|
A
peer-reviewed electronic journal published by the Institute for Ethics and ISSN
1541-0099 26(1)
– February 2016 |
The Stoic Sage 3.0
– A Realistic Goal of Moral
(Bio)Enhancement Supporters?
Stefan Lorenz Sorgner
John Cabot University, Rome
Journal of Evolution and
Technology - Vol. 26 Issue 1 – February
2016 - pgs 83-93
Abstract
I propose to show that any direct moral bioenhancement
procedures that could be realized within a relatively short period of time are
not realistic options. This does not have to worry us, however, because
alternative options for promoting morality are available. Consequently, moral
bioenhancement is not an option for dealing successfully with the increased
potential destructiveness of contemporary technologies within a
short-term framework, i.e. within this century. In what follows, I will explain
why this is the case, and why, contrary to Ingmar Persson and Julian
Savulescu, I think this need not worry us too much. In section 1., I will
critically analyze moral bioenhancement by means of citalopram, aimed at
reducing the tendency to harm others directly. I give this prominence because
it could be a practical option for altering human emotions and dispositions –
to my
mind, it seems the most promising practical option in this field. In
later sections, I will consider other means of realizing moral bioenhancement, since
the first option does not do the job it is supposed to, and because Persson and
Savulescu are concerned with alternative approaches.
Introduction
Let me begin by
affirming that I am no enemy of enhancement procedures in general. I regard
genetic enhancement, morphological enhancement, cyborg enhancement, and
pharmacological enhancement as extremely promising fields of enquiry, insofar
as they may promote intelligence, memory, the health span, or beauty – characteristics
that often contribute to a good life (Sorgner 2010, 85–100). These
enhancement technologies can also be seen as promising ways to enhance morality
indirectly. However, the issue is different with direct moral bioenhancement
(Douglas 2011), particularly when it is supposed to solve the increased
potential destructiveness of contemporary bio- and other technologies.
In their recent
collaborative work, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu suggest the need for
moral bioenhancement, claiming that increasing technological possibilities will
promote the likelihood of humanityÕs destruction, since there might be madmen
who will use advanced technology for this purpose (e.g. Persson and Savulescu
2012, 46–59). Their main foci are not methods of indirect moral
enhancement, such as education and promoting cognitive capacities. They affirm
the use of these technologies, too, but do not seem to regard them as
effective. In a paper from 2013, they claim, Òthe degree of moral improvement
since the time of Confucius, Buddha and Socrates has beenÉ small in comparison
to the degree of technological progress, despite moral education,Ó which seems
to imply the ineffectiveness of traditional ways of promoting morality (Persson
and Savulescu 2013, 130). Consequently, they are interested in finding more
effective means of promoting morality, and they focus on direct moral
bioenhancement. In an earlier paper they even argue in favor of moral
bioenhancement that would be ÒobligatoryÓ – by analogy to Òeducation or
fluoride in the water.Ó As they express it, Òsafe, effective moral enhancement
would be compulsoryÓ (Persson and Savulescu 2008, 174).
I am more
hesitant about moral bioenhancement, because I regard it as, for practical
purposes, a highly problematic technology. In any case, I do not
regard it as an option for dealing successfully with the increased potential
destructiveness of contemporary technologies within a
short-term framework, i.e. within this century. In what follows, I will explain
why this is the case, and why, contrary to Persson and Savulescu, I think this need
not worry us too much. In section 1., I will critically analyze moral
bioenhancement by means of citalopram, aimed at reducing the tendency to harm
others directly. I give this prominence because it could be a practical option for
altering human emotions and dispositions (Crockett et al. 2010a, 2010b) –
to my
mind, it seems the most promising practical option in this field.1 In
later sections, I will consider other means of realizing moral bioenhancement, since
the first option does not do the job it is supposed to, and because Persson and
Savulescu are concerned with alternative approaches.
I propose to show
that any direct moral bioenhancement procedures that could be realized within a
relatively short period of time are not realistic options. This does not have
to worry us, however, because alternative options for promoting morality are
available.
