciesism.
In this article, I have provided a number of detailed
reasons for suggestion number 1. The parallel between genetic enhancement by
modification and education is one insight that must be considered when
discussing the future of education. In other words: We can expect that genetic
enhancement by modification will be a central issue for the future of parental
education.
Notes
1. If genetic
alterations were irreversible, were made in the interest of children, and were actually
in the best interest of the child in most cases, then it could be seen as good
that they are irreversible. However, this is not a line of thought that I will
consider here.
2. Sections 2.1, 2.2. and 2.7 contain further developed
passages from an earlier article of mine (Sorgner 2010a, 4–6).
3. Helpful complementary arguments concerning this issue can be found in
chapter 4 of Blackford’s monograph Humanity
Enhanced (Blackford 2014, chap. 4).
4. The following argument rests on a revised and expanded
version of Sorgner (2013b).
5. “Heritable variation – genetic, epigenetic,
behavioural, and symbolic – is the consequence both of accidents and of
instructive processes during the development” (Japlonka and Lamb 2005, 356). A
striking case is that of the evolution of language: “Dor and Japlonka see the
evolution of language as the outcome of the continuous interactions between the
cultural and the genetic inheritance system” (Japlonka and Lamb 2005, 307).
6. “Waddington’s experiments showed that when variation
is revealed by an environmental stress, selection for an induced phenotype
leads first to that phenotype being induced more frequently, and then to its
production in the absence of the inducing agent” (Japlonka and Lamb 2005, 273).
7. Jonathan M. Levenson and J. David Sweatt show that
epigenetic mechanisms probably have an important role in synaptic plasticity
and memory formation (2005, 108–118).
8. “Belyaev’s work with silver foxes suggested that there
is a hidden genetic variation in natural populations. This variation was
revealed during selection for tameness, possibly because stress-induced
hormonal changes awakened dormant genes” (Japlonka and Lamb 2005, 272).
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