|
A
peer-reviewed electronic journal published by the Institute for Ethics and ISSN
1541-0099 26(2)
– December 2016 |
Book
review: Stefan Lorenz Sorgner’s Transhumanismus:“Die gefährlichste Idee der Welt”!? (Freiburg, Basel, Wien:
Herder, 2016)
Thomas
Damberger
Department of Education, Goethe University Frankfurt/Main
Estella
Hebert
Department of Education, Goethe University Frankfurt/Main
Journal of
Evolution and Technology -
Vol. 26 Issue 2 – December 2016 - pgs 82-85
Stefan Lorenz Sorgner is
professor of philosophy at the John Cabot University in Rome and one of the
leading experts in the field of post- and transhumanism.
Sorgner’s new book Transhumanismus: “Die gefährlichste
Idee der Welt”!? (English:
Transhumanism: “The Most Dangerous Idea in the World”!?) serves as both an introduction
to the topic and an overview of the intentions and aims of transhumanism.
The book is divided into five parts. In his introductory
comments, the author starts by pointing out that transhumanism
brings a number of possible advantages. He makes clear that transhumanism,
despite those possible advantages is often faced with prejudices. Of these, one
of the most popular is that all transhumanists pursue
the prospect of immortality. Sorgner aims to counter
these prejudices by presenting a clear and informed analysis of the relevant body
of transhumanist philosophy (p. 13).
The
first part, entitled “Ist der Transhumanismus die gefährlichste Idee
der Welt?” (English: “Is transhumanism the most dangerous idea in the
world?”), deals with the ambiguous differentiation
between transhumanism and posthumanism.
Here Sorgner refers to Fereidoun M. Esfandiary (FM-2030)
who according to Sorgner accredits superhuman abilities
to the transhuman, while still defining the transhuman as being part of the human species, whereas the posthuman for him would be defined as a being that is located
beyond the human. By contrast, Nick Bostrom supports
the viewpoint that the posthuman might indeed be
attributed with special abilities, but still belongs to the human species (p.
18).
Sorgner analyzes a distinct difference between transhumanism and posthumanism in
relation to the respective philosophical traditions. He argues that transhumanism originates in the naturalistic and utilitarian
reasoning of the English-speaking discourse, whereas posthumanism
finds its origins in continental philosophy (p. 21). According to Sorgner, transhumanism is
multifaceted and diverse. Thus one can find social-democratic positions, prominently
represented by James Hughes, as well as more libertarian positions, including
the ideas of Max More. Irrespective of the various positions and influences, the
overall aim of transhumanism is to develop trans- and
posthuman possibilities further through the application
of new technologies. Because of this, transhumanism
is also essentially concerned with questions of human enhancement, understood
as a means to an end, which is something Sorgner takes
up in the next part of his book.
In the second part, entitled “Eine
Landkarte der Verbesserung”
(English: A geographical map of enhancement), Sorgner
presents an overview of the enhancement variations that are most discussed at
the moment. He not only mentions enhancement of emotions, physiological functioning,
and intellectual abilities, but also analyzes the option
of genetic enhancement, which has been very controversial, especially in the discussions
conducted in German (p. 41 ff.). Sorgner explains that,
whereas bioconservatives like Jürgen Habermas, Michael Sandel and
Francis Fukuyama reject the idea of genetic-technological enhancement, bioliberals, such as Julian Savulescu,
present a contrary opinion. Transhumanists explicitly
advocate genetic enhancement and regard it as a possible and desirable
instrument on the way to a posthuman future.
In the third part of the book, entitled “Stammbäume des Meta-, Post- und Transhumanismus”
(English: Genealogical trees of meta-, post- and transhumanism),
the author focuses on the task of clearly differentiating transhumanism
from posthumanism conceptually. This is necessary, as
the terms are often used incorrectly, especially in the academic discourse. At
the same time, Sorgner identifies the little known
position of metahumanism. Metahumanism
can be understood in two different ways. On the one hand, it can be located
beyond the dualism of body and soul. In this sense, metahumanism
has to be distinguished from humanism, as humanism, on Sorgner’s
account, is defined by a categorical ontological duality. On the other hand, Sorgner understands metahumanism
as a mediating authority located between transhumanism
and posthumanism (p. 83). Metahumanism
therefore aims at bridging the gap between transhumanist
and posthumanist thought.
The fourth part of the book is entitled “Nietzsche and
Transhumanism.” It is no secret that Nietzsche is
regarded as the forefather of transhumanism in parts
of the transhumanist movement, while being rejected
in other parts of the movement. Sorgner shows that for
Nietzsche the Übermensch
defines the raison d’être of being.
In other words: It would be the human’s task to advance to the Übermensch through
the process of self-improvement. In the eyes of Nietzsche, however, the Übermensch cannot
be made or created, but rather develops in the form of an evolutionary step.