1. Moral bioenhancement by means of citalopram
In what follows,
I treat moral bioenhancement as related to the reduction of direct harm done to
individuals, as this seems to me the most promising approach to altering human
emotional tendencies, especially in light of Molly CrockettÕs research on serotonin
(Crockett et al. 2010a) and the heated debate it inspired. Crockett gave citalopram
to research subjects, altering their level of discharge of serotonin. Then she
and her colleagues checked how the level of serotonin affected their reaction
to the Òfat manÓ version of the notorious Trolley Problem (see, e.g., Thomson
1976, 204−217) and the Ultimatum Game (see GŸth,
Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982). According to Crockett and her team, the results show
that the higher the level of discharge of serotonin, the lower the inclination
of the test takers to inflict harm directly on other individuals. Even though
the effect described is a mild one, it has promoted considerable discussion
around the possibility and desirability of moral bioenhancement. If it is seen
as morally wrong to inflict direct harm on individuals, then a lower
inclination to do so can be interpreted as a moral enhancement. If
technological intervention to that end works in principle, then the likelihood
is high that further research will lead to more efficient methods.
Doubts have been
raised concerning CrockettÕs interpretation, for instance those of Harris and
Chan (2010). They have criticized Crockett for identifying as a moral
enhancement a reduced inclination to sacrifice a fat man to save five other
human beings who would otherwise be killed by a runaway trolley. As Harris and
Chan make clear, from a utilitarian standpoint this does not count as a moral
improvement. They also point out that if Jasper Schuringa had possessed a
higher level of discharge of serotonin, he probably would not have stopped Umar
Abdul Mutallab, the so-called Underwear Bomber, from setting off a bomb on
December 26, 2009. Schuringa would have had a reduced inclination to harm an
individual, thus inhibiting him from acting against the bomber. But stopping
the bomber was clearly the morally justifiable course.
In the following sub-sections,
I will deal with two options for implementing this type of moral
bioenhancement: legal obligation and personal free choice. Each of these options
has problematic implications.
1.1
Moral (bio)enhancement as legal obligation
One way to argue in
favor of moral bioenhancement as a legal obligation is by analogy with
vaccinations. Even though this analogy works in many respects, it fails with
respect to a central premise. Health is a state that is in the interest of most
human beings. This does not apply to a reluctance to directly harm an
individual human being, the sort of bioenhancement that we are considering at
this point. Indeed, under some circumstances harming an individual could be a
morally justifiable act, maybe even a politically necessary one. To guarantee
the stateÕs inner and outer security, a police force and an army are needed;
within certain limits, these have the right and the need to use force against
individuals. The same applies to other people who find themselves in situations
where force is needed; the case of Jasper Schuringa and the Underwear Bomber is
only one extreme example.
There are also many
everyday examples, such as the need to use force against violent youth who act
aggressively against the elderly or the vulnerable. Such examples show why it
cannot be in the interest of a country to render moral bioenhancement
technologies legally compulsory, because this might, in the end, endanger the
very existence of the state. For example, non-morally-enhanced citizens from
other countries might visit State Y, where it is compulsory for citizens to
become morally bioenhanced. There could, accordingly, be outsiders who endanger
the internal order of State Y by violent acts, fraud, robbery, or other crimes.
State Y could also risk being invaded by rival countries whose soldiers are not
morally bioenhanced. Again, morally bioenhanced soldiers with a heightened
tendency not to harm other individuals directly will not be able to fulfill
their duties adequately, thus possibly endangering the stateÕs existence. Due
to the risks to inner and outer security associated with moral bioenhancement
technologies, living within a legal jurisdiction where these technologies are legally
compulsory is not in the interest of most human beings. Leading a good life
usually requires a safe environment; a state in which inner and outer security are
at risk does not provide such an environment.
1.2
Moral (bio)enhancement as free choice
Would voluntary
moral bioenhancement be of interest to individual consumers? The easiest case
would be one where somebody simply wishes to reduce her tendency to harm others
directly. However, I doubt that this would apply straightforwardly to all, or
even many, people, since acts of harming are so widespread and can be important
means to protect a variety of human interests. One interest individuals could
have in being morally bioenhanced would be to avoid sanctions for immoral and
illegal behavior. This case is well represented by a repeat criminal offender:
for example, a serial rapist who is offered freedom if he is willing to undergo
a form of moral bioenhancement such as chemical castration. The motivation of
the offender to choose moral bioenhancement is to avoid the sanction of imprisonment.
