|
A peer-reviewed
electronic journal published by the Institute for Ethics and ISSN
1541-0099 17(1)
– March 2008 |
Anthropocentrism revisited. A
Review of Marc D. Hauser’s Wild Minds
Anoop Gupta, Faculty of Education, University of Windsor
Journal
of Evolution and Technology - Vol. 17 Issue 1 –
March 2008- pgs 73-74
http://jetpress.org/v17/gupta.html
Hauser (New York: Henry Holt, 2000) seeks to answer
the question of whether animals think. Though his attempt is noteworthy for
contributing to a reversal of our tradition of bias against non-human animals
(henceforth “animals”), he is reluctant to conclude that they are self-aware. I
shall argue that he is open to the charge of anthropocentricism, the idea that
we view, or assess, other things in terms of human characteristics;
specifically, he uses animals' lack of morality to conclude they are not
self-aware.
I shall first briefly describe Hauser’s view, focusing
on his conclusion regarding animal consciousness. Next, I take issue with his
claim that animals are not self-aware.
Hauser tells us that the only way to understand what
animals think is to see how they develop “mental tool kits” to solve problems
in their environments (p. xv). He utilizes pictures to illustrate his point
about how the mind deals with problems that are useful and memorable. Yet he
also sees a radical difference between human and animal problems: we have rules
for behavior and they do not. He claims that animals are moral patients
(objects of moral concern) but not moral agents (they do not make moral
choices).
We must consider Hauser’s argument that animals are
only moral patients, since this provides the basis for his thesis that they are
not self-aware. His reasons that animals are not moral agents are that they:
(a) do not have empathy, being not self-aware; (b) cannot inhibit themselves,
being incapable of conceptual change; (c) do not consider the beliefs and
desires of others; (d) do not understand how their actions impact others, which
requires being able to attribute mental states to others; (e) do not understand
duty and responsibility; and (f) do not understand norms of emotions and
actions in their societies – further, they
have no concept of right or wrong. He offers only a limited acknowledgement of
animal consciousness.
What is ironic is that Hauser began by attempting to
understand animals in terms of their own environments. The remarkable thing
about Hauser’s list, however, is that it measures animals against human
standards. Not only is his account anthropocentric; it is also highly
implausible for evolutionary reasons. If there has been one big message from
Darwin it is that we are part of nature.
As is well known, Darwin and others showed us that humans
are animals, differentiated only by species membership and not ontologically
different from others. We all sit on a consciousness continuum, though some
differences are qualitative. Since all organisms evolved to confront problems
in their environments, it would be at least reasonable to think that we all did
so in similar ways, and to different levels of sophistication.
In fact, we can take issue with Hauser’s list. Having
moral emotions is not the same as valuing them. Many animals have moral emotions.
Animals have a more limited ability to inhibit behavior, but the ability is not
totally lacking.
Further, although there is an issue of degree, it is
too uncharitable to think that when humans act they “intend,” but, when animals
do, it is merely “instinct.” To postpone one desire for another happens all the
time when animals protect their fellows. In fact, so-called instinctive
behavior includes those very moral emotions that underlie ethics.
Animals, many of them, do consider the interests of
others. They often understand how their actions affect others, too. We need not
have an understanding of duty or responsibility to be ethical. On the face of
it, Hauser makes it sound as if we must study Kant in order to be ethical. A
duty is a historical concept and, it suffices to say, not the only way to
motivate ethical behavior. Responsibility leads us back to the problem of free
will. We must consider responsibility in a context. Animals, many of them, are
social. They have norms – the proverbial
pecking order – and often they have to learn
them in the same way we did.
Reading Wild
Minds, we are left thinking, “Animal’s are second-rate humans.” But the
thesis cuts both ways. If we want to understand animals better we need, I
think, to free ourselves of the theological underpinnings that led us to
separate us from the rest of creation. Hauser attempts to explore the question
of animal thinking scientifically, but falls prey to anthropocentricism in a
specific way.
Anthropocentricism is as much about what qualities we
think we can ascribe to other (non-human) objects, as what we cannot. So-called
human characteristics may not be our province alone. Man is not the measure of
all things, but self-knowledge can provide clues about how to interpret the
behavior of other animals. Hauser’s observations, I have argued, do not
substantiate the claim that all animals are not self-aware.
Anthropocentrism is a political charge; animal consciousness is, in part, that sort of issue. It would be impossible, if we aim to be objective, to ignore how we use animals, and how our thinking about them, as not fully conscious, legitimates it. Based on Hauser’s own evidence – and in light of the tremendous suffering animals endure at our hands – he does not go far enough in recognizing animal consciousness. Unfortunately, animals may be far more conscious that we have been willing to admit.