This step can be facilitated, yet it cannot be forcedly made or taken. The Übermensch
becomes a possible option only when “higher humans” – humans with special
character traits – work on enhancing their capacities. According to Sorgner, this does not exclude the use of technology (p.
132ff.). Sorgner successfully uses Nietzsche’s ideas
for his own transhumanist position, as becomes
especially apparent in the last part of the book.
In the fifth and final part, entitled “12 Säulen transhumanistischer Diskurse” (English: 12 pillars of transhumanist
discourse), Sorgner defines which aspects constitute
weak transhumanism in his eyes, even though the term weak is to be understood as carrying no
adverse judgment. On the contrary, the term implies that weak transhumanism is not merely a transhumanist
position: it also refers to certain posthumanist
approaches, and so merges transhumanist and posthumanist positions. (This connection is what Sorgner understands as metahumanism.)
One essential pillar of transhumanist
discourse is the fact that transhumanists reject the
idea of the human species as something categorically exceptional. In contrast,
what makes the human species special can be located in its gradual differences from
other biological species: for example, human beings possess a higher form of
intelligence and the ability to act morally (p. 145ff.). Sorgner
argues that another essential pillar is constituted in the assumption that genetic
selection is a morally legitimate option. This is why he does not see a
fundamental – but rather a gradual – difference between selection of genes via
a free choice of partners or via preimplantation
genetic diagnosis (p. 152).
A third pillar defined by Sorgner
is also worth mentioning, as it takes genetic modification for reproduction as
a future variation of education. For Sorgner,
education constitutes not only a conventional, but also a legally grounded form
of enhancement. Advancing education through new technological possibilities, as
can be seen in the form of genetic engineering, thus seems to be a plausible
option (p. 154ff.). Aside from considerations of moral enhancement and the
plurality of the good, which would assume that deafness for example might
indeed be desirable, Sorgner postulates yet another
pillar of transhumanism, which promises the
overcoming of speciesism. This brings up the
interesting and challenging question of which moral principles and criteria should
be applied when dealing with human-animal hybrids, cyborgs, or digital uploads in
the form of whole-brain emulations.
Sorgner provides a detailed and distinct overview of what defines transhumanism and what is understood as transhumanism.
His knowledge of the international state of scientific research and of the continental
and utilitarian traditions of moral philosophy underline the fact that the book
is a very informative and fascinating read. At the same time, Sorgner does not hesitate to point out polemics brought
forward by famous thinkers and writers only to counter these with concise,
comprehensible and cogent arguments to make the transhumanist
position clear.
The way in which Sorgner
manages to illustrate his own position, which he defines as metahumanist,
and which includes both transhumanist and posthumanist aspects, is striking. It is especially
striking because in the German-speaking discourse such considerations, which
include genetic enhancement as a variation on education, are clearly rejected within
the current academic discourse. In the German context, therefore, it can be
regarded as extremely brave that Sorgner opens up
such a perspective on the topic, illustrating it vividly to his readers.
It would have been desirable if the author had given
slightly more consideration to the concept
of human enhancement (not only referring to examples of the phenomenon). For
example, one position in the extensive literature on this topic treats human
enhancement as referring to the enhancement of humans explicitly and merely through
new technologies. This position, however, does not agree with the concept,
clearly favored by Sorgner,
that education is a form of enhancement. Education might utilize specifically “educational”
techniques. At the same time, however, it always aims at using these techniques
to protect someone’s freedom and enhance their self-determination, rather than
seeking to limit or deny it. Therefore an enhancement of the human
which simply “adds” technological advancements to a human body, could
not be considered “educational.” The opposition that arises between these two
positions should not be overlooked.
Second, it would have been helpful if the author had discussed
the possibilities of human enhancement in relation to current hegemonic power
structures. Overcoming boundaries, even those in relation to the human self,
always takes place within the context of pre-existing structures. It is these
that facilitate the appearance of new technologies in the first place. And at
the same time, the pre-existing structures make it essential that technologies
for self-enhancement and overcoming the self are used and developed. Therefore,
the advancement of transhumanist and posthumanist ideas as well as their practical
implementations might be seen not only as a possibility but also, perhaps, as a
necessity, one that needs to be embraced and developed further in order to
ensure one’s own existence. It would have been worth exploring how this
imperative relates to existing power structures.
At this point, the book has been published only in
German. However, Sorgner’s ideas offer great
opportunities and benefit for his German-speaking readers, since the book
offers a chance to theorize transhumanism in a wider
public discourse very accurately defining what the concept of transhumanism is. This is supported not only by Sorgner’s argumentative precision but also by the fact that
his writing is easy to read without being simplistic, something that cannot be
taken for granted in the German-language discourse on transhumanism.