Even so, the procedure is not necessarily in his interest,2 since sexual
intimacy is central to his well-being and he is thus sacrificing a part of his
well-being to avoid being imprisoned. It is even possible to imagine violent
offenders who connect acts of brutality with their personal conceptions of a
good life. This is in no way a defense of their anti-social behavior, but it
vividly illustrates that there can be, and usually is, a gap between the moral
life, judged from outside, and someoneÕs idiosyncratic conception of a good
life. While acknowledging the validity of this insight, we can, of course, also
affirm that living in a society means that one has to limit oneÕs possibilities
for living as one chooses.
Alternatively,
what about the case of a religious believer, Z, who is threatened with eternal
torture if she acts immorally? Z holds that, by conforming to her faithÕs moral
requirements, she can increase the likelihood of having a blessed afterlife. In
her current life, however, when she feels she is being unfairly treated she
lashes out with attacks that are (let us stipulate) legally and morally
forbidden. Accordingly, she decides to reduce the risk of being sanctioned by
the criminal justice system, and especially in the afterlife, by undergoing
moral bioenhancement. On the one hand, her aggressiveness is a positive for her
because it proves she is strong and, therefore, it is connected to her feeling
of well-being.3 At the same time, her aggressive acts are forbidden.
Her ideal of a good life – one involving mastery and strength – is essentially
connected with her aggressive inclinations. This ideal is curbed by living in a
society and by her religious understanding that she will be tortured in the
afterlife for aggressive behavior.
It seems clear
that some people might decide to undergo moral enhancement to avoid punishments.
In ZÕs case, her behavior can lead to being punished in both this and (at least
according to her religionÕs teachings) the next life. By conforming to moral requirements,
she can reduce the likelihood (as she understands it) of both secular and eternal
punishment. If there were no political, moral, or religious sanctions, people
like Z would not be interested in moral bioenhancement, because their morally questionable
acts are also ones that provide them with intense feelings of fulfillment.
But could the type
of moral bioenhancement under discussion be of interest to individuals who are
not afraid of being sanctioned: people who operate within the law, but who are
not interested in morality because they regard anything legal as also morally
legitimate? One example could be a sadomasochist couple. Their neighbors might fear
them, whether rationally or not, but the couple find S&M fulfilling.
Moral enhancement
aimed at inhibiting impulses to inflict direct harm would (most probably) not
be an option for them: given their proclivities, it would clearly decrease
their capacity for living a good life. Bioenhancement might become an option,
however, if the drugs in question were effective only against causing harm in a
more discerning sense – that is, if the operation of the enhancement drug
distinguished situations where inflicted pain is not necessarily seen as a harm. Citalopram is probably not a drug
that could be used for such a purpose, as it does not seem to be capable of such
a sophisticated distinction. Will we be able to develop a drug that stops
people from harming others – understood in a suitably discerning way
– but does not stop them, in all cases, from inflicting pain? Remember,
too, that in some cases it might be morally justified, or even obligatory, to harm
others, as in the case of stopping a terrorist bomber (or, arguably, in war).
Would not a drug be needed that is capable of distinguishing between morally
justified and morally forbidden acts of harming other people?
Is it necessary
to refer to such extreme cases to claim that this type of moral bioenhancement
is not in the interest of most people, and hence would not be chosen freely by
them? I doubt it. I think that it is important to realize that for most of us there may be a gap between
our conception of a good life and any moral demand that we reduce our tendency
of directly doing harm to other individuals. The following three short examples
exemplify how important directly doing harm to others can be in our everyday
lives. First: suppose that, as you are trying to board a bus, some rude young
men attempt to push past you even though they were behind you in line. Here a
certain verbal force directed at them is appropriate. If they succeed and you
miss your bus, it will be very upsetting – so you resist their action.
This is a very simple example to support my basic view that morality (in the
sense of inhibition of aggressive or directly harmful conduct) often is in the
interest of the immoral: for example, the rude young men succeed in getting
into the bus by pushing past you, while you are left having to take the next
one.
Another example:
if there were an increased tendency to avoid directly harming any living thing,
some valuable practices, and their associated professions, might vanish. If moral
bioenhancement promoted a reluctance to kill fish for food, for instance, this
might eliminate the profession of fishermen and be contrary to what many fish eaters
regard as a contribution to their leading a good life. Or imagine a social
event where you see an attractive person whom you wish to meet – but your
more assertive and talkative friend manages to push you aside and monopolize
the conversation. It is his aggression toward you that leaves you alone and
disappointed.
All three
everyday examples reveal the tension between leading a less aggressive life and
the importance of direct aggression toward other living beings, something that
often helps you to maintain your own idea of a good life. I am not assuming a
strong and detailed conception of the good by making this judgment. I am merely
showing that a certain standing – a position of power and leadership
– is a relevant component in most conceptions of the good life. Moral
bioenhancement of the sort under discussion – a reduction of the
inclination to do direct harm – is therefore problematic. After
reflection on everyday examples of human social intercourse, it becomes clear
that there will be a clash between this understanding of morality and many, if
not most, conceptions of a good life.
Of course,
undergoing this type of moral bioenhancement might result in someoneÕs conception
of a good life itself becoming altered. That granted, it might also turn out that
oneÕs conception of a good life remains the same – even while the
prospect of living such a life recedes. If that experience were commonplace, as
I suspect it would be, the bioenhancement procedure would decrease the likelihood
that many people would reach the goals essential for their conceptions of a
good life. As I am assuming that a good life is immediately connected to
someoneÕs physiopsychology, and that this differs radically among different
human beings, any Òthick,Ó non-formal, account of the good is bound to be
implausible. One aspect relevant for many people, however, is their will to
live, to develop their capacities, and attain some standing in their communities.
Since these elements are components of the good life, as conceived of by many
persons, it is highly likely that there is a tension between a morality of not directly
harming and many of the conceptions of a good life that are specific to
individuals.
2.
Further moral bioenhancement options
Persson and Savulescu
do not employ not-harming other persons as their sole criterion of morality.
They also analyze the relevance of enhancing pro-social behavior more generally, enhancing a sense of justice, and
reducing cognitive biases toward near-future outcomes (e.g. 2012, 105–110). If we adopt their approach, a better
practical example than citalopram might be oxytocin, which can be used to
promote pro-social behavior. As with citalopram, however, we can easily identify
examples where the drug does not promote morality: examples that illustrate how
pro-social behavior cannot be identified with morally good or justifiable behavior.
Perhaps, for example, followers of Pol Pot represented pro-social behavior of a kind, but it would be implausible to refer
to it as, in any sense, behavior that was morally
good or justified. The same argument could be made by reference to members
of many criminal organizations or totalitarian regimes who act pro-socially toward
members of their own group – since these are the ones near and dear to them
– but whose actions are nonetheless morally deplorable or even monstrous.
In a different
respect, oxytocin is nonetheless superior to citalopram: even though pro-social behavior can be an obstacle to leading a
good life, this is less likely than in the case of not harming another person.
Pro-social behaviour, belonging to a community, and having close intensive
human ties are elements that are identified with a good life by a great
percentage of human beings. Recent psychological studies support the
plausibility of connecting pro-social behaviour and happiness (e.g. Aknin et al. 2015).
Still, it needs
to be noted that oxytocin has only a temporary, reversible effect upon human
beings. Someone could take it in order to deal with a special situation: for
example, a woman who is not able to love her child after she gave birth to it. Taking
oxytocin is not, however, a realistic option for dealing with the grand
historic goal that Persson and Savulescu have in mind – reducing the risk of the global
destruction of humanity. Criminals are not usually willing to take oxytocin
when they feel the wish to kill someone. Hence, a more reliable technology would
be needed. Still, it is an open question whether technologies with long-term, reversible effects (e.g. by means of
specific drugs) or technologies with permanent, irreversible effects (e.g. by
means of genetic modification) would be the better option. To get a better
understanding of the implications, maybe we need to imagine possible outcomes that
could count as successful direct moral bioenhancement.
If it were
possible to genetically engineer some moral virtues, a different, more open
attitude toward direct moral bioenhancement might be plausible. Let us say that
scientists find out that there is a necessary correlation between a specific
gene and the virtue of justice. Everyone with Gene X would embody the virtue of
justice, would regard freedom, equality and solidarity as norms, would act upon
them, would watch out when they are being attacked (and respond in an
appropriate manner), and would try to convince others to act accordingly. Given
such a situation, it might be possible to say that a Stoic Sage 3.0 had come
into existence. If she were created in this manner, through a form of genetic
editing, then I would – I think – be among the first to consider options
for promoting the presence of Gene X. In this case, several practical options might
be available: wider use of genetic modification technologies such as
CRISPR-Cas9 or using gene selection after IVF and PGD. Given that the methods
for promoting Gene X were sufficiently reliable, it might even be worth
discussing whether it could and should be legally compulsory for everyone living
within the boundaries of State Y to have Gene X. In those circumstances, it would
be important to consider the suggestions made by Persson and Savulescu (2008) when
they
argue in favor of obligatory moral bioenhancement (Òsafe, effective moral
enhancement would be compulsoryÓ). In such a situation, I can imagine good
arguments in favor of a structural analogy between compulsory education and
obligatory moral bioenhancements by means of genetic interventions.
The
problem with this example is that contemporary scientific research is far away
from detecting any Gene X with which the virtue of justice is identified. It is
not clear whether, in principle, such a gene can even be conceptualized. Even
if such a gene could be identified, and detected in particular cases, practically
realizing it would be a further biotechnological challenge. As IÕve mentioned, gene
selection after IVF and PGD could be an option, but it might not be possible to
find Gene X in all sets of fertilized eggs. We are, of course, even further
away from realizing Gene X in a reliable manner by means of genetic
modification.
If we had a
biotechnological way of promoting the virtue of justice, then I would value this
moral bioenhancement procedure in the same way as I do moral education. I must
also stress that I am not excluding the possibility that direct moral
bioenhancement can eventually be made to work. Still, I do not currently see any
way of realizing it within a short-term timeframe, and so I am extremely
hesitant about the practical relevance of much of the recent academic discussion
of moral bioenhancement (to which, admittedly, I am adding with this paper).
Recall that moral enhancement is supposed to relate especially to reducing the risk
of a technological destruction of humanity. To reduce that risk, however,
enhancement of the virtue of justice would have to be enforced globally. This,
in turn, would require a very far-reaching and powerful enforcement mechanism;
the very idea of global enforcement seems to presuppose a
world state, a global government, and moral norms that are globally shared. It
is highly questionable whether the presence of such a global authority would,
indeed, promote human flourishing, but I will not address that topic here.
So far, it seems
clear that the most practical technologies – such as the use of citalopram
– cannot fulfil the grand historic task assigned to direct
biotechnological enhancement by thinkers such as Persson and Savulescu. Versions
of direct moral bioenhancement that could plausibly do so can scarcely even be conceptualized,
and they are technologically so challenging that they will not represent a
realistic option within any short-term framework.
3. The
relationship between cognitive and moral development
Given the general
validity of the above analysis, along with the insight that direct moral
bioenhancement is not one of tomorrowÕs hottest and most realistic
technologies, must we infer that we are doomed – and that, given the
developmental speed of powerful technologies, criminals or fanatics will soon
be able to use them to destroy humanity? I do not think so, as I am in
agreement with HarrisÕs (2011) position that a betterment of our cognitive
capacities also promotes morally good conduct. In order to increase the
likelihood of a morally better way of dealing with the various challenges
related to the application of emerging technologies, it seems plausible to expand
cognitive capacities directly, instead of using moral bioenhancement, and I
will now offer some arguments to this effect.
Earlier, I
mentioned that Persson and Savulescu (2013) hold that there has been only small
moral progress since Confucius, Buddha, and Socrates – at least when
compared to the rate of human technological progress. I disagree with their judgment.
On the contrary, it is feasible that, at least on a social level, cognitive and
moral advancement have taken place in parallel with each other and with
advances in technology.
Morality, as I understand
it,
is related to the recognition of norms such as negative freedom and human equality
(Sorgner 2010, 239–44) – norms that developed during the
Enlightenment; accordingly, when I consider the relationship
between cognitive capacities and morally good or right conduct, it is these
norms that I have in mind. How is it possible to think that these norms were in
practice, and respected, in past ages without having been articulated consciously?
If we held that there has been hardly any moral progress in this sense, imitating
the approach of Persson and Savulescu,4 we would have to assume that
something like this was the case.5
Though I relate
the notion ÒmoralityÓ to norms such as freedom and equality, this understanding
of the concept deserves further attention. Clearly enough, morality is a
multi-faceted notion that can be related to the concept of the right as well as
to the values and norms in use during a certain cultural epoch. Furthermore,
the notions of a good life, moral rightness, and their relation to the concept
of morality might require further clarification. By directly identifying
morality with norms such as freedom and equality, I implicitly signal that this
is the notion of morality which I subscribe to, and that I am using a particular
notion of morality that is widely accepted within the German philosophical
tradition. My use of the concept does not imply that there was no conception of
morality or morally justifiable conduct before the Enlightenment. It does,
however, imply that I am employing a contemporary understanding of morality as
a criterion for judging whether, and (if so) how far, an arc of moral development
has taken place.
Historical
studies present us with reasons why the Persson/Savulescu thesis is highly
implausible, since history makes it clear that neither the norm of negative
freedom nor that of equality between all persons played any role in Ancient
Greek and Roman societies – or in the various kingdoms of Medieval Christendom
(Eissa and Sorgner 2011). In classical antiquity, political systems were
strongly hierarchical. People could take it for granted that there was such a
thing as a ÒnaturalÓ slave; even the greatest ethical thinkers of ancient times,
such as Aristotle (Pol. 1 4,
1254a13-17), agreed with this assumption. Much the same applies to the Holy Roman
Empire during the Middle Ages. How can one even imagine that the moral and political
norm of negative freedom played any role in communities before the
Enlightenment? Citizens were forced to follow the religious, metaphysical, and
moral beliefs of their religious and political rulers; Socrates was, after all,
sentenced to death because of supposed disrespect to the gods.
Prior to the Enlightenment,
political and religious authoritarianism and repression were common. Since the
advent of the Enlightenment in Europe in the late seventeenth century, thinkers,
scientists, writers, soldiers, and ordinary citizens have sustained a struggle for
the right to live according to their own conceptions of a good life. It is
primarily this wish – the
commonplace, yet radical, wish to live a good life according to oneÕs
own criteria – that explains the central Enlightenment developments. The French
Revolution, the increasing relevance of the natural sciences, and the
development of new technologies by engineers relate closely to the fight
against the dominance of Christian religious and aristocratic political leaders
– the dramatic and ongoing struggle that made it possible to move away
from totalitarian systems toward modern liberal democratic political structures.
On an intellectual level, philosophers from Descartes through Locke and Kant
supported this development, as did artists and writers such as Leonardo da
Vinci and the Marquis de Sade (Sorgner 2010, 239–42).
Besides the
genealogical reflections mentioned here, there is empirical evidence in favor
of genuine social progress since the European Enlightenment. The psychologist Steven
Pinker, especially in his recent monograph The
Better Angels of Our Nature, has brought together empirical evidence showing
that we Òorient [us] away from violence and toward cooperation
and altruismÓ – and that such a process has unfolded over millennia (Pinker 2011, xxv).
A reduction of violence against individuals implies a strengthening of
respect for individual integrity. Various examples that Pinker discusses strongly
indicate that significant moral progress has occurred. Pinker also stresses the
relevance of empathy and reason among our ÒBetter AngelsÓ (2011, xxv) and the importance, in this context, of
Òthe concept of human rights – civil rights, womenÕs rights, childrenÕs
rights, gay rights, and animal rightsÓ (2011,
xxiv–xxv). Yet, when trying to explain the phenomena in question,
he refers to a great variety of reasons, trends, and processes. Even though his
reflections do not provide us with a final explanation of the processes that he
identifies, his empirical data support the thesis that moral progress has taken
place. If one grants that there has been significant moral
progress from the Middle Ages to our time, affecting many citizens of
enlightened and some non-enlightened countries, it might be related to the
advancement of our cognitive capacities.
I regard it as
highly credible that such advancement has occurred. There has been incredible
progress in technologies, the sciences, and mathematics during the previous
millennia, associated with a need to develop further and to gain more specific
and more detailed cognitive capacities for dealing with this advancement
physiologically. Furthermore, there is also some empirical evidence for a
cognitive advancement. One recent aspect of this development is referred to as the
Flynn effect, which implies that there has been an increase of intelligence in
industrial countries from 1930 onwards, given the results of standardized tests
that have been in use since then (Flynn 2012).
If a cognitive
advancement (as suggested by the Flynn effect) and moral progress (such as Pinker
describes) have both occurred, moral and cognitive advancements seem to be
correlated processes. Pinker refers to the Flynn effect as a potential reason
for moral progress (or at least a decline in violence) and mentions the
likelihood of a Òmoral Flynn effectÓ:
We can now put together the two big ideas
of this section: the pacifying effects of reason, and the Flynn Effect. We have
several grounds for supposing that enhanced powers of reason – specifically,
the ability to set aside immediate experience, detach oneself from a parochial
vantage point, and frame oneÕs ideas in abstract, universal terms – would
lead to better moral commitments, including an avoidance of violence. [...]
Could there be a moral Flynn Effect, in which an accelerating escalator of
reason carried us away from impulses that lead to violence?
The
idea is not crazy. The cognitive skill that is most enhanced in the Flynn
Effect, abstraction from the concrete particulars of immediate experience, is
precisely the skill that must be exercised to take the perspectives of others
and expand the circle of moral consideration. (Pinker 2011, 656)
Pinker
tries to explain the expansion in moral consideration of others by means of increased
prevalence of the cognitive skill of abstraction. It may, of course, be true
that this line of thought is a mere suggestion, rather than an empirically grounded
scientific explanation. For their part, Persson
and Savulescu (2012, 107) acknowledge and emphasize the relevance of the work
done by Pinker and Flynn, and there is an enormous amount of empirical
evidence for at least a correlation
between cognitive and moral advances. Although correlation does not equal
causation, analyzing historical developments suggests two relevant conclusions.
First, contemporary human beings seem to be cognitively advanced, displaying an
enormous capacity for grasping complex relationships, understanding many lines
of causation, and developing unprecedented forms of technology. Second, given
our current understanding of morality, there clearly has been moral progress.
Nowadays, freedom and equality are far more widely shared in the world than
ever before. Is there a causal relationship between the cognitive advancement
and the moral progress that we can discern in human history? Although I cannot
prove this, there seems to be at least a widespread correlation between them,
and there may be a causal connection.6
Further
scientific investigation is needed before we can claim with confidence that
cognitive development actually promotes moral development. But one reason why it
may be the case is that our capacity for imagining what it is like to be
someone else promotes the likelihood of recognizing Òthe otherÓ as someone
worthy of moral consideration. In all, there is some plausibility to the
position that further cognitive enhancement processes will lead to further
moral enhancement on a social level; and, contra Persson and Savulescu, cognitive
enhancement does not have to be feared.
Thus, emerging
technologies that further promote our cognitive capacities may also tend to
promote morality. It may be true that the risk of global human extinction
increases with emerging technologies, but the propagation of morality may also be
promoted through technology. In that case, we do not have to be doomed, even if
we are not in a position to enforce moral bioenhancement through global laws. In
short, emerging enhancement technologies can be seen as indirect tools for
promoting moral progress.7
Conclusion
We should conclude
that direct moral bioenhancement is not a technological option for the time
being. Perhaps, however, this is not so much a cause for concern as Persson and
Savulescu suggest, since indirect moral bioenhancement, via cognitive
enhancements, may work more effectively than they are willing to acknowledge.
In
this article, I have dealt with the question whether moral bioenhancement could
be an appropriate means to the central goal that Persson and Savulescu
regularly stress: that is, whether it is a plausible means to reduce the risk
of human extinction. As part of their analysis, Persson and Savulescu point out
that it is easier to harm than to do good, and that (given the developmental
speed of enhancement technologies) it will be even easier in the future for
madmen to bring about human extinction through the use of powerful emerging
technologies. Persson and Savulescu conclude that it is important to promote
the morality of human beings not solely through education, but also – and
in particular – by means of technologies that directly promote morality.
My response is as follows. We have reason to believe that promoting cognitive
capacities and rationality by means of emerging technologies is sufficient to
increase the likelihood of human beings acting morally on the social level. By
contrast, it is highly unlikely that moral bioenhancement will do the trick
within a sufficiently short time.
Given the
correlation between cognitive capacities and morality on a social level, there
are reasons to trust that cognitive enhancement techniques will reduce the risk
of human extinction. If we employ genetic enhancement, morphological
enhancement, cyborg enhancement, and pharmacological enhancement – all
aimed at promoting general intelligence, memory, and/or the capacity to
concentrate – we can produce significant moral progress, shaping a future
in which the human species does not have to be doomed. Contrary to the worst fears
of Persson and Savulescu, our species can continue to flourish and undergo moral
development. Emerging technologies aimed at cognitive enhancement are promising,
though admittedly indirect, means to enhance morality and the prospects of
human survival.
Notes
1.
To promote prosocial behavior by means of oxytocin might also be a promising
option, but it faces challenges similar to those faced by the version of moral
enhancement I am focusing on at this point. I will return to this. The
biotechnological promotion of respect for – and of acts in accordance
with – the norms of freedom and equality would be an extremely complex
goal. I do not expect it to become a relevant option soon.
2
In order to rid themselves of fear, guilt, and shame, many rapists would be
happy to eliminate their sexual and violent compulsions. There are, however, many
who would not freely choose this option.
3. I am not
implying that any act of religious self-control is an inauthentic crime against
our Òtrue nature.Ó No such conception of a unified human nature is hidden, or
implicit, in my analysis. I merely hold that it seems impossible to make a
non-formal statement concerning values that lead to a good life or eudaimonia,
because the physiopsychology of human beings differs so radically among the human
population that each individual has his or her own idiosyncratic and specific
needs, drives, and wishes for living a good life (see Sorgner 2013). This view is not
in conflict with the position that the norms of freedom and equality are legal
and moral achievements that human beings have historically fought for. These
norms are the result of struggles between various interest groups during and
since the Enlightenment. They are not metaphysically valid norms, yet they are
wonderful achievements that I wholeheartedly praise and for which I fight, and
I am happy that many people agree with me in this respect (see Sorgner
2010).
4. In fairness to them, their understanding of morality is obviously a wider
one than mine. It is, however, not relevant in the present context to deal with
that issue in any detail.
5.
It is interesting that Kant in his anthropology also talked about a historical
process, determined by various conflicts, that leads to human moral perfection.
His position is founded upon a strange, teleological understanding of historical
developments, but his observation that conflict can lead to moral improvement
is at least worth noting in this context. See Kant 2006, Part 2.
6. I stress a correlation between cognitive and moral advances on a
social level, since the rejection by Persson and Savulescu of any significant
moral progress in our cultural history is concerned with that level. The
relationship between the cognitive and moral states of an individual is not a
necessary one, i.e. it is not impossible that cognitively advanced human beings
are morally corrupt. My point relates to a probable social phenomenon: there is a high likelihood that a society with
cognitively advanced human beings will also be a society that is morally
advanced.
7. An additional
remark: In order to critically analyze the question whether there has been
Òmoral improvement since the time of Confucius, Buddha and Socrates,Ó it might
be necessary to consider some further, including more metaethical, issues. When
discussing morality, Savulescu and Persson refer to a great variety of
phenomena, e.g. non-harming, pro-social behavior, and altruism. Some of these
phenomena suggest that morality implies a certain sort of action, and thus an
act-centered understanding of morality (non-harming). At other points, they
seem to associate morality with a certain emotional tendency or type of
character (altruism), implying an agent-centered or even a virtue ethical
approach. I cannot go into more detail here concerning this highly important
issue.
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